

The Social Contract

Expression Graphics | April 2012

University of Western Ontario (London, Ontario)

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Preface

On behalf of the Department of Political Science, I would like to congratulate you on publishing this year's issue of *The Social Contract*. The editorial staff invested significant time and effort to produce a fine volume that includes some of the best essay submitted by undergraduate students over the past year.

This issue includes essays on a range of topics covering the main subfields of political science, but the questions they raise are relevant to the wider public as well.

In this issue of *The Social Contract*, some of our best students address wide ranging questions with insight and logical rigour. Politics is all around us, and the essays that follow will exemplify the claim that it can be studied systematically in a way that deepens our understanding. In this journal, readers will discover the value of reflecting on political institutions and actors that affect us all.

The Department of Political Science at UWO is proud of the excellent students who worked hard to produce this issue of the journal. We spend our working lives producing our own research, so we know that it takes dedication and perseverance to produce work of such high quality.

Please accept our thanks, our congratulations and our best wishes.

Charles Jones

Chair

Department of Political Science

University of Western Ontario

Letter from the Editor

Celebrating its seventh year at Western, *The Social Contract* continues to evolve and develop as a serious academic journal. It has grown to be a vital part of the Political Science department, and allows students an important opportunity to let their hard work be recognized.

Throughout the year, many students worked hard at assembling this journal; without their valuable input, this journal would not be a reality. Each and every member of this year's Editorial Staff and Board played a vital role in the creation of this journal, and from the bottom of my heart, I thank you. As well, I would like to recognize Marshall Lang, a UWO Alum and former staff member for *The Social Contract*. Marshall has been an indispensable resource this year; his hard work, dedication and overall good nature has helped to create this volume of *The Social Contract*. It is all truth when I say that without him, we would be lost. Once again, from the bottom of my heart, thank you. Not enough can be said about Professor Nigmendra Narain, whose hard work and guidance have been a necessity at all stages of the development of this journal. His special abilities, professionalism, dedication and personal concern for every student—involved in *The Social Contract* or not—is an inspiration to me and to the Editorial Board and Staff as well. Without Professor Narain, *The Social Contract* would be nothing.

This year, we received over 150 submissions for *The Social Contract*. Unfortunately, we cannot publish every paper submitted. If your paper was not chosen this year, please do not be discouraged; the caliber of papers submitted this year is the highest that I have seen in the 3 years I have worked on this journal. Every submitter should be proud of themselves. Cindy Ma and her staff next year will certainly have high standards to meet. However, I have faith in her exceptional abilities, and cannot wait to see *The Social Contract* grow in its eighth year. Until then, I hope that you enjoy the seventh edition of *The Social Contract*. The articles are all relevant to current events; in studying the past, we can learn for tomorrow. It is my hope that you find these articles engaging, stimulating and informative. I am confident that you will.

Regards,

Melissa George

Editor-in-Chief

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

POLITICAL THEORY

“Cosmopolitan and Global Justice”

By Emma Lecavalier

The contemporary world is stricken by stark poverty amongst individuals, and scarred by economic inequality between states. The tenacity of such inequality and the needlessness of such suffering has prompted countless inquiries into the topic of injustice. Yet, despite this shared sense of injustice, intellectual opinions have often been divided. Some argue that inequality should be approached from the individuals' standpoint. This position represents the stance of cosmopolitan theorists, for whom justice is owed to all persons simply *qua* persons. Indeed, this philosophical stance provides justification for moral and political obligations that give weight to the interests of all human beings, and impose significant constraints on statist self-preference.¹ Many, however, hold that states have primary moral significance, and that obligations to our fellow citizens take precedence over obligations to other human beings, a philosophical stance referred to as patriotism.² This view argues that cosmopolitanism ignores the historical existence of peoples into social and political communities and states. A more just world is one in which peoples and states are able to exercise greater self-determination in order to realize a more just society within their borders. For the patriot, then, the question is one of *national justice*, rather than *global justice*.

This doctrine stands opposed to the ideal enshrined in Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that, "*everyone* is entitled to the rights and freedoms

¹ Richard Vernon, *Cosmopolitan Regard: Political Membership and Global Justice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 1

² While a variety of terms have been used in this debate, I will refer to the terms used by Charles Jones in his book *Global Justice*. A discussion and justification for this term will be given in Section I. Charles Jones, *Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)

set forth" in its declaration.³ This paper will seek to evaluate both patriotic and cosmopolitan positions and will address the controversial question of the ethical significance of national boundaries in terms of duties to compatriots and others. Do we have obligations of justice that are special to our fellow citizens or that are more extensive than those that we owe to outsiders? Or are our moral obligations owed equally to both? Specifically, I will address this question with regard to socio-economic, or subsistence rights. To the extent that efforts to alleviate global poverty are underpinned by this philosophical disagreement over national/international obligations, this question is one of increasing salience. My analysis will conclude first, that the division between patriotic and cosmopolitan theories is in many ways a false dichotomy, and that patriotic loyalty can exist concurrently with cosmopolitan obligation. Second, it will also conclude that patriotic loyalty, when it remains the primary source of obligation, inhibits the full realization of universal human rights. To this end, cosmopolitan conceptions of justice are better suited to provide socio-economic human rights.

The Debate

Before evaluating the competing theories of obligation, it is necessary to first expand upon the question at hand: do states have obligations to non-citizens? This question is one that is particularly relevant to debates about human rights, for the universal human rights regime rests upon a notion of impartial obligation which insists that "persons should have the same obligations to everyone, and not favour their own."⁴ Indeed, human rights are generally

³ [Emphasis added] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a1>

⁴ Simon Caney, "Individuals, Nations, and Obligations," in *National Rights, International Obligations*, ed. Simon Caney, David George, and Peter Jones (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc, 1996): 119

recognized as *egra omnes*- transcending geopolitical borders and applying to *all* persons.⁵ Yet in many ways, geopolitical borders have remained barriers to the realization of universal human rights. Assertions of human rights generally assume that states are the main agents obliged to protecting and ensuring those rights, however some states lack the capacity to meet these obligations, a phenomenon which has increased in recent years with the emergence of collapsed or failed states.⁶ This is startling clear when one looks at the situation of global poverty. Article 25 of the UN Human Rights Declaration states that "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care."⁷ Yet, nearly half the world – over three billion people – live on less than \$2.50 a day⁸, and nearly 22,000 children under the age of five die daily due to abject poverty and preventable diseases.⁹

If states cannot provide for these destitute peoples, then whom- if anyone- is morally or legally obligated to fulfill their claims to basic human rights? The challenging ethical dilemma posed by this contemporary predicament leads us to ask 'To whom is justice owed?' Two different camps of theorists have confronted this question of international obligation and global justice. Some theorists argue that the needs of fellow citizens should be prioritized, while others theorists seek to expand the scope of the state's duties beyond its borders and to the international community as a whole. These positions represent patriotic and cosmopolitan conceptions of justice, respectively, and will be discussed below.

⁵ Anthony Carty, "International Law" in *Global Ethics*, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 281

⁶ Jones, *Global Justice*, 69-70

⁷ Universal Declaration of Human Rights

⁸ World Bank Development Indicators, 2008, <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL/countries/1W-XM?display=graph>

⁹ Levels and Trends in Child Mortality, http://www.childinfo.org/files/Child_Mortality_Report_2010.pdf

Patriotism

This definition of this position must be clarified further, for it is associated with multiple terms in political theory. Charles Beitz has called it the "Priority of Compatriots" challenge;¹⁰ Charles Jones has used the terms "compatriot favouritism" and "communitarianism,"¹¹ while Kok-Chor Tan and Simon Caney have used "patriotic concern,"¹² and "nationalism."¹³ Though often used interchangeably in theoretical literature, these terms have different and even competing definitions. Each in some way denotes a separation between those included and those excluded, between members and non-members, and as such remain relevant to the debate. However, for the purposes of this paper, I will primarily use the term patriotism, defined broadly by Charles Jones as "love of one's country and one's compatriots." I will avoid terms such as nationalism and communitarianism and focus upon terms that are state-centric. This is because the state, as the wielder of political, economic, and institutional powers, is the main actor charged with the provision of human rights.

Jones defines patriotic loyalty as "a willingness to sacrifice one's own interests to some degree for one's fellow countrymen or countrywomen."¹⁴ As such, the patriot is one who believes he or she is justified in extending greater concern to "some persons (compatriots) than to others (non-compatriots or 'foreigners')."¹⁵ Ronald Dworkin has called these special concerns "associative obligations," a breed of mutual obligations which exist within political

¹⁰ Charles Beitz, "Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment," *Journal of Philosophy* 80 (1983): 593

¹¹ Jones, *Global Justice*, 115

¹² Kok-Chor Tan, "Poverty and Global Distributive Justice," in *Global Ethics*, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 256-273.

¹³ Simon Caney, "Individuals, Nations, and Obligations," 119-137.

¹⁴ Jones, *Global Justice*, 114

¹⁵ *ibid*, 113

communities.¹⁶ Members, Dworkin argues, regard their mutual obligations as special to their community, holding distinctly within its boundaries.¹⁷ Indeed, the patriot holds the state to be embedded with some intrinsic value, and as such, their priority is national justice. In addition to this conception of intrinsic value, Thomas Nagel has also described patriotic obligation as having an instrumental purpose as well.¹⁸ In this sense, borders can also be morally significant, but only in a weak and derivative sense.

There are two main subsets of patriotic loyalty, an extreme and a moderate position, or what Jones has referred to as 'Exclusionary Patriotism' and 'Compatriot Favouritism.' The first position asserts that non-compatriots fall outside the sphere of ethical concern altogether, implying that "'foreigners' count for nothing, morally speaking."¹⁹ This position uses citizenship as the sole criterion for moral consideration, and consequently has been outright rejected in most academic circles as being morally unjustified and even bigoted²⁰; therefore, for the purpose of this paper, I will not discuss Exclusionary Patriotism, and will instead analyse the second and more moderate form of patriotism- Compatriot Favouritism.

Compatriot Favouritism poses a more significant challenge to competing theories of cosmopolitanism. Rather than the wholesale exclusion of non-citizens from ethical concern, it generates special obligations which supersede citizens' obligations to non-compatriots. It should be stated that when analyzing patriotism, we should be careful not to confuse *obligations* with

¹⁶ Ronald Dworkin, *Law's Empire* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986): 195-201

¹⁷ Eerik Lagerspetz, "Ronald Dworkin on Communities and Obligations: A Critical Comment," *Ratio Juris* 12 (1999): 108

¹⁸ Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 30 (2005): 113-147

¹⁹ Jones, *Global Justice*, 111

²⁰ *ibid*, 116; Stephen Nathanson, "In Defense of 'Moderate Patriotism,'" *Ethics*, 99 (1989): 538

loyalty.²¹ Indeed, this is one of the central distinctions made by cosmopolitans, since loyalty does not hold the same moral force which accompanies obligation.

Defenders of patriotism have argued that the state is the primary arena for justice theory; often quoted is John Rawls's *Law of Peoples*, where he explicitly rejects the extension of his account of justice across the globe.²² Simon Caney has noted the normative significance of such beliefs, calling the state the sole "context of justice."²³ David Miller is one of the leading proponents of patriotism, claiming:

"Nations are ethical communities... the duties we owe to our fellow-nationals are different from, and more extensive than, the duties we owe to human beings as such."²⁴

His defense of patriotism grows from his belief in the intrinsic value of the political community, and the ways in which prioritizing all persons equally, regardless of citizenship, would "risk undermining the conditions of mutual trust and assurance that make responsible citizenship possible."²⁵ Thus, from a consequentialist viewpoint, Miller denies the claim that the equalizing of our priorities to all persons can discharge international obligations of justice. In his theory a politics of equal recognition is dangerous and possibly counterproductive, eroding the foundations of the very institutions charged with fulfilling such obligations.

²¹ Simon Caney, "Individuals, Nations, and Obligations," 121

²² Margret Moore, "Defending Community: Nationalism, Patriotism, and Culture", in *Global Ethics*, ed. Duncan Bell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010): 133

²³ Simon Caney, "Global Distributive Justice and the State," *Political Studies* 56 (2008): 487

²⁴ David Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 27

²⁵ David Miller, *Citizenship and National Identity*, 89

Cosmopolitanism

Three shared elements of cosmopolitanism challenge the patriotic notion of associative obligations. Thomas Pogge defines these three elements as: first, individualism, in which "the ultimate units of concern are *human beings* or *persons*;" second, universality, in which "the status of ultimate concern attaches to *every* living human being *equally*;" third, generality, in which "this special status has global force."²⁶ Theorists seek to highlight the moral irrelevance of geo-political borders, revealing, "how and why the methodological statist assumptions in arguments for justice can and ought to be dropped;" they argue that justice can be "extended to the global domain."²⁷ Obligations should not be circumscribed by borders but ought to apply regardless of any characteristics that differentiate us from one another.²⁸

The philosophical foundations of cosmopolitanism are quite broad. Onora O'Neill, for instance, derives her cosmopolitan ethic from the application of Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative: "act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become universal law."²⁹ Thus, obligations are a matter of "refraining from an action whose fundamental principles others cannot share," a maxim which allows no one to make exceptions for their own case.³⁰ Others, like Charles Beitz and Simon Caney, apply more

²⁶ Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002): 169

²⁷ Kok-Chor Tan, "Poverty and Global Distributive Justice," 262

²⁸ Allen Buchanan, *Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004)

²⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 2nd ed, tr. Lewis White Beck (London: Collier Macmillan, 1990): 31

³⁰ Onora O'Neill, *Faces of Hunger: An Essay on Poverty, Justice, and Development* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986): 134

Rawlsian approaches to human rights obligations, arguing for the global extension of the difference principle.³¹

Thinkers such as Peter Singer and Robert Goodin apply a utilitarian logic to cosmopolitan conceptions of justice. Russell Hardin defines utilitarianism as "the moral theory that judges the goodness of outcomes- and therefore the rightness of actions in so far as they affect outcomes- by the degree to which they secure the greatest benefit to all concerned."³² In his essay 'Famine, Morality, and Affluence,' Singer provides one of the most famous accounts of this argument. Specifically, he addresses the moral indefensibility of global poverty; that some people live in abundance while others starve is both perplexing and unnecessary. He argues that if states and individuals can prevent this suffering without sacrificing anything of comparable moral or material significance, they are morally obligated to do so.³³

Finally, deontologists forward an alternative moral theory to utilitarianism. Rather than deriving ethical judgments based upon consequentiality, a theory is deontological in form if it grounds morality in "imperatives that lay down moral obligations that are independent of the consequences of their being followed."³⁴ Henry Shue's pioneering argument in *Basic Rights* is one such example. At the book's time of writing, U.S. President Jimmy Carter was deliberating about the proper scope of human rights:

"In particular, whether a human rights foreign policy should concentrate on protecting against threats to personal security from authoritarian regimes, or

³¹ The difference principle is a principle of social justice advocated by Rawls, which argues that inequalities should be organized so as to maximize the condition of the least advantaged. John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)

³² Russell Hardin, quoted in Jones, *Global Justice*, 23

³³ Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (1972): 229-243.

³⁴ Kok-Chor Tan, "Poverty and Global Distributive Justice," 258

whether it should engage with the broader evils associated with material deprivation."³⁵

What Shue argued is that this choice is in some ways a red herring- in fact, subsistence rights *as well as* security rights are 'basic' rights, meaning that their "enjoyment is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights."³⁶ Shue emphasized that what is important about a right is "its role in justifying a person in demanding that others 'make some arrangements' that will guarantee that the person can enjoy the substance of the right."³⁷ When applying Shue's basic rights approach to cosmopolitan theory, it becomes morally required that social, political, and economic arrangements be consistent with the recognition and fulfillment of these basic rights which are held by all persons.³⁸

The relevance of Shue's cosmopolitanism to the debate about global poverty is quite apparent; as such, rights-based cosmopolitanism, rather than utilitarian cosmopolitanism, will be the theory generally adhered to in this paper. Shue's basic-rights have also been called claim rights, which means that if a person has a basic right to something, then "there is a claim on some other or others to ensure that the content of the right is obtained by the right-holder."³⁹ Thus, "to have a claim-right is to be owed a duty by another or others;"⁴⁰ as such, the existence of a right produces a duty or set of duties, and consequently gives rise to duty-bearers. This brings us back to the larger debate confronted in this paper, which is the question of what duties are owed to by

³⁵ Charles R. Beitz and Robert E. Goodin, *Global Basic Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009): 1

³⁶ Henry Shue, *Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996): 19

³⁷ Beitz and Goodin, *Global Basic Rights*, 9

³⁸ Jones, *Global Justice*, 50

³⁹ Jones, *Global Justice*, 52

⁴⁰ Shue, *Basic Rights*, 14

state's to non-citizens, or more precisely, who, in the absence of a capable state, is the duty-bearer for the world's three billion poor people?

Patriotism vs. Cosmopolitanism

When surveying the nature of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, it seems we have two separate sources of moral claims to explore, with no clear rules as to why one set should take precedence over the other. Notably, patriotism does not necessarily disagree with cosmopolitan, or take issue with its view of global justice. Rights-based cosmopolitanism, especially, has the potential to exist concurrently with patriotic loyalties, since unlike the demands of utilitarianism, there is only a moral minimum that it requires be met. However, patriotism does present an argument for cosmopolitan's limitation, which states that though there may be good reasons for global distributive obligations, there are also good (if not more important) kinds of local obligations that conflict with the global ones.⁴¹

Indeed, for both the patriot and the cosmopolitan the debate is primarily about the scope of duties and as such, what is at stake is the priority of their respective conceptions of justice.⁴² Therefore, the patriot must show the ways in which state boundaries constitute a landscape of ethical meaning, while the cosmopolitan must show that the differences between the domestic and global realm are in no way morally significant- arguments which will both be evaluated below.

⁴¹ Jones, *Global Justice*, 111

⁴² *ibid*, 112

Citizen vs. Foreigner

Critics often liken the cosmopolitan to Charles Dickens' character Mrs. Jellyby, who is so concerned with poor children in African that she completely neglects her own. In arguing this point, patriotic theorists often refer to hypothetical scenarios to illustrate their reasons for defending patriotic obligation, arguing their point through analogy. One such scenario is the *Godwinian fire dilemma*, in which "someone is confronted with the choice of saving only one of two people who are trapped in a burning building;" one victim is a stranger and the other victim is one's own partner.⁴³ Indeed the choice seems obvious. However, in the given situation, the rescuer's reasons for giving preferential treatment to one's partner are "the intimacy of this relationship and the importance of intimacy in living a meaningful life."⁴⁴ And as Jones rightly asserts, the justificatory power which accompanies such intimacy "cannot be wielded on behalf of compatriot-saving."⁴⁵ Indeed, it is impossible that within a nation state each member knows his or her fellow compatriots intimately; as such, most fellow citizens are as strange to us as foreigners. Let us then change the Godwinian analogy, and suppose that the two victims are strangers- one is a compatriot and one is not. The conclusion becomes very much less obvious, as your connection to the compatriot is based upon the randomness of your birth and the arbitrariness of your geopolitical boundaries. Thus such commonly used analogies act not as challenges to cosmopolitan impartiality, but rather serve to emphasize the way in which an the patriotic loyalty is in some ways the prioritization of one group of strangers over another.

Admittedly, the above argument in some ways oversimplified the nature of the compatriot relationship. The distinction between citizen and foreigner is one imbued with a variety of values and meanings, some normative, and some more existential. Indeed, the meaning of citizenship,

⁴³ Jones, *Global Justice*, 122

⁴⁴ *ibid*, 125

⁴⁵ *ibid*, 125

for some, is inherently valuable. I will address both sides of this dichotomy, and analyse the meanings associated with each of these roles.

Simon Caney notes that, in some instances, patriotic arguments are based upon conceptions that the moral value of citizenship is independent of the moral value of its respective political community.⁴⁶ Martha Nussbaum notes as well that patriotic pride can emerge from a sense of 'my-ness,' a patriotic allegiance fixed upon an objective love of one's country.⁴⁷ David Miller exemplifies this when he states:

The subject is partly defined by its relationship and the various rights, obligations, and so forth that go along with these, so these commitments themselves form a basic element of personality. To divest oneself of such commitments would be, in one important sense, to change one's identity.⁴⁸

The historical narrative of a nation gives one's patriotic identity increasing salience, as it stretches back and forward across generations, creating a deeper and more durable sense of community. Thus, the connection between nationalism and identity is one of particular significance in patriotic discourse.

George Fletcher illustrates an extensive defense of these arguments, demonstrating the ways in which patriotic loyalty is inherently valuable to the individual for reasons of self-fulfillment. He states, "to love myself, I must respect and cherish those aspects of myself that are bound up with others. Thus by the mere fact of my biography I incur obligations towards others."⁴⁹ To fulfill these obligations is a way of self-fulfillment. As such, it is necessary to reinforce our constitutive bonds in order to achieve a personally meaningful existence. Therefore, whether its

⁴⁶ Simon Caney, "Individuals, Nations, and Obligations," 121-130

⁴⁷ Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in *Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Martha Nussbaum (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996): 2-20

⁴⁸ David Miller, "The Ethical Significance of Nationality," *Ethics* 96 (1988): 650

⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 122

utility is greater political cohesion or more favourable self- recognition, the value of citizenship for patriots holds considerable weight for both the individual and the state.⁵⁰

The cosmopolitan response to such claims is not to argue the weight of truth in these ideas, but rather, to emphasize the ways in which these ideas are not mutually exclusive with cosmopolitan conceptions of justice. Indeed, cosmopolitanism does not condemn the value of cultural solidarity or meaningful political participation. Instead, it seeks to highlight the ways in which these components of nationalism are constitutive of *loyalties* rather than *obligations*. While its value is in no way diminished, the moral duties attached to citizenship should not come at the expense of duties to fellow humans. Citizenship in and of itself is in no way morally unjust; however, in order to understand the full scope of patriotic obligation, we must recognize that citizenship is only one side of the coin.

What cosmopolitans take issue with in the concept of citizenship is the idea of exclusion, and the way in which it produces 'foreigners.' The geo-political boundaries of states constitute more than just the bounds of state inclusion - they construct a human 'otherness' which makes imagining strangers, or more specifically 'foreigners,' inherently difficult. Elaine Scarry problematizes this distinction when she states:

There exists a *circular relation* between the infliction of pain and the problem of otherness. *The difficulty of imagining others is both the cause of, and the problem displayed by, the action of injuring.*⁵¹

Here, Scarry illuminates how borders can, in a sense, sever us from the human connections which should transcend boundaries, desensitizing us to the suffering of the global poor,

⁵⁰ George Fletcher (*Loyalty*) notes this argument when he states, "In acting loyally, the self acts in harmony with its personal history. One recognizes who one is. Actions of standing by one's friends, family, nation, or people reveal that identity." Quoted in Caney, *Individuals, Nations, and Obligations*, 122

⁵¹ Emphasis in original. Elaine Scarry, "The Difficulty of Imagining Other People," in *Love of Country*: 102

subsequently allowing us to evade moral responsibility help alleviate their pain. Indeed, in this way, the emphasis on patriotic pride can be morally dangerous and subversive to the goals of both national and global justice.

Negative vs. Positive Rights

Thus, we might consider what is arguably the most salient concept underlying the split between patriotic and cosmopolitan conceptions of obligation: the negative/ positive rights concept. Negative rights have generally entailed duties of forbearance, refraining from actions that would infringe upon the rights of others. For positive rights, on the other hand, forbearance is not enough; these rights are positive in the sense that "positive action is requires if individuals' access to the contents of the rights is to be protected."⁵² This dichotomy has also been referred to as the distinction between civil-political rights and socio-economic rights respectively. It must be noted that although socio-economic rights bear the same formal legal status as civil and political, "the obligations attached to the former are virtually non-existent in comparison to the latter."⁵³ Patriots argue that socio-economic rights are citizens' rights, and are claims that can be made by citizens upon their respective states. Indeed, these rights in particular generate duties, and thus, the need for duty-bearers. However, cosmopolitans would suggest that each individual holds a claim to these rights, regardless of their citizenship. This distinction has long defined the discourse on global poverty, as states' recognize their obligations to fulfill the negative rights of all, but question their obligations to fulfill positive rights internationally.

Thomas Pogge frames the distinction between the two duties frankly: "Thus killing a person for the sake of some gain is widely thought to be morally worse than failing, for the sake of a

⁵² Jones, *Global Justice*, 63

⁵³ Patrick Hayden, "Superfluous Humanity: An Arendtian Perspective on the Political Evil of Global Poverty," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 35 (2007): 14

like gain, to rescue him."⁵⁴ Indeed, this comment introduces an important debate about the distinction, or lack thereof, between the two kinds of duties. Henry Shue breached this topic in *Basic Rights*, arguing positive and negative rights are both interdependent and inseparable—neither one of these rights can be enjoyed without the other, nor can any other rights be enjoyed without these basic rights.⁵⁵

Shue introduced a three-part characterization of the duties generated by all rights. Briefly, these are:

(i) duties to *avoid* depriving right-holding individuals of the content of the right

(ii) duties to *protect* right-holders from being deprived of the right content

(iii) duties to *aid* deprived right-holders when avoidance and protection have failed⁵⁶

Indeed, negative rights require not only forbearance ("duty not to torture anyone"), but also positive action ("duty to stop attempted torture, or duties to help victims of torture")—there is no one-to-one ratio between rights and duties.⁵⁷ In recognizing the interdependent nature of 'positive' and 'negative' rights, the dismissal of so-called socio-economic rights becomes problematized. However, Shue still does not define the problem of agency— that is, *who* is responsible for upholding these rights.

Brian Orend makes a compelling argument to answer this question. For him the general principle is that the more power and influence one has over the objects of another's vital needs, the greater degree of responsibility one has in connection with that person's human rights.⁵⁸ To

⁵⁴ Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 130

⁵⁵ Shue, *Basic Rights*, 31

⁵⁶ Jones, *Global Justice*, 65

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, 64

⁵⁸ Brian Orend, *Human Rights: Concepts and Context* (Peterborough, Canada: Broadview Press Ltd., 2002): 129-

this end, defenders of patriotism argue that patriotic partiality stems from the relationship between citizens and their states, for the state exercises considerable influence over its citizens' lives. Furthermore, Thomas Nagel argues that the domestic basic structure is all but absent on a global scale.⁵⁹ The difference is qualitative, the main reason for it being that at the global level citizens are not the authors of the laws that can coerce them. Samuel Freeman, as well, argues that basic institutions exist only at the state level, and takes this as a practical reason for the restriction of justice to this domain.⁶⁰

What each of these theories fails to recognize is the inter-subjective nature of states. Indeed, the emergence of globalisation has led to the diffusion of state power, and conversely, the heightened interdependence among states. This includes a shared global economic order in which *both* rich states and transnational corporations exercise considerable power over individuals' daily lives. In this sense, it is not necessarily a one's own state that exercises the most influence over one's life, as Orend asserts- rather, it is those select actors with considerable economic wealth. By Orend's own logic, then, it is these actors that should bear some of the duties to uphold basic rights.

Thomas Pogge famously analyzed this relationship, going one step further to outline a causal nexus between our global institutional order and the persistence of severe poverty. He argues that the structure of this system is unjust, as well as avoidable, and famously asserts that the starving and sick of the world are not merely dying, but rather, they are being killed.⁶¹ Once this is understood, the injustice of this order, and of the coercive imposition of it, becomes visible. Indeed, as Pogge would have us believe, whether or not the above inter-connections

⁵⁹ Thomas Nagel, "The Problem of Global Justice," 113-147

⁶⁰ Samuel Freeman, *Justice and the Social Contract* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

⁶¹ Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 182

between positive and negative duties hold, global poverty constitutes a violation of state's negative duties in the most traditional sense. As such, states', specifically wealthy states', responsibilities to the global poor are not voluntary or optional, but morally obligated due to the coercive power which they exercise internationally.

Conclusion

Thus, when asked the question 'Are our obligations to our fellow citizens more extensive than our obligations to our fellow human beings,' it is apparent that the answer is far from clear. However, in this paper, several conclusions have been reached. First, when discussing the competing philosophical stances of patriotism and cosmopolitanism, it becomes apparent that the dichotomy between the two is largely false. Many of the arguments fronted by patriots appeal to the sentiment of loyalty rather than the more rigorous duties of moral obligation. It is clear that a cosmopolitan conception of justice can be achieved while respecting citizen's right to patriotism. There is, however, one contingency to this relationship, that is, patriotic loyalty can only be respected as long as it does not violate the basic rights of others. Indeed, this leads to the second conclusion reached- that cosmopolitan conceptions of justice better facilitate the realization of basic human rights. Indeed, the focus on the value of the individual transcends the contentious nature of sovereignty and citizenship, better confronting the needs of the global poor.

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“Systems of the Imagination: Adam Smith and the Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquiries; Illustrated by the History of Astronomy”

By Jeremy Luedi

The works of Adam Smith touch upon various topics, and his magnum opuses the *The Wealth of Nations* and *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, are important works in the realms of politics/commerce and morality, respectively. These works along with Smith's more obscure writings are seen by most as separate treatises, evidence of his pluralistic philosophy, and at times even contradictory. This perceived inconsistency is given voice by “Das Adam Smith Problem” - a term coined by several 19th century German thinkers.¹ This paper endeavours to explain Smith's theory of systems and intellectual paradigms, as illustrated by the history of astronomy in *The Principles Which Lead and Direct Philosophical Enquires*. Smith describes his notion of systems via four terms; namely Wonder, Surprise, Admiration and the Imagination. It is these terms and the framework which they form, that underpin Smith's work, and which demonstrate the theoretical consistency evident in his writing.

Smith's conceptualization of how intellectual paradigms or 'systems' come about and maintain their strength, draws heavily on his insights pertaining to the workings of the human mind, and its influence on how we interact with and qualify the universe. The central factor in Smith's analysis is the role played by the imagination. Smith appears to use imagination, partially in its original sense, yet also as a synonym for our inner stability; our notion / feeling of inner continuity. According to Smith, it is the imagination which exerts the greatest influence over an individual, as opposed to facts or reason, when determining whether a worldview is embraced and perpetuated. Smith references the power of this process by stating “how easily the learned

¹ Teichgraeber III Richard, “Rethinking Das Adam Smith Problem,” *North American Convention of British Studies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 106.

give up the evidence of their senses to preserve the coherence of their imagination.”² The preeminence enjoyed by the imagination, is due to the importance attributed to its maintenance, namely in the constant efforts which need to be undertaken in order to sustain a state of tranquillity.³

Smith identifies sentiments not reason, as the instigators of this internal turmoil, and describes the state of the imagination via three terms: wonderment, surprise and admiration.⁴ These three sensations are in turn the manifestations of our perception of the outside world, and how we internalize the various events and phenomena of the universe. Wonder comes about when we are encountered with strange and foreign objects or instances, which we are unaccustomed with, and which as a result we cannot compartmentalize into our range of understanding; even if we are forewarned of any impending novelty.⁵ Smith uses the example of loadstones and iron to demonstrate how upon seeing the forces of magnetism at work, an individual would witness “an impulse...conjoined to an event...which according to the ordinary train of things...he could have so little suspected it to have any connection.”⁶ Surprise is felt, when we encounter familiar objects in anachronistic or unexpected circumstances, such as when “we are surprised at the sudden appearance of a friend, whom we have seen a thousands times, but whom we did not imagine we were to see then.”⁷ Lastly comes Admiration, which is the least

2 Smith Adam, *Essays on Philosophical Subjects*, ed. Wightman, W. L. D.,(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), IV.35. – here after to be referred to as “EPS”

3 EPS -Imitative Arts, II.20

4 EPS – History of Astronomy (HA), Intro.6

5 EPS – HA, Intro.2

6 EPS – HA, II.6

7 EPS – HA, Intro.3

potent of the three, and which arises when we perceive familiar objects, and when our only consideration of them is merely our certainty of our expectations of them.⁸

Wonder and Surprise influence the emotions which we feel, since instances which cause them interrupt the equilibrium of the imagination. Smith views any occurrence which tampers with the tranquillity of the imagination as disruptive, whether the wonderment or surprise unleashed by said event results in despair or euphoria.⁹ A quick succession of emotions, leads due to its unexpectedness, to great internal turmoil. When two emotions succeed each other, that are each-other's opposite, the greatest effect is felt, as “when a load of sorrow comes down upon the heart that is expanded and elated with gaiety...its seems...almost to crush and bruise it, as a real weight would crush and bruise the body.”¹⁰ Such a perturbed and tempestuous imagination, is a dangerous entity, and such a succession can “so entirely disjoint the whole frame of the imagination, that it never after returns to its former tone and composure;” potentially causing frenzy, madness and death.¹¹ Smith illustrates this point with the story of Thrasimenus, a Roman lady who whilst in the midst of despair over the loss of her son; slain in battle, promptly dies from joy when he returns unexpectedly.¹² The unexpected nature of such a succession causes the heart “to be doused” with emotion. Unexpectedness leaves the heart unprepared, for anticipation of an object, in turn allows “the emotion which that object emparts [to be] to a degree evident...and its effect on the individual is lessened.”¹³

8 EPS – HA, Intro.4

9 EPS – General Introduction, 5.

10 EPS – HA, I.6

11 EPS – HA, II.10

12 EPS – HA, I.6

13 EPS – HA, I.1

Smith regards such sources of unexpectedness and wonder negatively for they involve pain, and views them as disutility,¹⁴ consequently associating pleasure with actions that restore “the state of tranquillity and composure” of the imagination.¹⁵ The equilibrium of the imagination depends on the smooth flow and continuity of an individual's stream of consciousness. Wonder, Surprise and unexpectedness all derive their potency from their abilities to interrupt an individual's train of thought, thereby breaking the bridges or bonds, which weave a series of events into one continuous reality.¹⁶ Events and objects which cause an individual to feel Wonder and Surprise, do so specifically, because they create circumstances which expose the disconnect between the speed of thought and the speed of causation.¹⁷ Ideas move faster than successions of events in the real world, and therefore the imagination “is continually running before them [events] and therefore anticipates, before it happens, every event which falls out according to the ordinary course of things.”¹⁸

Smith states explicitly that “the stop which is thereby given to the career of the imagination, the difficulty which it finds in passing along such disjointed objects, and the feeling of something like a gap or interval betwixt them, constitute the whole essence of this emotion [Wonder].”¹⁹ It is this interval between events, which although not usually perceived, that causes upon its emergence the imagination to be destabilized. In order to restore the imagination to its equilibrium, and to attempt to prevent such intervals in the future, Smith suggests the employment of philosophy,²⁰ in order to learn and make sense of the world, for “...the repose and

14 EPS – General Introduction, 5

15 EPS – Imitative Arts, II.20

16 EPS – HA, II.8

17 EPS – HA, II.8

18 EPS – HA, II.8

19 EPS – HA, II.9

20 Smith does not use the term 'philosophy', in its modern context, rather uses it to encompass all aspects of human knowledge, and appears to allude to the literal definition of 'love of wisdom'

tranquillity of the imagination is the ultimate end of philosophy.”²¹ The use of philosophy and education, allows individuals to alleviate feelings of Wonder by creating systems of thought that explain and order nature,²² which “seems to abound with events which appear solitary and incoherent...[and] disturb the easy movement of the imagination.”²³ Smith argues that the distinction between the common man and the philosopher is not from nature, but rather the product of “habit, custom and education.”²⁴

Interestingly, Smith argues that our attachment to and proclivity to use philosophy, is not an inherent trait, rather the result of our historical development and the emergence of civilization. Here Smith assumes the role of a social contract thinker, for he elucidates on a transition from an original position, to our current intellectual / social paradigm. He states that early in its history, mankind did not put much “stock in small incongruities” and the disjointed appearance of nature.²⁵ Smith continues that this was due to our preoccupation with more pressing issues of survival and security.²⁶ Despite our preoccupation, we could not be oblivious to the “greater things”, such as eclipses or comets.²⁷ Such events invoke amazement, described by Smith as part Surprise and Admiration, which subsequently led to the first attempts to describe the world. The ancients viewed such natural occurrences as the products of independent beings, such as gods, and promptly imbued said events with anthropomorphic qualities.²⁸ In this manner, common observances such as storms, were attributed to the mood of Neptune or the invisible hand of Jupiter, the flow of fountains to the dryads which inhabited them, and the fortune of plants to

21 EPS – HA, IV.13

22 EPS – HA, II.1

23 EPS – HA, II.12

24 Smith, Adam, *The Wealth of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), I.iii.4

25 EPS – HA, III.1

26 EPS – HA, III.3

27 EPS – HA, III.2

28 EPS – HA, III.2

nymphs, and so “in the first ages of the world, the lowest and most pusillanimous superstition supplied the place of philosophy.”²⁹

This age of superstition is for Smith, humanity's original position, however he argues that the creation and maintenance of law and security are crucial for the emergence of philosophy. Once order and security were established within a community, and there was an end to subsistence living, the “curiosity of mankind increased...[and rendered] them more attentive to the appearances of nature...and more desirous to know what is the chain which links them all together.”³⁰ It seems that philosophy is a product of what Smith calls “leisure”, namely a good which is pursued “for its own sake, as an original pleasure”, yet one which arises only when civilization has reached a certain level of permanence and security.³¹ Although philosophy is viewed as an intrinsic good, for it calms the imagination, it seems that it is only required due to the development of society. While Smith does not regard civilization as a bad thing, the fact that philosophy is required to stabilize our imaginations in our new civilized world, does add some ambiguity concerning the utility of civilization itself.

By utilizing philosophy to create systems, we gain more knowledge and experience pleasure as the imagination is soothed “to see the phenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable, all deduced from some principle and all united by one chain.”³² The imagination feels discomfort, during these intervals because its sense of continuity and fluidity of thought and interaction with the outside world is severed. This leaves it to “fluctuate with no purpose from thought to thought,”³³ and our imagination withdraws within itself, whereas when it is tranquil it

29 EPS – HA, III.3

30 EPS – HA, III.3

31 EPS – HA, III.3

32 EPS – General Intro. - excerpt from *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Letters*, II. 133-4

33 EPS – HA, II.4

“expands itself to everything around us.”³⁴ These systems generate pleasure because they connect the spaces between events, thus preventing such fluctuations from occurring, and giving the imagination a framework with which to explain events, and thereby eliminate Wonder.³⁵

While these systems cater to the human impulse to categorize, and while such explanations can heighten one's appreciation of events, by revealing the “hidden springs” behind them, the more learned an individual is, the less satisfied he is with basic explanations.³⁶ The explanation of the layman that a plant is a weed, satisfies his imagination, for even this basic system is sufficient to sooth, whereas the imagination of a botanist would remain in a state of turmoil, and would require a far more specific system.³⁷ Similarly, the actions of a skilled artisan cause the layman to feel Wonder and therefore unsettle his imagination, for the layman does not comprehend the connections between a series of specialized events, whereas the learned practitioner experiences only Admiration, for his imagination is not perturbed by such familiar actions.³⁸ Crucially however, the persuasive and explanatory power of a system is not dependant on its validity or probability, rather the critical factor is its ability to sooth the imaginations of the individuals employing it.³⁹

Despite what seems to be the establishment of a purely subjective or human standard for science, Smith does state that while systems need only sooth the imagination, they must first still arise due to “speculations at least plausible and buttressed with accounting for observed appearances.”⁴⁰ While Smith is a proponent of empirical thinking, and while some degree of

34 EPS – HA, IV.1.9
35 EPS – HA, II.1
36 EPS – HA, II.11
37 EPS – HA, II.2
38 EPS – HA, II.11
39 EPS – HA, II.12
40 EPS- General Intro, 6

observed phenomena must be evident in any system, systems are still free to explain occurrences in whatever manner, in order to satisfy the imagination.⁴¹ In the *History of Astronomy*, Smith lays out his vision concerning the history and progression of such systems of thought, comparing them to imaginary machines.⁴² Smith espouses the view that the first such systems are the most complicated, and that successive systems are more simple⁴³, and therefore 'better'.⁴⁴

The longevity of systems is directly linked to the amount of disconnect felt between it and our perception of the world. Smith, heavily influenced by Newtonian thinking, often describes this ideas within materialistic terms, stating that “the fitness of any system or machine to produce the end for which it was intended,” is measured by to what extent the “very thought and contemplation of it is agreeable.”⁴⁵ Whereas a system may originally have appeared valid to the imagination, overtime new observances and discoveries are made / experienced, which cannot be assimilated by the contemporary systematic tenets.⁴⁶ This in turn, leads to modifications and additions to the system in order to eliminate any Wonder or Surprise which might be generated as a result. These ad hoc adaptations, do however, overtime cause a system to be burdened, eventually making it too complicated, and ultimately unacceptable to the imagination. Once it no longer has the ability to calm the imagination, the imagination begins to search for or generate a new system which satisfies it.⁴⁷

41 EPS – HA, II.12

42 EPS – HA, IV.19

43 This progression of systems, comes across to the modern reader as an account of memonic evolution, and while Smith seems to be alluding to a similar notion, I have chosen not to use the term 'meme', when referencing systems, despite some apparent similarities, in order not to be anachronistic

44 Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), IV.1 - hereafter referred to as “TMS”

45 TMS, IV.1

46 EPS – General Intro. 7

47 EPS – General Intro. 7

Smith attempts to indicate this evolution of systems, with his theoretical history of thought, as well as drawing on historical examples. The history of astronomy, offers clear examples of systems and their successive modifications. Smith uses the progression of the Platonic or geocentric universe system, and its conflict with the Copernican or heliocentric system, to demonstrate the problems facing new systems. While the geocentric system was based on the common observances and plausibility necessary for system formation, over the centuries new additions were required in order to maintain the integrity of this system, for ever increasing numbers of observances conflicted with it.⁴⁸ Over time more and more spheres, circles and other theoretical contrivances, were introduced, growing from twenty-seven in the model of Eudoxus to fifty-six in Aristotle's and later seventy-two for the 15th century thinker Fracastorio.⁴⁹ This over-complication of the geocentric model, eventually failed to fully please the imagination, and other models began to be considered.

The emergence of the heliocentric model, did over time replace the geocentric model, for “the motions of the heavenly bodies had appeared inconstant and irregular...[and such] tended to embarrass and confound the imagination.”⁵⁰ Despite continual refinement over several centuries, it took a long time for the heliocentric system to usurp the place of geocentrism in the imaginations of many. This difficulty is attributed by Smith to the fact that the replacement of systems can be devastating and stressful the imagination, and that there exist “prejudices of the imagination and prejudices of education.”⁵¹ The former is based upon common sense observations, and in the case of geocentrism, many believed that since they felt no sensation indicating earthly rotation, that the heliocentric system did not satisfy their imaginations. The

48 EPS – HA, IV.9

49 EPS – HA, IV.9

50 EPS – HA, IV.13

51 EPS – HA, IV.52

latter results from systematic preconceptions, as a result of dogmatic attachment to a specific system; for example the biblical support for geocentrism.⁵²

As previously mentioned, the strength of and value attributed to systems by the general populace depends on the level of disconnect which is experienced in their imaginations.⁵³ It is therefore essential that systems be able to clearly and simply satisfy the imagination. Smith argues that the methods which we employ to understand and convey the power of a system are key to its success,⁵⁴ for

“the best method of explaining and illustrating...arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the principles of these compositions, which contribute to persuasion or entertainment.”⁵⁵ By employing devices which facilitate both enjoyment and understanding, a system is better equipped to satisfy the minds of the general populace, for its explanatory function needs to be readily comprehensible. Stylistic devices such as parables, analogies or metaphors simplify otherwise complicated notions, allowing for greater comprehension and therefore quicker soothing of the imagination.

Smith is a strong proponent of the power of such devices in communicating systems and states that the analogy chosen to describe some systematic notion could, “be the great hinge upon which everything turned”⁵⁶ - the defining aspect of whether a system is accepted or rejected. Smith litters his works with metaphors, all of which are designed to better communicate his ideas, and are attempts to as effectively as possible pacify the imaginations of his readers. The parable of the Poor Man's Son (PMS), is one in which Smith demonstrates his metaphorical skill,

52 EPS – HA, IV.52

53 EPS – HA, II.12

54 EPS – HA, II.12

55 EPS – General Intro, 2

56 EPS – HA, II.12

and it is a passage which can be viewed within the larger context of this theory of systems. The PMS is someone who “heaven in its anger has visited with ambition, [and] who goes beyond admiration of palaces to envy.”⁵⁷

By moving from admiration to envy, the PMS is leaving the established system. His lifelong ambition and efforts for betterment, eventually show him the error of his ways, since the rich are no happier in the things that matter,⁵⁸ for “in ease of body and peace of mind, all the different ranks of life are nearly upon a level.”⁵⁹ Smith views the attitude of the PMS as a delusion or “illusion of the imagination,” yet it remarks that it is a useful delusion, which maintains the momentum of human endeavours. Smith views the son's actions as delusional because the son embraces a system which is deceiving him, yet which is arguably more useful or beneficial than the 'truth'.⁶⁰ Smith states that the 'healthy' mind would simply let itself be taken in by the imagination, however it is important to note that Smith views systems not as truths, rather as conceptualizations of the world. All system to a greater or lesser degree are for Smith delusions, and it is because of this fact that he warns against mistaking systems for truth.⁶¹

Smith again uses the connection between delusions and systems in his parable of the Invisible Hand. Similar to Smith's comments on the PMS, the Invisible Hand makes “the same distribution of the necessities of life which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions.”⁶² Again deception occurs, for the metaphor of the Invisible Hand is the analogy used by Smith to rectify the “uneasiness [concerning] the reconciliation of selfishness

57 TMS, IV.1.7

58 TMS, IV.1.7

59 TMS, IV.1.11

60 TMS, IV.1.7

61 TMS, VI.ii.2.18

62 TMS, IV.1.10

and the perfection of the system.”⁶³ The uneasiness stems from the interval between events caused by the notion of selfishness conflicting with the system, thereby causing sensations of Wonder. Smith uses this metaphor as the instrument with which he attempts to calm the imagination, by showing how an otherwise complicated system functions.

The metaphor of the chessboard, demonstrates the fallacy of holding dogmatically onto a system, and the danger and folly of trying to propagate one's system throughout society. The power which systems exert over individuals is also an issue in the realm of politics, where competing systems can have significant consequences on society at large. Here too we find ourselves “uneasy until we remove any obstruction that can in the least disturb or encumber” an individual's system of choice.⁶⁴ Whereas alterations at the theoretical level as seen earlier, can be implemented, when systems meet factors which disturb the imagination in the realm of politics, the methods of removal and rectification can have dire consequences, for “we take pleasure in beholding the perfection of so beautiful and grand a system.”⁶⁵ Smith warns specifically against assuming that a system is perfect or represents pure truth and states that this dogmatic attitude is personified in the ‘man of systems’.⁶⁶ Whereas Smith regards the simplification of systems of philosophy, as a positive and natural progression, he states that systems of language “become more and more imperfect” with simplification.⁶⁷ This oversimplification of language systems leads to their deterioration, yet it is exactly such systems which men of systems or ideologues

63 TMS – Introduction, 8
64 TMS IV.1.11
65 TMS, IV.1.11
66 TMS, VI.ii.2.18
67 LRBL, i.34v

use, in order to convince the imaginations of the populace of their respective systems, as they are “often so enamoured with the supposed beauty of [their] own ideal plan of government.”⁶⁸

Systems for Smith represent our attempts to pacify the imagination by conjuring up mental frameworks which order and explain the universe, thereby providing us with a sense of stability, and inner calm. By understanding his underlying philosophy concerning the formation, role and importance of these systems, one can then begin to more fully comprehend Smith's works. While Smith is a pluralist, and at times his various works may seem isolated or even contradictory, they are actually treatises extrapolating on his theory of systems. By understanding the reasons behind our adoption of various intellectual paradigms, Smith allows us to view the theoretical framework underpinning his writings, and in the process enables the reader to draw parallels among the various parables; identifying the core foundations of Wonder, Surprise, Admiration and the Imagination.

68 TMS, VI.ii.2.18

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

“Russian Democratization”

By: Matthew Slahta

Russia cares not whether you believe in socialism, or in a republic, or in a commune. What matters to her is that you respect the greatness of her past and that you hope for and demand greatness in her future...Russia's past, and only her past, can be the guarantor of her future¹.

- Peter Struve

The collapse of the Soviet Union and communism represented one of the foremost shifts of Russia's political systems in the twentieth century. A society that was once predicated upon the collective good of the state devolved into one that accepted Glasnost², Perestroika³, and capitalism. The ultimate result of this radical shift in political ideology was an apparent liberal democracy. As defined for the purposes of this essay, in the words of Samuel Huntington, liberal democracy is a form of representative democracy in which free, honest, and periodic elections are held under the presence of political pluralism⁴. However, this essay will assert that the presence of the aforementioned characteristics alone is not sufficient to guarantee effective and efficient liberal democracy. Rather, what matters is the way in which the law is made, the competency of those whose task it is to make it, and the characteristics of the particular agency that enacts the law⁵. This essay will argue that true liberal democracy has failed to emerge in post-Soviet Russia, as the Russian government has failed to unite its citizens under a cohesive national political ideology predicated upon the belief in a democratic semi-presidential system of liberal democracy. In order to argue for this thesis, this essay will first give a historical

¹ Nicolai Petro. "Russia's Alternative Political Organizations." *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. 88. Print.

² The policy or practice of more open consultative government and wider dissemination of information

³ The policy or practice of restructuring or reforming the economic and political system

⁴ Steven Fish. "Some Concepts and Their Application to Russia." *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 16. Print.

⁵ Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 193

background regarding the fall of communism in Russia and will then examine the political, economic, and social facets that have led to the failure of democracy in Russia after the fall of communism.

The Soviet Union collapsed as a result of economic stagnation, the aspirations of national minorities, and intellectual dissent⁶. The political foundation of the Soviet Union was predicated upon the thesis that the abolition of private property and the national collectivization of state resources would result in the good of the proletariat. Undergirding this thesis was the belief that with collectivization, the state would eventually wither away and a classless society would form a communist utopia. However, in the Soviet Union, no such utopia ever occurred. Instead of withering away, the organs of the state came to dominate all aspects of everyday life, and in doing so, violated every innate right that humans hold dear. Free speech, property rights, and religion were all outlawed by the state for the collective good. While the lure of collective socialism and the idea of equality sparked the October Revolution in 1917, the ideas of freedom and democracy led to the collapse of communism in 1991. As such, the collectivization of resources by the Soviet state led to mass inefficiencies and economic stagnation. With the drop of oil prices in the 1980s and the Soviet's heavy spending on proxy regimes, the Soviet Union was forced to borrow heavily from foreign sources⁷. In addition, national minorities and intellectuals began to feel disenfranchised by Soviet political incompetence regarding social and fiscal policy. Eventually, in an effort to revive the Soviet state, the government instituted the economic and political reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika. Although these reforms were meant to strengthen the Soviet Union, they would ultimately lead to its demise. In 1991, the Soviet Union would cease to exist and in the following months an official political policy of liberal democracy was born.

⁶ Lee Edwards. "The Fall of the Soviet Union." *The Collapse of Communism*. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 2000. 38. Print.

⁷ Edwards, *The Collapse of Communism*, 39

Firstly, the Russian semi-presidential system of government has failed to unite the Russian people under a cohesive national political ideology predicated upon the belief in liberal democracy. According to Maurice Duverger, a semi-presidential liberal democracy requires three things: the president of the republic must be elected by universal suffrage, the president must possess considerable power, and the president must have opposite him a prime minister and ministers who can only remain in power if parliament does not show enmity towards them⁸. In light of this definition, Russia's current semi-presidential political system arguably displays the façade of a liberal democracy. However, with respect to the actual institutions of a liberal democracy, Russia fails. Seemingly free-elections mask widespread voter fraud and potential opposition candidates to the presidency are discouraged from running.

Widespread voter-fraud in the current Russian political system has supplanted actual universal suffrage with a process orchestrated by an oligarchy of elites. According to the Russian Central Election Committee (CEC), votes in some electoral districts during the 2000 election, which Putin eventually won, were inflated up to one hundred and twenty percent to favor Putin and deflated up to fifty percent in favor of the opposition candidate⁹. Despite this knowledge of voter-fraud, the CEC did not publish the discrepancy between the tallied and reported vote totals¹⁰. This failing was likely a result of fear of falling into disfavor with the bourgeois political elites. Rashid Khamadeev, mayor of Naberezhnye Chelny exclaimed after the 2000 electoral vote: "We will take the results of each polling station and see how many people came and how they voted. And we will see how each local leader worked – and in whose favour? And is it worth it to keep him in his post?"¹¹. Hence, the Russian electoral and political system is

⁸ Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 195

⁹ Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 36

¹⁰ Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 34

¹¹ Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 56

predicated on corruption and coercion. Even with respect to the legislature (Duma), the same coercive effects can be felt.

With regards to the Parliamentary Power Index (PPI), the Russian legislature ranked nineteenth out of twenty-four post-communist regions¹². Largely, this can be attributed to politician's bourgeois status and their desire to remain in this elite wealthy class. In the Russian political system, the legislative branch of government does not control its own resources and fiscal budget. Instead, the power of the purse resides with the presidency¹³. Thus, the rejection of the presidency and the possible dissolution of the legislature would largely be seen as unfavorable, as this could result in the loss of the bourgeois status of those in the legislature. Ergo, the Russian political system can be seen as an oligarchy of the elite: an elite that manipulates legitimate democratic processes in order to be elected to power, stay in power, and exert influence over the ordinary Russian citizenry.

In response to the aforementioned argument, the objection is raised that the failure of Russian Democracy is caused by an inherent failure in the semi-presidential political structure itself. Proponents of this counter-argument assert that the semi-presidential system "may not solve some of the inherent problems of presidentialism, and indeed could make them worse by reifying the conflict between two state powers and personalizing them in the figure of the president and the prime minister"¹⁴. By investing the power of the presidency and democracy in one person, this creates a "constitutional dictatorship"¹⁵. Hence, the more powerful the presidency, the less democratic the political system. According to the Sairoff scale, which measures the power of the presidency of semi-presidential countries, the Russian president

¹² Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 208

¹³ Fish, *Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics*, 205

¹⁴ Robert Elgie, and Iain McMenamin. "Semi-Presidentialism and Democratic Performance." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9.3 (2007): 323-340. Print.

¹⁵ Elgie, *McMenamin, Semi-Presidentialism and Democratic Performance*, 325

scores seven out of a possible nine¹⁶. Out of forty-five semi-presidential systems, only Mozambique scores higher. Therefore, one can plausibly argue that there is a direct correlation between the amount of power invested in the president and the failure of the system. Thus, the semi-presidential system is itself and alone at fault for vesting so much power in one person, thereby developing a *de facto* autocratic regime that presides in the guise of democracy.

In response to this counter-argument, it is important to note that a powerful presidency in a semi-presidential system does not by itself directly correlate to the strength of democracy within that system. For example, according to the Sairoff scale, the power of the French president is equal to that of the Russian president (seven out of nine on the scale)¹⁷. However, with respect to parliamentary power, France scored twelve points higher in the PPI scale than Russia and is approaching the parliamentary power of the United States¹⁸. The contrast between France and Russia's PPI Scale suggests that a powerful parliament may balance the potential autocracy of a powerful president and maintain a liberal democracy in a semi-presidential political system. Thus, as demonstrated by the comparison of France and Russia, the inherent faults of a semi-presidential political caucus cannot be faulted for the failure of liberal democracy in Russia.

Secondly, the failure of liberal democracy in Russia has led to an economic downturn and the stagnation of the Russian economy. Prior to the collapse of communism, the Soviet Union's GDP in 1990 and 1991 was \$570 billion dollars and \$560 billion dollars, respectively¹⁹. However, by the year 1998, Russian GDP was reduced to fifty-five percent of what it was prior

¹⁶ Elgie, *McMenamin, Semi-Presidentialism and Democratic Performance*, 331

¹⁷ Elgie, *McMenamin, Semi-Presidentialism and Democratic Performance*, 331

¹⁸ Steven M. Fish and Matthew Kroenig. *The Handbook of National Legislatures: A Global Survey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

¹⁹ "United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts." United Nations Statistics Division. N.p., 1 Dec. 2010. Web. 26 Nov. 2011. <<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resQuery.asp>>

to the collapse of the Soviet Union²⁰. Moreover, by the end of 1999, more than twenty-five percent of Russia's population was living below the subsistence level²¹. According to the Index of Economic Freedom, by the year 2000 Russia's economy ranked 122 out of 161 countries²². Importantly, the economic downturn in Russia following the collapse of communism can be attributed to the failure of liberal democracy to properly develop political institutions and widespread corruption that has led to the oligopolistic concentration of wealth.

Russian economic collapse after the fall of the Soviet Union can be attributed to the failure of liberal democracy to properly develop political institutions to liberalize, stabilize, and privatize the Russian economy²³. With the collapse of the Soviet Union many consumer products and goods' prices were de-regulated and market factors were used to determine price. While this allowed for adequate supply to reach demand, inflation became rampant and had reached twenty-five hundred percent per annum by 1992²⁴. Moreover, the real average monthly wage relative to prices decreased by over sixty percent from 1990 to 1992²⁵. Thus, consumer purchase power decreased and poverty increased. However, a notable exception to the complete liberalization of the economy was the energy sector. In 1992 domestic oil prices were only ten percent of the world price and in 1998 the cost of domestic fuel was still at only seventy-five percent of the world price²⁶. Still, no sector of the Russian economy was immune from corruption. With the institution of the loans for shares program in Russian energy companies, wealth amongst the classes became significantly perverted and the gap between the rich and the poor grew at an

²⁰ Zoltan Barany, and Robert Moser. "Russian Economic Reform, 1991-1999." *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 136. Print.

²¹ Barany, Moser, *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, 136

²² Gerald P O'Driscoll Jr., and Kim R. Holmes, and Melanie Kirpatrick. *2000 Index of Economic Freedom* (New York: The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal, 2000).

²³ Barany, Moser, *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, 136

²⁴ Barany, Moser, *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, 145

²⁵ Barany, Moser, *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization*, 152

²⁶ Barany, Moser, *Russian politics: Challenges of Democratization*, 142

elephantine rate. As a result, the liberal “destatization”²⁷ of the energy sector without effective laws to define and enforce relationships between business and politics created a corrupt kleptocracy²⁸ that enhanced the wealth of bourgeois politicians while allowing an oligopolistic control of natural resources to emerge. Thus, democratic economic reform in Russia has effectively served to marginalize the income of ordinary Russian citizens and transfer wealth from state resources into the hands of an elite, oligopolistic few.

In response to the aforementioned argument, the objection is raised that Russia’s economic decline was directly a result of international market factors and not the result of an inept liberal democracy. For instance, fallout from the 1997 Asian financial crisis and a global depression of oil prices depressed Russian GDP by twenty-eight percent from 1997 to 1998²⁹. Such a downturn in the Russian economy can be linked to external market factors that adversely affected the Russian economy as it would any other market economy. Moreover, the state of the Russian economy in the years following the global financial crisis provide further support to the argument that it was market forces, rather than the absence of an effective political structure, that caused the collapse of the Russian economy. Russian GDP per capita grew at a rate of six point four and ten percent in 1999 and 2000 respectively, and market stabilization led to higher than average economic growth and prosperity of the middle class³⁰. In addition, after the Russian financial crisis in 1998 until 2007, Russia’s middle class saw their disposable incomes double with an average growth rate of seven percent per annum³¹. Compared with France, a country with a similar semi-presidential democracy, Russian economic growth from 1997 to 2007 was on

²⁷ Barany, Moser, *Russian politics: Challenges of Democratization*, 141

²⁸ A form of political and governmental corruption where the government exists to increase the personal wealth and political power of politicians and the ruling class

²⁹ “United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.” United Nations Statistics Division. N.p., 1 Dec. 2010. Web. 26 Nov. 2011. <<http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resQuery.asp>>

³⁰ United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.

³¹ “The World Factbook.” Russia. Central Intelligence Agency, 15 Nov. 2011. Web. 26 Nov. 2011. <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html>>.

average three hundred percent higher³². Thus, after accounting for the impact of global market factors, statistics demonstrate that Russia's newfound liberal democracy has fostered economic development and growth and has not resulted in economic stagnation.

In response to this counter-argument, it is important to note that while total Russian GDP has risen since the collapse of the Soviet Union, GDP per capita has fallen. In 1980, at the height of the Soviet Union, GDP per capita was \$3,542³³. In 2000, nine years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, GDP per capita was \$1,771³⁴. This represents a near fifty percent decline in the average income of Russian citizens since the introduction of liberal democracy. Moreover, the year 2000 is important, as the 2000 Russian presidential elections represented the pinnacle of liberal democracy and freedom in Russia following the collapse of communism. Although liberal democracy was at its height, economic performance for the ordinary citizen was at nadir. Furthermore, responding to the comparison of economic growth with France, it is important to note that French GDP per capita through 2007 was nearing its apex, with the average GDP per capita at four and a half times that of Russia, or approximately \$41,000³⁵. Thus, the comparison of economic growth between the two countries is flawed, as one represents the emergence and growth of a rapidly developing economy, while the other represents the economic performance of an economy that is already largely developed.

Lastly, liberal democracy in Russia has failed to result in substantive social freedoms for Russian citizens. Under the Soviet regime, Soviet citizens read biased newspapers, were not permitted to travel freely, and could not vote freely. While some of these basic freedoms have more or less been made available to Russian citizens, the incorporation of civic society into the Russian social structure has failed. According to Robert Putnam, the function of civic society is

³² United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.

³³ United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.

³⁴ United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.

³⁵ United Nations Statistics Division - National Accounts.

to increase “social capital” and “social connectedness” that will eventually facilitate cooperation and coordination for the common good of society³⁶. Putnam asserts that a civic society has important functions on both the horizontal and vertical level. On the horizontal level, civic society builds up social capital amongst people and facilitates cooperation in democratic development. On the horizontal level, civic society serves the purpose of an external regulator, checking the “abuse and misuse” of government power³⁷. With respect to both the horizontal and vertical functions of civic society, Russian civic society has failed as a result of indirect influence by the Russian government.

The failure of civic society in Russia is a result of government restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the indirect censorship of the media by the Russian government. Firstly, prominent anti-Kremlin NGOs have seen increased levels of taxation to thirty-five point nine percent and have also experienced increased levels of harassment by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB)³⁸. Moreover, under the Putin government, some NGOs have simply been denied registration. An example is the Kremlin’s denial of registration for the Salvation Army on the pretext that it was a militarized organization that might pose a threat to the government³⁹. In addition, in 1997, under the Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Association, non-registered religious organizations could face “liquidation” by court order⁴⁰. Consequently, the horizontal and vertical functions of civic society in Russia have been lopsided. The liberal democratic system in Russia has created a managed democracy in which the rule of law is selectively enforced to subordinate the will of the people to the needs and wants of the state.

³⁶ Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, and Andrei Riabov. "Civil Society." *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004. 140-141. Print.

³⁷ McFaul, Nikolai, and Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 141

³⁸ McFaul, Nikolai, and Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 159-162

³⁹ McFaul, Nikolai, and Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 162

⁴⁰ McFaul, Nikolai, and Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 162

Similarly, the media has been rendered an opaque, biased tool to promote state propaganda. According to Larry Diamond, the sixth fundamental characteristic of a liberal democracy is that there are alternate, independent sources of media to which citizens have “politically unfettered access”⁴¹. In post-communist Russia, media outlets are either state owned or are controlled by oligarchs who use the media as a political tool. Under Putin, when media outlets broadcast unfavorable material, such as the coverage of the Chechen war, their owners are threatened with imprisonment⁴². As such, “Putin is no enemy of free speech. He simply finds it absurd the idea that someone has the right to criticize him publically”⁴³. Hence, Russian civic society is manipulated and controlled by those in government; it is starved by the very liberal democracy it tries to regulate. As a result, liberal democracy as practiced in the post-Soviet Russia has failed to result in substantive social advances for Russian citizens.

In response to the aforementioned argument, the objection is raised that despite the problems associated with the transition to liberal democracy, Russian people generally enjoy more social freedoms than prior to the collapse of communism. With the end of communism and the beginning of Perestroika, people were able to reintegrate into a heterogeneous civic society predicated upon their own political beliefs. At the beginning of Perestroika in 1987, roughly thirty thousand informal political organizations were formed⁴⁴. By 1990, this number had doubled⁴⁵. With the end of communism, three main political agendas took precedence: Russian nationalists who emphasized the importance of cultural heritage, human rights groups that sought to cement the rule of law, and a Marxist group, albeit a significant minority⁴⁶. As communist rule ended and liberal democracy was installed, civic participation erupted. A country once bent on a

⁴¹ McFaul, Nikolai, Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 3

⁴² McFaul, Nikolai, Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 189

⁴³ Ksenia Pomomareva, Deputy chief of Vladimir Putin’s presidential campaign staff in 1999-2000, March 26, 2001 (reported in the St. Petersburg Times, March 27, 2001)

⁴⁴ Nicolai Petro. "Russia's Alternative Political Organizations." *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995. 147. Print.

⁴⁵ Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture*, 147

⁴⁶ Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture*, 147

single ideological monolith was transformed into one where fifteen million people claimed membership in some form of a political group⁴⁷. Therefore, to assert that there was a decline or stagnation in social freedom with the institution of liberal democracy would be erroneous.

In response to this counter-argument, it is important understand the difference between political association and political action. While citizens have been permitted to join political organizations following the collapse of communism, their role has remained minimal. In a 1995 poll, sixty-six percent of Russians responded that ordinary citizens have no role to play in democracy, only politicians do⁴⁸. By 1997, this number had risen to seventy percent⁴⁹. Moreover, by 1997, seventy-four percent of Russian citizens believed that democratic procedures were a “façade”⁵⁰. Hence, while some democratic political organizations have been created, the masses that participate in civic society recognize that their impact is negligible. Thus, while liberal democracy in Russia has created the promise of political participation in a civic society, in reality, however, it has only created a bourgeois political elite whose members control the majority of the Russian political landscape.

In summary, this essay has addressed the question of whether or not Russian democracy has failed after the fall of communism and has argued that true liberal democracy has failed to emerge in post-Soviet Russia, as the Russian government has failed to unite its citizens under a cohesive national political ideology predicated upon the belief in a democratic semi-presidential system of liberal democracy. Firstly, this essay has shown that the Russian semi-presidential government has deprived Russian citizens of fair and equitable elections that promote liberal democracy. Secondly, this essay has demonstrated that economic stagnation has arisen as a direct result of unsound economic policy forwarded by the liberal democratic government. Lastly, this

⁴⁷ Petro, *The Rebirth of Russian Democracy: An Interpretation of Political Culture*, 147

⁴⁸ McFaul, Nikolai; Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 276

⁴⁹ McFaul, Nikolai; Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 276

⁵⁰ McFaul, Nikolai; Andrei, *Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political Reform*, 276

essay has shown how the Russian liberal democratic government has curtailed and managed social rights and selectively enforced the rule of law to arbitrarily ban various social groups.

The implications of Russia's current failure at liberal democracy may result in significant ramifications in the future. With the corruption of government, the depression of the economy, and a lack of social groups that can promote any irrevocable change, the current liberal democracy in Russia may only continue to worsen. Eventually, the marginalization of ordinary citizens may become too much for the democratic system to bear, and something may change. As demonstrated by Russian history, the method of this change will remain uncertain. However, it is certain that revolution is not out of the question.

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“Reconciling International Intervention and National Sovereignty with Respect to Human Rights Atrocities in Rwanda and Kosovo”

By: Larissa Fulop

International law subsumes the principles that govern associations at the interface of sovereign states and is founded on both explicit and tacit agreements.¹ Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a pragmatic embodiment of the “inherent dignity” and “inalienable rights of all members of the human family” with the purpose of achieving “freedom, justice and peace in the world”.² Where the Declaration falls short, however, is in its failure to specify the circumstances under which state-sponsored human rights violations may necessarily justify intervention from the international community, a breach of national sovereignty. The charge of protecting human life and promoting human welfare lies first and foremost within the jurisdiction of sovereign states.³ But when a nation proves unable or unwilling to preserve elemental human rights, a responsibility deficit transpires at the expense of its citizens.

Can this deficit be replenished by a mobilization of international political will? If so, according to what authority and under what circumstances? Controversy surrounding international intervention for humanitarian purposes was spawned by distress felt in both Rwanda and Kosovo at the end of the 20th century, Rwanda epitomizing the cost of widespread inaction in the face of genocide⁴ and Kosovo raising questions with regard to both the moral and legal implications of unsanctioned and consequently

¹ Leonard Binder, “The Moral Foundation of International Intervention,” *Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation Policy Papers* 22 (1996): 5.

² “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” *United Nations*, accessed October 31, 2011, <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>.

³ Ramesh Thakur, “Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS,” *Security Dialogue* 33 (2002): 324.

⁴ Joel Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda,” *Words over War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, ed. Melanie Barton, John H. McGuinness, and Margaret E. Greenberg (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 213.

confounding intervention.⁵ To espouse absolute sovereignty is to risk being complicit in the face of humanitarian tragedy, yet to intervene liberally is to risk the subjection of weak states to stronger states in violation of customary international law. This paper argues that international intervention and state sovereignty are capable of co-existing to the extent that an upholding of the universal human rights to life and liberty remains the preeminent motivation of such interventions.

First, I will assess both moral and legal evaluations of a rights-based approach to international intervention. I will correspondingly address the issue of when, if ever, it is appropriate for a state to intervene into the affairs of another for the purposes of protecting foreign individuals from state-sponsored human rights abuses. I will then discuss reasons for the failure of and lessons learned from intervention in Rwanda, and consider rationalizations for and against intervention in the absence of Security Council consent with reference to Kosovo. Finally, I will contemplate the strengths and shortcomings of the ICISS report, 'Responsibility to Protect'.

Various schools of thought prescribing distinct tenets for how nations should interact have pervaded Political Science since the Enlightenment. In his essay *A Few Words on Non-Intervention*, John Stuart Mill questions "whether a nation is justified in taking part, on either side, in the civil wars or party contests of another."⁶ A realist response deals with the manifestations of power and confrontation in the world that advise states against compromising their national interests by extending themselves to others.⁷ Statists similarly caution against intervention but emphasize the structural and normative principles of international law that endorse sovereignty,⁸ while relativists appeal to cultural sensitivity in order to explain internal affairs as a matter of national jurisdiction⁹. All three perspectives, however, stress

⁵ Klinton W. Alexander, "Nato's Intervention in Kosovo: The Legal Case for Violating Yugoslavia's National Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval," *Houston Journal of International Law* 22 (2000): 431.

⁶ John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on Non-Intervention," *New England Review* 27 (2006): 261.

⁷ Jack Donnelly, *Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practice*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 155.

⁸ Donnelly, 157.

⁹ Donnelly, 158.

noninterventionism, a policy that falls short of protecting the human rights of foreign individuals who involuntarily suffer at the hand of corrupt domestic systems.

Maintaining an indispensable system of sovereign states is often considered to be incompatible with upholding universal human rights; a state may perceive a given course of intervention as patronizing if it is unable or transgressive if it is unwilling to protect the safety and lives of its people.¹⁰ According to Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.¹¹

Yet according to Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”.¹² When a nation fails to uphold human rights, two international standards, state sovereignty and individual sovereignty, inevitably come into conflict.¹³ This is not to say, however, that these two standards cannot enjoy a measure of cooperation. International law should and, for the sake of legitimacy, must, be based on universally recognized principles of morality. This morality need not be the product of formal international agreements nor based on any Westphalian legal archetype.¹⁴ If it is to have any practical significance, morality must be rooted in an implicit global consensus to uphold a diffuse rights-based ethical system.¹⁵ That human rights are fundamental and, as such, are vested in all individuals as members of the human race is vital to understanding the interdependency that need exist

¹⁰ Binder, 7.

¹¹ “Charter of the United Nations,” United Nations, accessed October 31, 2011, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.

¹² “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”

¹³ Mohammed Ayoob, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty,” *The International Journal of Human Rights* 6 (2002): 81.

¹⁴ Joelle Tanguy, “Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention,” *Ethics & International Affairs*, 17 (2003): 141.

¹⁵ Binder, 5.

between core, moral validations for human rights and technical formalities of the international legal process.¹⁶

The United Nations is the crux of international law enforcement and, accordingly, is the sole organization with power to authorize an intervention into sovereign territory.¹⁷ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) constitutes an intergovernmental military coalition for enforcement action where nations fail to diplomatically resolve internal conflicts.¹⁸ Having determined the gravity of a threat to international peace and security, the United Nations will authorize forceful intervention by NATO only as an unfavourable last resort.¹⁹ Although the UN Charter forms the framework within which the coalition operates, the United Nations and NATO's respective stances on intervention are as distinct as the organizations are from each other. Moreover, NATO is comprised of only 28 out of a total 193 UN member states and has experienced limited expansion since its founding in 1949.²⁰ These factors have most likely contributed to an atmosphere of strong disaffection towards the coalition and the intervention efforts it stands for in both the South and East. These reality of conflicting ideologies in international politics poses a great obstacle for bringing the United Nations' utopic state system, built on both a respect for sovereignty and the assurance of individual security, to fruition.²¹

Intrastate conflicts are unique in character and decisions to either abstain or intervene have had and will continue to have differential effects under distinct circumstances. The failure of the international community to thwart high-profile human rights atrocities in Rwanda in 1994 was largely influenced by the acute effects of intervention in Somalia less than a year prior.²² Having entered the region as part of a

¹⁶ Heinz Klung, "Transnational Human Rights: Exploring the Persistence and Globalization of Human Rights," *Annual Review of Law and Social Science*, 1 (2005): 86.

¹⁷ Thakur, "Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS," 324.

¹⁸ Clara Portela, "Humanitarian Intervention, NATO and International Law," (Research Rep., Berlin Information-center for Transatlantic Security, 2000), 3.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ "NATO Member Countries," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed November 2, 2011, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-EC343800E2CA6C64/natolive/nato_countries.htm.

²¹ Thierry Tardy, "The UN and the Use of Force: A Marriage Against Nature," *Security Dialogue* 38 (2007): 50.

²² Matthew Krain, "International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides," *International Studies Quarterly* 49 (2005): 364.

UN humanitarian mission, American forces unforeseeably found themselves in combat with and humiliated by Somali warlords following attempts to cultivate a level of stability that would virtually eliminate the need for future interventions.²³ The inadvertent result was a widespread dissemination of prudence and anti-interventionism in light of the little payoff tendered by this great risk.²⁴

When faced again with a situation of state-sponsored human rights abuses in Rwanda, the UN was reluctant to commit extensive resources.²⁵ In an effort to avert another Somalia, the international community ironically became implicated in an unprecedented humanitarian tragedy. Hutu military extremists and government officials in opposition to the power-sharing Arusha Accord between president Habyarimana and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) carried out the assassination of Habyarimana and ensuing organized slaughter of over 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus, so as to impede an RPF takeover.²⁶ In light of Somalia, the extent of international intervention in the early stages of conflict was limited to many Western nations ensuring the safe evacuation of their own citizens followed by a short-lived United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR).²⁷ The deployment of UNAMIR II, in response to mounting reports of civilian casualties, similarly failed to curb violence seeing as its full measure of troops and resources was not realized until months after the conflict had dissipated.²⁸ Furthermore, a belated Security Council-sanctioned intervention by the French, although

²³ George B. N. Ayittey, "The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution," Cato Institute: Policy Analysis, 1994, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-205.html>.

²⁴ Krain, 364.

²⁵ William Ferroggiore, "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction," The National Security Archive, 2001, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/index.html>.

²⁶ Stettenheim, 234.

²⁷ "The US and the Genocide in Rwanda 1994: Evidence of Inaction."

²⁸ Ibid.

successful in creating a 'safe zone' for the displaced, actually facilitated the flight of chief military and political culprits of genocide.²⁹

The Rwandan genocide epitomizes undue suffering at the expense of vacillation and administrative hurdles in the international arena. Proponents of more vigorous action, such as ex-Force Commander of UNAMIR Roméo Dallaire, struggled against the executive power of the Security Council in a post-Somalia climate.³⁰ Dallaire principally blamed "the American leadership, [which projected] itself as the world policeman one day and a recluse the next", for squashing any prospect of preemptive action against those suspected of plotting genocide.³¹ An inquiry into the UN's failure to thwart the genocide unsurprisingly revealed "a serious gap between the mandate and the political realities in Rwanda and between the mandate and the resources dedicated to it".³² Given the upset of American forces in Somalia, abstaining from Rwanda undoubtedly had the underlying economic and political motives of safeguarding both resources and reputation. In summation, a lack of political will from the Security Council and other UN member states obscured the glaring need for intervention. With the benefit of hindsight, however, the international community came to acknowledge that the early action insisted on by Dallaire was both lacking and necessary, and vowed to shift its image from bystander to participant.³³

NATO's intervention into Kosovo in 1999 raised issues of an entirely different nature: can taking forceful action against another state, albeit with humanitarian motives, be justified in the absence of express Security Council consent? Like Rwanda, conflict in Kosovo was fueled by ethno-political tensions.³⁴ The largely Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) sought the separation of Kosovo from

²⁹ Linda Melvern, "French accused of complicity in genocide that killed a million in Rwanda," *The Independent*, 5 November 2006. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/french-accused-of-complicity-in-genocide-that-killed-a-million-in-rwanda-423029.html>.

³⁰ Krain, 367.

³¹ "In Depth: Romeo Dallaire," CBC News Online, 9 March 2005, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/dallaire/>.

³² "Rwanda: Inquiry Finds UN failure to halt 1994 genocide," United Nations: Africa Recovery, December 1999, <http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/subjindx/134peac2.htm>.

³³ Stettenheim, 235.

³⁴ Roberto Belloni, "Kosovo and Beyond: Is Humanitarian Intervention Transforming International Society?" review of *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society* by Nicholas J. Wheeler and *The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions* by Ken Booth, *Human Rights & Human Welfare* 2 (2002): 40.

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which ultimately led to an incursion by Yugoslav military forces and the ensuing Kosovo War of 1998-1999.³⁵ Under the direction of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic, Serbian forces conducted massacres, arson, and rape throughout Kosovo in an effort to dissuade civilians from supporting the KLA and, ultimately, to drive off the KLA itself.³⁶ The Security Council condemned the massacre but at the same time reaffirmed its commitment to the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.”³⁷ NATO had warned that it would conduct airstrikes if the Serbs did not comply with the UN’s demands for a cessation of hostilities.³⁸ Following the discovery of mass graves of Albanian civilians in Racak, NATO took up arms against Serbian units despite the absence of a UN endorsement of force for purposes other than the protection of unarmed monitors in the event of emergency.³⁹

NATO’s intervention in Kosovo—the first of its kind to bypass the consent of both the Security Council and the warring state in question during the post-Cold War era—became a matter of intense debate within the international community.⁴⁰ Although espoused by ex-Secretary General Kofi Annan, it was reproached by Russian President Boris Yeltsin who contended that NATO had contravened the inviolable standard of national sovereignty embodied in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.⁴¹ But nowhere in the UN Charter is a sovereign nation granted the right to repress its own people. In view of lessons learned from both the Holocaust and Rwanda, NATO felt morally obliged to act independent of an irresolute Security Council in order to avert catastrophe.⁴² With the application of force, its campaign was successful in destroying Serbian bases, communication towers, weapons, and vehicles, in building tent

³⁵ Julie Mertus, “Reconsidering The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from Kosovo,” *William and Mary Law Review* 41 (2000): 1744.

³⁶ Marry E. O’Connell, “The UN, NATO, and International Law After Kosovo,” *Human Rights Quarterly* 22 (2000): 75.

³⁷ Alexander, 434-35.

³⁸ Mertus, 1745.

³⁹ O’Connell, 79.

⁴⁰ Alexander, 436.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Portela, 7.

cities for the displaced, and ultimately putting an end to human rights abuses in Kosovo.⁴³

The inability of the Security Council, once again, to reach consensus on how to approach the discord between sovereignty and ethics, made it impossible for NATO to both protect civilian life and comply with international law.⁴⁴ However, this independent action risked undermining the international security framework by setting an unclear precedent as to what authority and what circumstances might justify future interventions.⁴⁵ Nonetheless, if an intervention is successful in thwarting a humanitarian tragedy, it should be commended not condemned by the international community. In the case of Kosovo, the moral benefits of intervention notwithstanding, state sovereignty and unanimous consent from the Security Council significantly outweighed its legal costs.

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established by the Canadian government in 2000 following Kofi Annan's call for a new world order,

It is essential that the international community reach consensus not only on the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights must be checked, wherever they take place, but also on ways of deciding what action is necessary, and when, and by whom.⁴⁶

A functional manifestation of this ideal emerged as 'The Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) in 2001, an ICISS report created to redefine the role of military intervention for humanitarian purposes.⁴⁷ The report constitutes a spectrum of principles, from the more general responsibility to prevent conflict and foster sustainable peace to the more specific and cautionary criteria to ensure that intervention is of ethical legitimacy.⁴⁸ The principle of responsibility to protect emanates from a need to bridge discrepancies

⁴³ Alexander 436-37.

⁴⁴ Michael W. Doyle, "International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect," *International Studies Review* 13 (2011): 79-80.

⁴⁵ Tardy, 61.

⁴⁶ Kofi Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," *The Economist*, 18 September 1999, 49.

⁴⁷ Doyle, 80.

⁴⁸ Dan Kuwali, "The African Union and the Challenges of Implementing the 'Responsibility to Protect'," *The Nordic Africa Institute, Policy Notes* 4 (2009): 1.

surrounding conceptions of intervention and state sovereignty; a norm of non-intervention ought to prevail, ceding to an international responsibility to protect only when the domestic responsibility is being unfulfilled.⁴⁹

The ICISS confers three primary duties on the international community: the responsibilities to prevent, to react, and to rebuild in the event of large scale human rights abuses such as genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.⁵⁰ A responsibility to protect must neither begin nor end with the actual act of intervention, but requires that sources of conflict be addressed at the outset and that afflicted regions be provided comprehensive assistance with reconstruction efforts following an intervention. Yet despite its apparent benefits, many critics feel that the possibilities proposed in R2P for a new world order will be confined to “failed” states, effecting a polarized structure whereby sovereignty is largely upheld in the Western world but increasingly suspended in Africa and the Middle East.⁵¹ Others feel that many nations lack the resources and operative preparedness required to respond to great atrocities locally let alone internationally.⁵² Intervention must avoid a “one size fits all” approach if it is ever to collectively be deemed just. Specific case-by-case bases should instead constitute grounds for interventions that are both mindful of a nation’s geopolitical clout and proportionate to a nation’s effective capacities.

Noninterference, the initial reaction to Rwanda, permits a harmful situation to go unabated and may even escalate violence by communicating apathy or consent from a muted international community. However, an intervention that challenges perpetrators of human rights abuses while providing support to victims, as was the case in Kosovo, has the greatest chance of halting or at least reducing the severity of violence to a point where meaningful discourse can transpire between representatives of the international community and representatives of the state in question. A responsibility to protect correlates with individuals’ rights to be protected and, as emphasized in R2P, prevention must always precede an

⁴⁹ Thakur, “Outlook: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS,” 323.

⁵⁰ Doyle, 80.

⁵¹ Mahmood Madmani, “Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish? Humanitarian Intervention and Its Critics,” *Africa Unbound*, 2009, http://africaunbound.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=115.

⁵² Kuwali, 2.

intervention and reconstruction efforts must follow. While various notable failures have caused many to doubt the effectiveness of intervention as a means of counteracting human rights abuses, intervention should not be dismissed but explicated; to require that the international community respond to all human rights atrocities is to guarantee that it responds to none, yet to insist that it respond to none is to guarantee atrocities. A holistic approach to sovereignty and intervention is thus plausible insofar as discrepancies between moral and legal justifications for intervention are overcome to reveal the fundamental interconnections inherent in international human rights.

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COMPARATIVE POLITICS

“Democratization in South Korea in Comparison to the Schmitter, O’Donnell and Whitehead
Transitions Framework”

By: Laurence Batmazian

On June 29, 1987, the Korean government ceded to the demands of protestors and surprisingly passed legislation immediately liberalizing many aspects of the previous authoritarian government. This represented the third and last “democratic juncture” allowing the country to smoothly transition from decades of political instability into the democratic consolidation stage. There were a number of theories developed in the mid-20th century that were used to explain the liberalization and democratization of authoritarian states. The transitions framework, introduced by Philippe C. Schmitter, Guillermo O’Donnell, and Laurence Whitehead, developed in reference to the democratization of Brazil and Spain involves the strategic maneuvering of both the authoritarian government and civil society groups. This essay will adopt O’Donnell’s explanation of the theory in his essay *Processes of Political Democratization* in the book *Counterpoints*. By using the second and third democratic junctures as cases in their own right, this essay will show that South Korean democratization, up to the point of democratic consolidation, fit the terms of the transitions framework as developed with reference to countries like Spain and Brazil. First, the transitions framework will be explained, followed by a comparison of both junctures displaying how the theory accurately describes the various groups, strategies, and fragmentations seen during Korean democratization.

O’Donnell properly defines a bureaucratic-authoritarianism as a state that fulfills the following three requirements: the coercive prohibition of the formation of organizations that publicly claim to represent the interests of the public sector, the nonexistence or formal existence of the basic institutions of political democracy, and the restriction of the political arena to only the actors that are already members. The transition can begin for a number of reasons such as a

perception that the bureaucratic-authoritarianism is so firmly consolidated that its leaders are lured into seeking legitimacy by way of elections, as in the Brazil case; alternatively it could occur because of the disappearance of a leader central to the regime, as in the Spanish case. These movements signal breaks within the solidarity of the authoritarian state that indicate to the opposition that some autonomous organization would not be repressed¹.

The transition's actors are a number of distinct groups with contradicting goals. On the government side, there are two groups, softliners and hardliners. The hardliners either believe in the bureaucratic-authoritarian government's unlimited duration or believe that the time to liberalize is yet to arrive. Regardless of their rationale, the hardliners are unconditionally opposed to liberalization throughout the process. Conversely, the softliners argue that the transition is a better alternative than the continuity advocated by the hardliners because they believe that liberalization will neutralize the most threatening opposition elements and effectively safeguard the fundamental interests of the dominant classes. The softliner group is always at risk of thinning out as members begin to get scared of the increasing speed of liberalization and move to the hardliner camp. However, this risk is also the softliner's advantage as they can bargain with the opposition that overadvancement of liberal goals could result in a retreat to the hardliner approach. It soon becomes evident as the transition begins that a hardline coup would likely be aimed at softliners as well as the opposition. Therefore, the softliners are stuck in balancing against a hardline coup and yet simultaneously against the over-reaching goals of the opposition.

The opposition is also split up into three groups. The opportunistic opposition is at one end of the spectrum and will accept any proposals by the softliners. If the opportunistics become

¹ Przeworski, Adam, "The Games of Transition," in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, ed. Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame), 108.

the main voice of the opposition, it will eventually halt democratization at the stage just short of political democracy. On the other end of the spectrum is the maximalist opposition which refuses to negotiate with the bureaucratic-authoritarianism. Thus, they view the opportunistic opposition as traitors to the cause. The maximalist opposition, as the radicals, give the hardliners fuel. Their goal is for a speedy democratization which throws aside the bureaucratic-authoritarianism's fundamental interests, which usually results in a state crisis. If the maximalists become the dominant voice in the transition, there is usually a high risk of a coup which could result in an opposition government plagued by disorder, overly-high objectives, and a highly speculative economy. Finally, the moderate opposition lies between the opportunistic and the maximalist viewpoints. This group is heterogeneous in its ideals and while all members want to establish a political democracy, some members will want to go further and expand democracy into the economic and social areas as well. They are distinct from the maximalist opposition in that they are ready to guarantee that the fundamental interests of the bureaucratic-authoritarianism will not be violated while establishing a democratic regime.

The main strategy for the transition is for the moderate opposition to enter into a coalition with the authoritarianist softliners as both are strongly interested in neutralizing the hardliners and the maximalists. As the repression initially declines, for whatever reasons, there is an outburst of autonomous organizations of civil society, which declare their independence from the regime². Over time, the moderate opposition, often a sub-group within civil society, asks for more and more concessions over time in an attempt to get the softliners to accept a degree of democratization greater than what was first envisioned. At every democratic juncture, the moderates must consider how much the softliners can be pushed. Furthermore, both sides must

² Ibid, 109.

be convinced that they are getting what they want and that the other side's commitments are binding. Eventually, if the strategy continues, by the time the softliners realize that the state has been heavily democratized and that their fundamental interests have been changed, it is too late for the hardliners to return the state to its original authoritarian ideals. Alternatively, if the hardliners realize early enough that the state is over-stretching its liberalization, it may choose to use military force to crush the opposition and return to repression.

Gretchen Casper, in her book *Negotiating Democracy*, expands on the idea of an “extreme conflict path” in which the government and opposition are at polar opposites with each other and “each actor [estimates] that it can obtain its ideal regime”³. This represents an alternative to the liberalization coalition as a method of effecting regime change. The process ends when one actor reassesses its position and realizes that it is very unlikely to obtain an outcome that even marginally protects its fundamental interests, and therefore chooses to allow for concessions. As the “panoply of popular organizations” get involved, the efforts of the popular groups such as labour unions and religious groups can play prominent parts in ending authoritarian rule⁴. In cases where this mass public realizes that the cost of continuing to support the opposition are too high due to attempted “neutralization” by the government, the opposition is forced to concede and the state continues along the authoritarian path. Alternatively, the opposition, acting as a non-conceding authoritarian-like group can also win if it has mass public support. However, regardless of the outcome, an authoritarian government is the result.

³ Gretchen Casper and Michelle M. Taylor, *Negotiating Democracy* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 92.

⁴ Scott Mainwaring, “Transitions to Democracy,” in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, ed. Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 303.

By analyzing the second and third democratic junctures (1973 to 1980; 1984 to 1987) in South Korea, each as their own case, this essay will show that the liberalization of South Korea closely follows the strategic transitions framework as described by O'Donnell.

In 1963, 1967, and 1971, the Korean government headed by President Park Chung Hee held elections to “confirm” his authoritarian legitimacy⁵. While Park expected to win the elections by a landslide considering his party had brought the country to economic success and was substantially involved in political manipulations, each election yielded a smaller margin than the last⁶. In 1971, he won the election against his opponent Kim Dae Jung with only 53.2% of the vote⁷. Fearing a future election loss, which would delegitimize the military-led government, Park Chung Hee held an executive coup on October 17, 1972 which instituted martial law, dissolved the National Assembly, and closed universities^{8,9}. The Yusin Constitution called for indirect presidential elections by a national electoral college, of which a third of members were appointed by the president¹⁰. Overnight, Park Chung Hee reverted whatever liberalization had occurred in Korea¹¹. By prohibiting the formation of organizations that publicly claimed to represent the interests of the public sector, removing even the formal existence of the basic institutions of political democracy, and finally restricting the political arena to only the actors that were already members, the Park government became the bureaucratic-authoritarian government as described by O'Donnell.

⁵ John Kie-Chiang Oh, *Korean Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 54.

⁶ Ibid, 59.

⁷ Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 57.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ John Kie-Chiang Oh, 59.

¹⁰ Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 58.

¹¹ Ibid.

The Yusin Constitution provided a common enemy to the opposition which escalated the motivation of antigovernment groups. Between 1974 and 1979, religious, intellectual, human rights, and writers' organizations joined the opposition movement suggesting to the regime a growing role of civil society against the authoritarian status quo¹². Despite harsh repression from Presidential Emergency Measures, the growing opposition began antigovernment campaigns such as the "One Million Signature Campaign for Constitutional Change" and dozens of "Prayer Meetings for the Nation"¹³ which called for liberalization. The rise of the "triple solidarity" of students, workers, and churches clearly began scaring the authoritarian government thereby initiating the transitions framework. By January 1974, three hundred thousand signatures had already been collected by the major opposition, the New Democratic Party (NDP). Furthermore, the alliance of the NDP, under Kim Young Sam, and the national civil society organizations in 1979 showed that a unified opposition had been created¹⁴. After an incident in August 1979, wherein female laborers staging a sit-in hunger strike in the NDP headquarters office were brutally repressed, the NDP declared a total war against the Park Chung Hee regime¹⁵. By this point, the creation of the two radical groups in the transitions framework had been completed. Kim Young Sam and the NDP represented the maximalist opposition, while the authoritarian government remained in a hardliner stance; thereby, making the formation of a liberalization coalition impossible and barring a smooth transition.

Segmentation in both the opposition and government, as predicted by the theory, soon followed. In October 26, 1979, Kim Chae Kyu, the director of the Korean intelligence agency, assassinated Park Chung Hee on the basis that his hardline approach would eventually cause the

¹² Ibid, 59.

¹³ Ibid, 59.

¹⁴ Ibid, 60.

¹⁵ Ibid, 62.

downfall of the authoritarian government¹⁶. This clearly reflects a split between the government softliners and hardliners. The assassination sent shockwaves throughout the state which prompted the major actors to rethink their strategies.

At first, the opposition, mostly represented by civil society groups, held street demonstrations in an effort to push the caretaker government into destroying the remnants of the authoritarian system. The political power void combined with fear of the opposition intensified the fragmentation of the government. The state under President Ch'oe Kyu Ha and martial law commander General Chong Sung Hwa responded favourably to the push by the maximalist opposition by releasing political prisoners and promising to amend the new constitution¹⁷. However, the hardliner/softliner struggle that the transitions framework describes became re-evident when a military coup, led by Chun Doo Hwan, Roh Tae Woo, and the authoritarian hardliners on December 12, 1979 installed a new military-led government¹⁸.

Without softliner support, the opposition quickly broke away and re-started its demands for radical change. On May 14, 1980, one hundred thousand students from thirty-four universities across the country demonstrated in the streets calling for Chun Doo Hwan's resignation¹⁹. Between May 14 and May 21, military hardliners decided to crush the maximalist opposition by imposing martial law, closing universities, and brutally suppressing demonstrators in the streets²⁰. The City of Kwangju became one of the strongholds of demonstrations in the face of martial law. In what is known as the "Kwangju Uprising", the government decided to

¹⁶ Ibid, 62.

¹⁷ John Kie-Chiang Oh, *Korean Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 75.

¹⁸ Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 65.

¹⁹ Ibid, 66.

²⁰ Ibid.

crush the opposition by using military force to disband the peaceful protestors²¹. Thousands of members of the opposition were injured or arrested in what became the end of Korea's second democratic juncture²².

The second democratic juncture suggests that the transitions framework is an accurate method of describing the transitional politics in South Korea in the late 1970s. The context of the bureaucratic-authoritarian government, the deadlock struggle between the government and opposition radicals, and the infighting between the hardliners and softliners are all consistent with the O'Donnell transitions framework. Finally, the strategic play by the moderate opposition upon the assassination of Park along with the military coup as the hardliners began to fear the downfall of the authoritarian state agree with the expectations of O'Donnell's theory. This essay will now contrast the second democratic juncture with the third democratic juncture in which there was a successful transition to the consolidation step of democratization.

The third democratic juncture occurred between 1984 and 1987. Between 1980 and 1984, the Chun regime held "social cleansing" campaigns and passed antidemocratic legislation which brought the political order and social environment under a military dictatorship²³. As mentioned in the transitions framework in reference to the Brazilian case, when a bureaucratic-authoritarianism feels secure enough in its stronghold on society that it begins to allow for some liberal principles, it can occasionally backfire and prompt the opposition to re-group. The Chun regime believed that its party would be successful in the upcoming National Assembly elections based on the substantial turnaround in the Korean economy, the ongoing restrictions on freedom

²¹ John Kie-Chiang Oh, *Korean Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 82.

²² Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 68.

²³ Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 80.

of the press, and the release of political prisoners in 1984²⁴. Thus, the authoritarian crisis beginning in 1984 was based on the overconfidence of the government in its stability of the status quo rather than political or economic failure. This overconfidence was further supported by the arrival of the Olympics in 1988 which required the Chun regime to publicize Korea as a stable and legitimate democracy²⁵.

However, Chun did not anticipate that the loosening of the authoritarian regime would prompt the reawakening of the aforementioned opposition made up by students, labor unions, and churches. These civil society groups, more untied and organized under national committees than in the 1970s, were able to establish a genuine opposition to the authoritarian government²⁶. The creation of the New Korea Democratic Party upon the release of Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung from the “political blacklist” attempted to unify the pro-democracy movement under a single party banner²⁷. Many radicals refused to even participate in the national elections which suggests the creation of a maximalist opposition versus moderate opposition. The election resulted in the NKDP receiving 35% of the vote which came as a shock to the ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP)²⁸. The DJP refused to accept the concessions with the NKDP on constitutional reform. This however reflects the NKDP’s commitment to being the moderate opposition by attempting to strike deals with the softliners towards liberalization while still allowing the continuance of some of the fundamental interests of the authoritarian government. Over time, the further consolidation of civil society organizations coupled with the constant refusal of the DJP to touch constitutional reform resulted in the NKDP’s resignation from the

²⁴ Ibid, 82.

²⁵ Ibid, 82.

²⁶ Sunhyuk Kim, “Civil society and democratization in South Korea,” in *Korean Society*, ed. Charles K. Armstrong (New York: Routledge), 55.

²⁷ Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 85.

²⁸ Ibid.

National Assembly and the reactivation of a massive democratization campaign using rallies, public declarations, and a signature campaign²⁹. The NKDP successfully launched a campaign to collect ten millions signatures nationwide which the regime unsuccessfully attempted to crush. The gravity of mass rallies along with the signature campaign prompted the splitting once again within the authoritarian government between the hardliners and softliners as outlined by the transitions framework. This split was mirrored in the opposition where the NKDP, at the protest of many people's movement groups, re-entered the National Assembly to participate in a special committee for constitutional reform. This reflects the multitude of groups expected in the transitions framework; however, it also draws out a difficulty in the theory in that it depends on personal perspective to decide whether NKDP acted as the opportunistic or moderate opposition while the other people's movement groups acted as a moderate or maximalist opposition. The coalition between the people's movement groups and the opposition NKDP was eventually restored in early 1987³⁰. Furthermore, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung decided to create a hardline opposition party which would be more radical in its demands for democratization. Hearing on the emergence of a more radical opposition quickly prompted Chun Doo Hwan to fall upon hardliner tendencies and unilaterally ended the constitutional reform discussion³¹. Violent protests, both pro and con-government, sprung up around the country. However, the tragic deaths of two university students, Pak Chong Ch'ol and Yi Han Yol, unified the opposition behind these "democratic martyrs" and caused a number of massive pro-democracy demonstrations around the country. These rallies eventually became strong enough that on June

²⁹ Ibid, 87.

³⁰ Ibid, 90.

³¹ Sunhyuk Kim, *Democratization In Korea: The Role of Civil Society* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 80.

29, 1987, the government dramatically and unexpectedly accepted the demands of the people's movement groups.

Contrary to the transitions framework as described by O'Donnell, much of this liberalization was dependent on the strategic moves and unification of the opposition rather than focusing on the trading of concessions within the coalition. The theory is accurate however in describing the various strategies and groups involved in the democratization process. Eventually, as the opposition became stronger and fruitlessly attempted to get concessions from the government, it began to call for help from civil society groups to mobilize the people. Finally, as the authoritarian government realized that it had no support from the general population, it had no choice but to fall for the demands of the NKDP. Thus, the process more closely follows the "extreme conflict path" as suggested by Gretchen Casper. However, as can be seen by later developments after 1987, the authoritarian government outcome predicted was not wholly accurate. Korea saw not only the handover of power between civilian governments but many aspects of democratic consolidation as well³².

A comparison of the two democratic junctures suggests that the transitions framework is able to accurately describe the types of groups formed within the liberalization process. While it leaves room for perspective as to whether a group can be classified as a moderate or radical, it is able to describe the general thematic goals of different groups within the spectrum. Furthermore, the fragmentation and strategic maneuvering of the Korean government and opposition as they attempted to protect their fundamental interests also fits the terms of the transitions framework. Therefore, the framework was able to describe the infighting within the authoritarian government

³² Young Jo Lee, "The Rise and Fall of Kim Young Sam's Embedded Reformism," in *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation* ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 103.

(which was clearer in the second democratic juncture) and the opposition (which became clear in the third democratic juncture). While the careful concessions made by the liberalizing coalition or the switch of authoritarian governments expected by Casper's theory's did not fit the terms of the liberalization, the transitions framework still holds to describe much of the Korea early democratization process.

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CANADIAN POLITICS

“Mighty Fortress or Humanitarian Haven? An Analysis of Canadian Immigration and Refugee Policy”
By: Katelyn Jones

For the last twenty years, throngs of migrants from around the globe have been induced or forced to flee their homelands. Since the collapse of both the Soviet Union and the communist economic system, mass migration has become a global phenomenon.¹ This phenomenon is part of what is known as the new world order (NWO). This NWO is characterized by transnational economic interdependence and the increased movement of capital to create a virtually “borderless world.”² Complexities have emerged because “while capital moves relatively freely and easily across international borders today in search of opportunities,” people do not.³

In reaction to the external phenomenon of global migration, states have increased restrictive immigration procedures and policy that keep the unwanted hordes out. Canada has followed suit. Although our society claims to be founded upon principles of social order and social justice, the Canadian immigration and refugee system has become a maze of red tape rather than a defender of democratic principles. It may be likened to a mighty fortress as opposed to a humanitarian haven. In order for this to be mended, immediate and robust federal and provincial government action is required through vast immigration policy reform.

To determine this, the essay is divided into three sections: 1) Description, 2) Case Study, and 3) Prescription. The first section contains an historical examination of Canada’s stance on immigration and refugees, with a description of the purpose of Canada’s immigration system. Following this is a look into the volatility of public opinion relating to immigration and a brief description of the components of Canada’s current refugee system. The second section is a detailed analysis of Bill C-11, the *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*: a major proposal for

¹ Lorne Foster, *Turnstile Immigration: Multiculturalism, Social Order & Social Justice in Canada* (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing Inc., 1998), 14.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

immigration reform recently passed in Parliament. The final section contains prescriptions for repairing Canada's immigration and refugee system through policy reform.

Description

Canada has a long tradition of helping people worldwide who seek protection. In the 42 years since signing the United Nations Refugee Convention, Canada has gained the enviable reputation of being a global leader in protecting refugees.⁴ Every year, Canada resettles 10,000 to 12,000 refugees, which is equivalent to 1 in every 10 refugees settled annually in nations around the world.⁵ An additional number of claims are filed by refugees seeking asylum from within Canada (reaching more than 32,000 in 2009⁶). Despite the growing number of migrants in need of asylum, population pressure indicators show that Canada is not a first haven for most asylum seekers.⁷ While the numbers of documented and undocumented migrants continue to rise exponentially, Canada's immigration measures only continue to be more restrictive; confirming that the aforementioned figure may be an erroneous attempt by Citizenship and Immigration Canada of attempting to display Canada's 'generosity'.⁸ In actuality, Canada's response to refugees has been both generous and stringent, and continues to be challenged by the increasing complexity of the new world order.

It is often recounted that Canada is 'a land of immigrants'.⁹ Since Confederation, the primary settlers have been from Britain and around the European continent.¹⁰ These immigrants largely left their homelands for the purpose of permanent resettlement in the hopes of greater

⁴ *Brief History of Canada's Responses to Refugees*, Canadian Council for Refugees, 2009.

⁵ "The Refugee System in Canada," *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*. Accessed 2 December 2011.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Foster, 13.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 14

⁹ Anthony H. Richmond, *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 130.

¹⁰ Gerald E. Dirks, *Canada's Refugee Policy: Indifference or Opportunism?* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1977), xi.

economic wellbeing.¹¹ Of the 728,000 British-born immigrants that currently live in Canada, however, they are rarely perceived as ‘immigrants’ (bar in official records).¹² A smaller (but increasingly significant) percentage of immigrants who sought to resettle in Canada did so to flee unbearable political or social conditions.¹³ When discussing immigrants, therefore, most people have this minority of arrivals from ‘non-traditional sources’ in mind.

Largely due to its immigrant foundations, for a great part of Canada’s history it has welcomed and encouraged immigration. In 1921, MP Samuel Jacobs spoke in favour of “those who are obliged to leave their own countries in Europe by reason of religious and social persecution” in a speech to the House of Commons.¹⁴ He also declared: “Now, this country, it seems to me, should be the haven of rest for people of that kind, and we ought to have our doors wide open for all those who flee from persecution, social or otherwise, in European countries.”¹⁵ Though Jacobs’ speech revealed a compassion for asylum seekers that was a political rarity at the time, his compassion markedly indicates an ethnic limitation. Historical records of Canadian immigration exhibit the obvious preference for European settlers (whether through voluntary immigration or forced migration).¹⁶ One author noted that “there was little pretense regarding the cherished ideals of liberal democracy upon which our egalitarian entitlements now flourish.” Consequently, the answer to the question who is best suited to join the Canadian society had been: European’s of “stalwart and industrious stock” with “hard-working, God-fearing, rational”

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Richmond, 130.

¹³ Dirks, xi.

¹⁴ *Brief History of Canada’s Responses to Refugees*.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Foster, 76.

values.¹⁷ It was only after the Industrial Revolution that Canada began to challenge these policies when faced with the declaration of the equal rights of all persons.¹⁸

By the 1970s, Canadian immigration developed chiefly as a family and refugee movement that emphasized humanitarian and compassionate aspects.¹⁹ It was at this time that a group of Tibetan refugees were welcomed- among the first non-European refugees permitted to resettle to Canada.²⁰ Soon following were more than 7,000 Ugandan Asians in 1972, many Vietnamese/Cambodians in 1975, and further Lebanese in 1976.²¹

Historian and academic Harold Troper alleged that by this time it was widely held that “Canada was then and always had been a haven for the oppressed. In retrospect the public imagination turned a select series of economically beneficial refugee resettlement programs into a massive and longstanding Canadian humanitarian resolve on behalf of refugees.”²² In view of this, it is not surprising that by the late 1980s Canada had an international reputation as a humanitarian and compassionate society.²³

In 1986, Canada was awarded the prestigious Nansen Medal from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in recognition of “their major and sustained contribution to the cause of refugees.”²⁴ This seemed to solidify Canada’s position as an international defender of vulnerable peoples and a safe haven to the needy. As will be discussed later, however, this assumption may have been awarded prematurely.

The 1980s also saw great immigration reform, including a new Immigration Act that leading political scientists described as “one of the best pieces of immigration legislation to be

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., 77.

¹⁹ Ibid., 77.

²⁰ *Brief History of Canada’s Responses to Refugees.*

²¹ Richmond, 132.

²² *Brief History of Canada’s Responses to Refugees.*

²³ Foster, 77.

²⁴ *Brief History of Canada’s Responses to Refugees.*

found anywhere.”²⁵ Despite this progressive policy, by the 1990s bills C-55, C-84 and C-86 were passed to deter new arrivals to Canada.²⁶ The increasing backlog of refugee claimants (reaching 125,000 persons by 1988²⁷) put more pressure on the system and generated more skepticism toward immigration in the Canadian public.

More recently, the Government of Canada has encouraged the admittance of business immigration. In 1998, special entrepreneur and investor classes brought an estimated \$3.1 billion to Canada.²⁸ 28 per cent of all business immigrants were from Hong Kong, with Taiwan, South Korea and the US representing significant numbers.²⁹ In spite of the perceived economic benefits to such programs, there has been much controversy surrounding issues of abuse by some who obtain entry to Canada but who refuse to fulfill their obligations once conducting business here.³⁰

The purpose of the immigration system is to find who is most appropriate to become part of Canadian society. In effect, it asks society’s question: “Who is best suited to join our regime?”³¹ The responsibility of immigration policy and the bureaucratic system is to identify the answer to this question by choosing individuals whose ideals are consistent with the guiding maxims of the Canadian people.

In general, because Canadian society is founded on principles of social order and social justice, immigration policy is meant to draw people who are both “industrious and compassionate, people who can create a life of progress and equality and people who can help

²⁵ Richmond, 172.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid., 159.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Foster, 13.

build a nation of abundance and generosity.”³² The historical and increasing presence of global migration means that states must also consider the acceptance of persons based not necessarily on these ideals; instead, persons are granted asylum based on their vulnerability due to political, social, economic or religious persecution.

Understanding the meaning of asylum is important to grasping the purpose of the immigration system. The Institute of International Law defines asylum as "protection which a state grants on its territory or in some other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who seeks it."³³ So, the granting of asylum essentially issues an individual absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of their original state of residence, but only to the benevolence of the secondary state of refuge. This definition is not exclusive, however, as exceptions do apply (for example, there is general consensus that war criminals do not qualify for asylum³⁴). This definition is the basis upon which various aspects of Canada’s immigration and refugee policy are founded.

Even with these comprehensive purposes, Canada’s acceptance or rejection of refugees is largely determined by various economic, political and humanitarian considerations.³⁵ This is because governmental decisions regarding immigration fundamentally reflect the prevailing attitudes or priorities of policy makers and the Canadian public at the time of implementation. Other major determinants of immigration and refugee policy include the “form of decision-making structures, the statures and effectiveness of the responsible Cabinet ministers, and the degree of confidence the government has had in its ability to determine accurately the public

³² Ibid.

³³ Dirks, 8.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid., 254.

interest.”³⁶ These considerations point to the vast complexities that exist in the immigration and refugee system and the challenges that arise when attempting to examine them for reform recommendations.

The volatility of public opinion related to issues of newcomers has become a trend in Canadian immigration policy. Conventionally, public support for immigration goes up or down as the economy fluctuates.³⁷ This has caused ‘the economics of immigration’ to come to the forefront as a public policy issue.³⁸ Politicians, policy advisors and social theorists have worked to promote the idea of a “mutual reciprocity of economy and other gains between newcomers and citizens.”³⁹ By endorsing a macro-myth that connects immigration with economic prosperity, they hope that apprehension over immigration will be reduced. Accordingly, they argue that immigrants create jobs and increase prosperity for all Canadians.

This economic hypothesis, however, is becoming more difficult to sell to the ordinary citizen. Instead of seeing the connection between immigration as a “mutually compensatory exchange”⁴⁰, many see newcomers to be taking jobs away from Canadians. Some see them only as pressures to the system; whereby they benefit from our social programs and insurance while giving back insufficient contributions.

This increasing insecurity is caused by economic uncertainty, and can result in forms of resistance and even racism. Such reactions often support immigration ‘reforms’ which, one author explains, is merely a “nostalgic yearning for a more familiar and stable society.”⁴¹ In this

³⁶ Ibid., 255.

³⁷ Foster, 18.

³⁸ Ibid., 142.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 143.

⁴¹ Richmond, 146.

scenario, the general public sees immigrants (only the visible minorities) as a detriment to their already economically unstable system.

An extreme example of this reactionary resistance to immigration is the outbreak of a fortress mentality. This outlook aims to protect family, neighbourhood, and country against perceived threats grounded in a fear of 'strangers'.⁴² It desires personal and collective security, but targets immigrants as the cause of economic uncertainty through means of hostility, discrimination or even violence. The detriments of such a mentality are vast, yet, as it will be shown, immediate and robust immigration policy reform could reduce damages and lessen the public opinion volatility regarding immigrants.

Canadian immigration policies focus on three concerns: 1) those that are admissible to the country for temporary or permanent residence, 2) initial settlement, and 3) long-term absorption into Canada's officially bilingual, multicultural society.⁴³ Comparatively, the refugee system has two main parts: the Refugee and Humanitarian Resettlement Program, for people seeking protection from outside Canada; and the In-Canada Asylum Program for people making refugee protection claims from within Canada.⁴⁴ These programs work to protect refugees in Canada who are at risk of torture or other cruel mistreatment in their home countries. As a signatory to the *United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment*, and in light of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*, refugee protection is meant to be a significant part of the Canadian legal framework.⁴⁵

⁴² Ibid., 146.

⁴³ Ibid., 130.

⁴⁴ "The Refugee System in Canada," *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*. Accessed 2 December 2011.

⁴⁵ "40th Parliament, 3rd Session, March 3, 2010-March 26, 2011: Legislative Summary." *LegisInfo*. Accessed 3 December 2011.

Case Study: Bill C-11

Finding who is in need of Canada's protection is a difficult process. Pressures on the system have emerged due a large number of asylum claims being determined as unfounded by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). This has led to a significant backlog of cases and long wait times for claimants.⁴⁶ Consequently, persons in genuine need of protection are forced to wait extended periods for a protection decision, while those who only aim to abuse the system end up staying in Canada for longer. Major proposals for immigration reform in Parliament were presented by the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism when he introduced Bill C-11, the *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*, to address these challenges.

Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the Federal Courts Act (short title: *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*), was introduced in the House of Commons on 30 March 2010 by the Honourable Jason Kenney.⁴⁷ The Conservative government's justification for this bill was a focus on streamlining the refugee determination process to deal with these new challenges (which included the backlog of 63,000 pending refugee claims, the delay in appointments to the IRB and the decrease in resources available to the IRB to administer these claims⁴⁸), as well as streamlining the removal process for rejected claimants to properly determine the applicants most in need of protection or requiring humanitarian consideration. In a news release, the government's stated intention in introducing these reforms was to "deliver quicker decisions on asylum claims and provide faster protection to those in need."⁴⁹ In total,

⁴⁶ "Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations," *Government of Canada: Canada Gazette*, Vol. 145, No. 12, 19 March 2011.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ "40th Parliament, 3rd Session, March 3, 2010-March 26, 2011: Legislative Summary."

⁴⁹ "New Release – Balanced Reforms Planned for Canada's Asylum System," *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*, 30 March 2010.

\$540.7 million would be set aside to implement the changes to the asylum system and to resettle more refugees from overseas.⁵⁰

Various global challenges also prompted the drafting of the bill related to the upward trend in asylum claims filed in industrialized countries and the increasing complexity of migration flows.⁵¹ Although the original draft of the bill contained positive features, the “fairness of the proposed system and its ability to properly determine applications by persons in need of protection or requiring humanitarian consideration” was questioned.⁵² This fact led various interest groups, individuals and concerned MPs to critically assess the bill and a number of amendments were suggested to ensure that fairness and accuracy would be preserved even with a faster processing and administrative system.

Interestingly, the passage of the Bill seemed to be a collaborative effort by all parties; with the acceptance of a series of amendments, the Bill received all-party support in both the House of Commons and the Senate.⁵³

A fast, fair and efficient system determination process favours legitimate refugees.⁵⁴ Therefore, Bill C-11 needed to be measured for both its fairness and expeditiousness in dealing with claimants. The Canadian Bar Association stated: “Expeditiousness without fairness leads to capriciousness and possible injustice. Fairness without expeditiousness leads to legitimate claims languishing in the system and encourages the proliferation of unmeritorious claims.”⁵⁵ Although

⁵⁰ “Backgrounder: Bill C-11: The *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*,” *Citizenship and Immigration Canada*.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² “Bill C-11, *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*,” *National Citizenship and Immigration Law Section: The Canadian Bar Association*, May 2010, pp. 3.

⁵³ “40th Parliament, 3rd Session, March 3, 2010-March 26, 2011: Legislative Summary.”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵⁵ “Bill C-11, *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*.”

a multitude of the policy proposals could be evaluated, the following is an examination of three of the major proposals put forth by the Bill.

First, a key development of the new system was the induction of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). Where there had previously been no appeal division, the new system allows for an oral hearing if “credibility issues arise as a result of the new evidence adduced.”⁵⁶ Because the only review previously available to claimants was judicial review in the Federal Court, this would ease constraints on the courts and would accelerate the waiting time for assessments. Decisions to appeals are to be made within 120 days or within 30 days for people from designated countries or with unfounded claims.⁵⁷

It is important to note that under Bill C-11 there is no access to the RAD by claimants whose country of origin is included on a government proposed list of “designated countries of origin”; thus a full appeal would only be available for “most” claimants.⁵⁸ The Liberal party expressed their concern about this wording. They suggested the provisions be changed to “safe countries of origin” so as not to provide the immigration minister with too much discretion in authorizing such countries and to avoid any politicization in the matter.⁵⁹

Second, and one of the most contentious aspects of C-11, is that the Immigration and Refugee Minister be allowed to compile a list of “Designated Countries of Origin”. Kenney stated that the criteria would be as follows: “if a country is a principal source of asylum claims to Canada, the overwhelming majority of which are unfounded; and if such a country is a signatory to and in compliance with international human rights instruments, which has a strong human

⁵⁶ Ibid., 16.

⁵⁷ “Background: Bill C-11: The *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*.”

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

rights record and which offers state protection to its citizens, including vulnerable individuals.”⁶⁰ He also explained that the designation process would be in the hands of a panel of senior officials who would consult with the UNHCR for support.⁶¹

Kenney claimed that this authority is needed due to the periodic spikes in unfounded claims from democratic and “safe” countries.⁶² He declared that “nationals from those countries, under these reforms, would still . . . have the same access they currently do to our asylum system. . . [but] would move somewhat more expeditiously, reducing the process by about four months by not allowing them to make two appeals.”⁶³ Despite his attempts to quell concern, a multitude of serious problems about this section were raised.

In an open letter from the Canadian Council of Refugees (CCR), they claimed that this proposal would create an “unfair two-tier system, denying some claimants access to the appeal based on nationality.”⁶⁴ They asserted that there can be severe persecution in countries that seem reasonably “safe” (for example, women making gender-based claims or claims made on the basis of sexual orientation)⁶⁵ which would not be fairly accounted for.

This concern was shared by the CBA. Because refugee determination is an individualized assessment,⁶⁶ they foresaw that there would be circumstances where a claimant would be deemed as founded even though they came from a country which is considered democratic and safe.

Following review by the Standing Committee, the designated countries of origin proposal remained in the Bill. Nonetheless, stricter limitations and criteria to be considered were added as regulations for the Minister when making designations.

⁶⁰40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Number 033, 26 April 2010.” *Legisinfo*.

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴“Bill C-11: Open Letter,” *Canadian Council for Refugees*, April 2010.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶“Bill C-11, Balanced Refugee Reform Act.”

Third, the Bill proposed restrictions on access to other immigration procedures for one year. In the 1st Reading of the Bill, persons who have made refugee claims were prevented from applying for a temporary resident permit for twelve months after their claim has been submitted.⁶⁷ Along with this, the Minister is prohibited from considering humanitarian and compassionate (H & C) grounds for anyone with a pending protection claim for a further year.⁶⁸ Whereas the old system allowed for immediate access to a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) after a negative decision was made by the IRB, the new system limited all access to PRRA for a full year after a final negative decision is reached (calling for the failed asylum claimant to be removed).⁶⁹ These provisions were meant to facilitate the prompt removal of failed refugee claimants so to reduce the backlog of claims.

Despite this aim, the one year ban to H&C applicants was of great concern. A Liberal member asserted that limiting access to this could “lead to people being deported in the face of humanitarian injustices and safeguards.”⁷⁰ As the H&C review process operates as a last resort of appeal for refugee, an entire avenue of recourse would be eliminated for the most desperate and vulnerable of refugee claimants. The Canadian Council for Refugees held that this bar would be limiting the recourse available to refugees (particularly affected children) as required by the UN *Convention on the Rights of the Child*.⁷¹

The CBA Section recommended that the one-year ban be completely withdrawn from the Bill. Because H&C applications are meant to “provide a vital safeguard to ensure that persons have a remedy for rights violations in circumstances that do not meet the stringent test for

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ “Backgrounder: Bill C-11: The *Balanced Refugee Reform Act*”.

⁷⁰ “40th Parliament, 3rd Session, Number 033, 26 April 2010.”

⁷¹ “Bill C-11: Open Letter,” *Canadian Council for Refugees*, April 2010.

refugee claims”⁷², they claimed the entire constitutionality of denying this recourse was in question.

After all readings in the House of Commons and amendments made by the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration (including the elimination of the 12-month prohibition of claimants⁷³), Bill C-11 received Royal Assent on June 29, 2010.⁷⁴

While preventing delays and abuse within the refugee system is important, the objective of all government reforms should be ensuring fair, effective service is provided to all who need it. Efforts to streamline the refugee system were obviously necessary, but (given the various areas of concern through policy in the Bill) fundamental fairness and individual rights must not be forgotten by the wayside of the process.

Prescription

As it has been shown, the Canadian immigration and refugee system is far from perfect. Though our society is founded upon principles of social order and social justice, the immigration system has become a maze of red tape rather than a defender of democratic principles. It may actually be more likened to a mighty fortress than a humanitarian haven. Nevertheless, it is not too late for policy reform to be instituted that would once again mark Canada as a leader in refugee protection and an upholder of humanitarian rights.

Every problem in the field of Canadian immigration stems from a lack of bureaucratic accountability.⁷⁵ It has been said that “bureaucracy seems to be the price we all have to pay for a ‘workable’ society.”⁷⁶ This suggests that we have no choice but to accept the maze of red tape and codified labyrinth of policies that our system has become. This belief is short-sighted,

⁷² “Bill C-11, Balanced Refugee Reform Act”.

⁷³ “40th Parliament, 3rd Session, March 3, 2010-March 26, 2011: Legislative Summary.”

⁷⁴ “Regulations Amending the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations.”

⁷⁵ Foster, 157.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

however, as it assumes that reformation and transformation is impossible. Change can be made if the root causes of this lack of accountability are identified.

Foster identifies the root cause as an “alienation and the fractured wholeness of modern life.”⁷⁷ This idea of modern alienation is seen in the human-less face of the bureaucracy. She argues that this is a structural problem that requires a structure solution and, therefore, puts forth four areas of reform that the Canadian immigration bureau must adopt to represent true democracy:

- (1) Enhancing interaction between the parties in the system, members of the public and the members of the administration;
- (2) Emphasizing informed consensus by compulsory public education and participation-driven decision making;
- (3) Creating effective receptors for transmitting information and for feedback; and,
- (4) Creating a culture of innovation that encourages and incubates new ideas.⁷⁸

Each of these solutions is essential to recreating an immigration system that is founded on democratic and humanitarian values.

The first and second recommendations address the issue of Canadians being largely left out of the decision-making process. Bureaucratic processes should not be so institutionalized that the average citizen is unable to give positive or negative feedback. Canada’s institutions should be “vehicles for public input and societal unity”⁷⁹; therefore, public participation should be encouraged at each juncture of the development of immigration policy.

The third recommendation relates to the challenge of the dissemination of policy to produce public feedback for improvement. The Auditor General of Canada has this as its formal task, but independent immigration research needs to be published for the public to receive unbiased and balanced evaluations of policy. Various think tanks publish evaluations of Canada’s immigration policy periodically (such as The Fraser Institute), but it is arguable

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 162

whether such reports are impartial. The Canadian Council for Refugees, therefore, needs assistance in educating the public in relation to immigration and refugee policy.

The fourth recommendation suggests that Canada's immigration policy focuses too much on sorting and selection of newcomers, and not enough on assisting them into Canadian life. Programs that support resettlement and adaptation exist for new immigrants, but they typically only last for one to two years upon their arrival. The Canadian Immigration Integration Program (CIIP) is a current program designed to further assist newcomers gain employment and social integration, yet this is only a five-year pilot program set to expire in 2012. Thus, a permanent and broad-focused program is needed to help immigrants adjust to Canadian life and increase their political, social and economic participation. Such a program would also benefit the larger Canadian public's view of new settlers and balance the volatility of public opinion related to immigration and refugees.

Another significant area of reform concerns the challenge of the shared federal and provincial jurisdiction of immigration. The Canadian Constitution grants this shared responsibility, although it gives the final determination of admissibility to federal authorities (Quebec is the only exception, with an independent department concerned with encouraging francophone immigration.).⁸⁰ This shared authority has caused major problems in skill and professional qualification recognition between provinces.⁸¹ It has meant, for example, that training in Ontario may not be recognized in Manitoba. In consequence, there has been resistance to making special arrangements for newcomers with foreign credentials. Some argue: why should foreign qualifications receive special handling when nationwide equivalence is not even acknowledged?

⁸⁰ Richmond, 144.

⁸¹ Ibid.

Therefore, reform is needed to work towards a coast-to-coast, Canada-wide recognition of skills and professional qualifications. This would alleviate concerns from Canadian-born citizens, as well as offer professional requalification and job opportunities across the provinces for Canadians and newcomers alike.

In conclusion, it has been shown that although Canadian society claims to be founded upon principles of social order and social justice, the immigration system is no longer a defender of democratic principles. It may be more likened to a mighty fortress than a humanitarian haven. In order for this to be mended, immediate and robust federal and provincial government action is required through immigration policy reform. One study based on refugees found this: "From its inception the experience of a refugee puts trust on trial. The refugee mistrusts and is mistrusted. In a profound sense, one becomes a refugee even before fleeing the society in which one lives and continues to be a refugee even after one receives asylum in a new place among new people."⁸² Refugees, therefore, place their trust and their lives in Canada when they make asylum claims. Considering this, we have the responsibility under the *Charter*, under the UN conventions and as Canadians not to abuse this trust.

⁸² E. Valentine Daniel and John Chr. Knudson, *Mistrusting Refugees*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995, p. 1.

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“The Growing Gap: Is Economic Inequality a Problem in Canada and Should Governments do Anything to Reduce it?”

By: Dawn Ellis

The attainment of opportunity, fairness and wealth in modern society is proving to be a daunting and challenging task. Some scholars dispute that the classification of society into categories of upper, middle and lower class by the level of income attainment does exist, maintaining that there are equal opportunities for every individual. Others contend that classism is not inevitable, and has been widely accepted and overcome by many. This brings forth the question; “is economic inequality a problem in Canada and should governments do anything to reduce it?” The purpose of this essay is to argue the importance of government intervention, to mitigate the problem of economic inequality in Canada. To validate the advancement of economic inequality in Canada, this paper is divided into three sections. In the first section, background information will frame the current magnitude and significance of economic inequality. In the second section, this paper will outline the case to limit government intervention by examining the neoliberal approach. This approach promotes the rule of the free market to lessen the economic inequality. Likewise, the institutions which support the neoliberal view will be identified, and their views explained. In the third section, this paper will present the case in favour of government intervention to correct or reduce the magnitude of economic inequality by means of mechanisms developed by the Keynesian-welfare approach. Furthermore, the interest groups that support the Keynesian-welfare approach will be determined, and their views explained. Finally, the significance of government intervention to reduce economic inequality in Canada will be reaffirmed and the ideologies presented by the neoliberal approach will be refuted.

In modern society, the growing division of “haves” and “have nots” has left many concerned with the future attainment of prosperity. A study conducted by Statistics Canada concluded that in the 1990s, many industrialized nations witnessed an increasing after-tax-income inequality meaning, that nations experienced an increase in the “gap between bottom- and top-income families” (Canada. Statistics Canada 2007). This phenomenon is being titled the ‘middle-class squeeze’, which describes the gradual decline of the middle-class (Wolff 2010: 1-2, 35). The gradual decline of the middle-class translates to a higher concentration of wealth at the top and a larger volume of individuals shifting from middle-class to the bottom or lower-class. For example, in the United States from 2007 to 2009, there was a decline in median wealth by 36.1 percent (Wolff 2010: 37). The decline in median wealth represents the diffusion of wealth to the top of the stratification. The ‘middle-class squeeze’ contributes to the growth of economic inequality because as the middle-class transitions to the lower-class, resulting in the expansion of wealth among the upper-class. The growth of economic inequality has numerous consequences within society.

The measure that is commonly used to quantify the impact of inequality within an economy is called the Gini coefficient (Chen, Tsaur, and Rhai 1982: 473). Inequality is ranked using a scale from 0.000 (zero) representing equality to 1.000 (one) representing the highest level of inequality (Chang, and Ram 2000:792-795). Referring back to the example used for the ‘middle-class squeeze’ in the United States between 2007 and 2009, the Gini coefficient rose from 0.834 to 0.865 (Wolff 2010: 37). This demonstrates the importance attempting to mitigate the effect of economic inequality because the middle class is being impacted by the growing inequalities. The hardships faced by the middle class include: proportionally higher taxation, lower quality social programs and the ramifications felt by an exponentially growing inflation

rate. Accordingly, these impacts will result in an even larger impact upon the overall productivity of society.

In Canada, the increase of the Gini coefficient is a result of the changing age mix, irregular pattern of lifetime income, and the increasing inequality of lifetime earnings (Armstrong, Friesen, and Miller 1977: 479). Baby Boomers are negatively affecting the Gini coefficient because the intergenerational transmission of their wealth is not occurring at a high enough frequency to minimize the economic inequality gap (Boix 2010: 512). In essence, children of Baby Boomers (Generation X) are not inheriting or maintaining the wealth of their parents. The irregular pattern of income was demonstrated in Canada, from 1989 to 2004 when income distribution between the 90th and 10th percentiles grew by more than one fifth (Canada. Statistics Canada 2007). Over a fifteen year period, “the absence of increases in government transfers to lower-income families or increases in taxes to higher-income families” has resulted in an even larger increase in the Gini coefficient (Canada. Statistics Canada 2007). The stagnation of lifetime earnings by the lower class contributes to economic inequality because it hinders the ability to attain wealth, resulting in an even larger equity gap. Therefore, economic inequality hinders the ability to accumulate wealth by means of earning income which has even greater social repercussions for future generations.

It is important to study economic inequality because of the implications that have been revealed by studying the disproportionate attainment of income and wealth within an economy. Economic inequality alters the make-up of markets; inequality evolves as the global market becomes increasingly homogenized; and equity is affected when structures within society evolve. The make-up of the market is altered when the demographic composition of the labour market fluctuates (Jätti 1997: 3). As the demographic composition within a labour market shifts, the

problem of economic inequality escalates because a large portion of middle-class income earners belong to the currently shifting demographic. In Canada, Denmark and Germany, the aging Baby Boomers are retiring from the labour market faster than they can be replaced (Martin et al. 2007: 8-10). The changing demographic composition alters the structure of the market thus, generating an inequality gap within the middle-class. The unifying effect of globalization has spread economic inequality from a broad global occurrence to a more specific and impacting domestic occurrence, the outcome is amplified within under-developed nations (Osberg 2000: 864). For example, industrialization led to technological advancements which presented opportunities for the wealthy and created barriers for the poor (Boix 2010: 513). As growth within the global market place occurs, the wealthy profit because they are able to acquire the tools that will benefit them whereas, the poor face economic inequality barriers that are difficult to overcome and reduce their ability to benefit from advancements. To summarize, economic inequality is a relevant issue because the concentration of wealth is continually growing due to the middle-class squeeze, the changing age mix, the irregular pattern of lifetime income, and increasing inequality of wages. Failure to alleviate the effects of social stratification will result in an impoverished society.

On one side of the debate for economic inequality, scholars argue in favour of the neoliberal approach to resolve problems that have been created from imbalances in equity. The methods resolution of used by the neoliberal approach to moderate economic inequality will be disproved in this argument. The Neoliberal approach believes in the philosophy of free markets and the notion of the 'invisible hand', by allowing the price signals of supply and demand to determine the efficient allocation of resources (Lipsey, Ragan, and Courant 1997: 384). The phenomenon known as the 'invisible hand' is a reference used once the self-correcting forces of

supply and demand achieve equilibrium. Market failure occurs when the best attainable outcome has not been achieved in the market (Lipsey et al. 1997: 387). In essence, the markets will 'self-correct' any deficiencies that may arise from supply and demand shortages or surpluses. The fundamental aspect of neoliberalism is the emphasis on freedom within the market, representing the 'perfect capitalist society' in which government intervention in the market is limited (Howlett, Netherton, and Ramesh 1999: 20). When economic inequality is present, the free market believes that government should not intervene to reduce the equity gap.

In reference to economic inequality, the market has failed to self-correct the deficiencies occurring within the market. Instead, the 'invisible hand' will restore equality within the economy. To lessen the effects of wealth concentration within the free market, government intervention must be limited; society must receive benefits from the dispersal of wealth; and the free market model must continue operating.

By decentralizing power, markets are able to function free of corrupt interests and political agendas therefore, enabling the market to focus on allocating workers to employment and consumers to commodities (Lipsey et al. 1997: 386). Limiting government intervention consists of: decreasing social assistance programs, taxation policies and market regulations. By allowing the free market to reduce economic inequality, it increases the availability of superior economic resources at less cost because of the reduced taxation costs that would have been incurred (Osberg 2000: 869). In a free market economy, competition is the main driver of production because each firm wants to be the most efficient producer. The problems that arise from economic inequality would be reduced with the increased presence of competition because the accumulation profits and excess wealth are dispersed across society through re-investment

(Howlett et al. 1999: 20). Therefore, the lack of government intervention fosters a stronger economy that is capable of self-correcting economic inequalities.

Ultimately, society receives larger benefits from the allocation of resources within the free market because it enables wealth to be efficiently dispersed across society. These benefits may include employment, structural changes within the economy and greater prospects of wealth accumulation (Martin, Cathie, and Thelen 2007: 3-10). Unemployment occurs when workers are not willing to accept lower wages that are being offered in the market place. According to the neoliberal approach unemployment is voluntary, it represents the failure to accept a lower wage, which is due to personal choice because the 'invisible hand' sends price signals in the form of wages to workers (Howlett et al. 1999: 21). The structural changes that occur within the economy benefit society because they relieve constraints on credit, enable diversity and entrepreneurship to flourish, and enable global trading to progress (Osberg 2000: 867). When opportunities for wealth attainment are realized by society, participation in the free market increases exponentially (Armstrong et al. 1977: 480-487). Economic inequality will decrease when society receives and exercises the benefits that have been made available to them through the free market.

By allowing the free market economy to continue despite market failures, in the long-term, the inefficiencies within the market will be reconciled (Martin et al. 2007: 1). Although some efficiencies will be sacrificed in the long-term, neoliberal policies emphasize the importance of freedom within the market. If the free market is limited by governments, the effect of self-correcting mechanisms is greatly diminished.

In Canada, the influence of the free market approach varies depending upon economic conditions within the market, the current political position of the party in power, and societal

trends. The duration and frequency of economic highs and lows influence the variance of government policies (Osberg 2000: 867). When the economy is prosperous, governments tend to be lenient and allow the free market to self-regulate. Another potentially constraining factor on the operation of the free market in Canada is the political landscape within Parliament (Jätti 1997: 36). It is a strong determinate of how taxes and transfer policies are implemented. For example, Canadians have witnessed the Harper Conservative government introduce free market policies which has resulted in cuts to social assistance, universal and anti-inflation programs (Osberg 2000: 865). Finally, societal trends influence the presence of the free market approach because as changes within equity needs occur, the free market must adapt to accommodate these growing needs (Boix 2010: 512). For instance, the real estate trends within society influence the amount of needed equity and the free market must accommodate the volatility of this essential need. Failure to provide the basic need of shelter results in economic disparity. In Canada, the existence of neoliberalism within the economy is very minimal because the policies brought forth do not suggest long-term sustainability and do not positively contribute to the economic inequality gap.

The fundamental ideologies of the neoliberal are supported by numerous lobby groups, think tanks and media outlets. In particular, the Canadian Council of Chief Executives (CCCE) is a lobby group that is dedicated to shaping public policy and maintaining freedoms within the private sector. The CCCE has developed public policies and recommended solutions pertaining to: fiscal, taxation, trade, competition, energy, environmental, education, and corporate governance policies (2011. Canadian). Maintaining the free market approach is encouraged by the CCCE because it incorporates and advocates the interests of the private sector to preserve freedoms, limiting stimulus to social programs and introducing new free market policies to

“advancing Canada's competitiveness” in the world market (2011. Canadian). The CCCE believes that by advocating the aforementioned interests of the private sector, society is able to prosper from the success of the free market. These interests would mitigate economic inequality by enabling society to obtain benefits such as: job security, faster attainment of wealth and increased cash flow within the economy. The benefits that society receives as a result of policy initiatives brought forth by the CCCE result in an overall increase in the well-being of society. The neoliberal approach to reducing economic inequality in Canada is supported by the CCCE, allowing the private sector to influence government inaction and encouraging the market to self-correct.

However, the neoliberal free market approach is not self-sustaining or reconciling in the long-term. The free market sustains the existence of capitalism because there is no reward or incentive to distribute wealth therefore, adopting the capitalist mantra of ‘profits above people’ (Martin et al. 2007: 21). To demonstrate, the existence of the free market approach from 1986 to 2000 in the United States resulted in an increase of the Gini coefficient by 0.033 for after-tax-income inequality (Canada. Statistics Canada 2007). The presence of free market policies over a fourteen year period did not see the dispersal of wealth, or the benefits that society was intended to receive, the economic inequality gap rose. The neoliberal free market approach is not self-sustaining in the long-term because there is no regulating force within the market which attributes to corruption in the private sector. A society built on capitalism allows patterns and cycles of economic inequality to develop at a faster rate because it fosters the growth of wealth concentration. To illustrate this point, individuals born into a wealthy families are likely to remain wealthy, and individuals born into poor families are likely to remain poor (Neckerman, and Torche 2007: 339). Therefore, free markets cannot equitably distribute wealth to lessen the

equity gap, it is clear that neoliberal policies encourage the sustainability of capitalism. Without government intervention, an adequate solution to economic inequality in Canada cannot be formulated.

A ratification to the neo-liberal approach perhaps lies in the Keynesian-welfare approach that seeks to mitigate problems which arise from the imbalances in equity. The Keynesian-welfare approach presents reasons that support government intervention and regulation as an effective redistribution mechanism for correcting market failures (Howlett et al. 1999: 24-27). However, governments should only intervene when the benefits of restoring imbalances within the market far exceed the costs (Lipsey et al. 1997: 397-398). Thus, if the cost is too high or the benefit is too low the government will not intervene to restore the balance within the market. When the government does choose to intervene, it attempts to be 'socially just' by providing the largest benefit to the greatest number of people (Howlett et al. 1999: 24-27). Forms of government intervention include: public provisions, redistribution and social insurance programs, regulation and structuring incentives (Lipsey et al. 1997: 397). The proactivity of government policy –as outlined by the Keynes-welfare approach-is important to mitigate the gap of economic inequality because it provides the most appropriate and realistic mechanisms to reduce imbalances. The existence of economic inequality in Canada can be moderated with the adequate implementation of public policy.

The government of Canada has justified intervention in the economy because of the benefits obtained by the larger majority of Canadians far exceeds the costs that would be bore by the minority of high income earners and the private sector. Presently, the bottom twenty percent of income earners in Canada are receiving less of the “income pie than they did ten years ago” (Armstrong et al. 1977: 486). Government intervention eases the economic inequality gap in

Canada because it has an ‘equalizing effect’ by proportionally dispersing wealth among Canadians (Jätti 1997:11). Methods of government intervention include personal income tax, capital gains tax and corporate taxation which are dispersed through social programs such as healthcare, regional assistance and education. The equalizing effect allows every Canadian the opportunity to fairly obtain and accumulate equity.

The social justice within the public sector forces the government to hold private sector accountable for their actions. Allowing the government to coordinate the redistribution of wealth provides the greatest and efficient allocation of resources (Martin et al. 2007: 4, 21). When societies are governed by the Keynes-welfare approach, the government is working and looking out for the best interest of people (Boix 2010: 501). With this in mind, the current government in power will avoid implementing policies that will upset its supporters. To demonstrate, governments with a large supporter base that is focused on left-wing issues will be inclined to implement policies that will enhance social programs. Accountability for market failures such as, economic inequality ensures that the government policies will be implemented to mitigate damages. Equality can be accomplished by implementing wealth redistribution mechanisms such as: social assistance, anti-inflation programs, regulating competition, and universal programs (Armstrong et al. 1977: 479-480).

In fact, it is embedded within the Canadian constitution that the government is obligated to intervene on matters concerning economic inequality. As stated in the Constitution Act, 1982:

Parliament and the legislatures, together with the government of Canada and the provincial governments, are committed to

- (a) promoting equal opportunities for the well-being of Canadians;
- (b) furthering economic development to reduce disparity in opportunities; and
- (c) providing essential public services of reasonable quality to all Canadians.

(Canada. Department of Justice 2011)

These obligations which are embedded within the constitution are essential to encouraging the betterment of society as a whole. This is done through the implementation of public policies, in an attempt to moderate economic inequality. To illustrate, the Canadian government has implemented policies regarding environmental regulation, safety regulations, taxation, and public spending (Lipsey et al. 1997: 401). Additionally, as the equity within the private sector increases or decreases, redistribution mechanisms implemented by governments follow accordingly (Canada. Statistics Canada 2007).

Several lobby groups, think tanks and media outlets support the Keynesian-welfare approach. For example, the Canadian Centre for Policy and Alternatives (CCPA) advocates moderating economic inequality through tax fairness. CCPA believes that wealthier Canadians and corporations should contribute more to public goods and services through direction taxation (2011. Inequality). By contributing more to public goods and services, a larger number of individuals within society are able to benefit from the improved quality. This form of advocacy aligns perfectly with the ideologies put forth by the Keynesian-welfare approach, using taxation implemented by the government to efficiently disperse wealth to reduce the effects economic inequality in Canada. Another supporting lobby group for the Keynesian-welfare approach is, "Working Families". In particular, they focus on putting public policy before profits in Ontario key policies include: education, health care, infrastructure, and health and safety programs (2011. About). These policies encourage the betterment of society as a whole therefore, moderating the effects of economic inequality in Canada.

The Keynesian-welfare approach represents the efficient allocation and coordination of resources within an economy by using the most 'socially just' means of distribution therefore, confirming that the Canadian government should intervene to mitigate the equity gap. The Keynesian-welfare approach is a more effective method of mitigating economic inequality in Canada because it encourages government intervention, but only when necessary. For intervention within the market to be justified, the government must acknowledge that the benefits provided to society will outweigh the costs to be placed upon by the minorities. The Keynesian-

welfare approach is attributed to fairness, opportunity and social justice, in contrast to the neoliberal approach, that has been characterized as being unfair, inequitable and immoral by putting profits above people. The free market is capable of allocating resources by any means necessary to correct deficiencies. The freedom within the private sector sacrifices resource efficiencies that could otherwise have been used to lessen the economic inequality gap. Furthermore, under the neoliberal approach, there is no accountability for market failures and there is not incentive or justification for the market to be 'fair'. As John Maynard Keynes would say, "in the long run we are all dead" meaning, if the government allows the economic inequality gap to increase, the poor will revolt and chaos will ensue (Lewis 2003: viii). In the long-term, society does not benefit from the profits of capitalism thereby, refuting the neoliberal approach to free market economies. Therefore, the problem of economic inequality will not be resolved unless the Keynesian-welfare approach of government intervention is applied to successfully correct deficiencies within the market. Indicating that the Keynesian economic approach is more effective in resolving the problems created by economic inequality. In Canada, economic inequality should be mitigated through the implementation of legislation, social programs, regulation, and taxation strategies.

To conclude, the division of wealth in Canada is rising annually and the government should be held responsible for correcting the resulting equity gap. This essay has confirmed that governments should intervene to mitigate any economic inequalities, as defined by the Keynesian-welfare approach. The neoliberal approach suggests that through limited government intervention the market will self-correct and society in the long run attains a larger benefit. On the contrary, the Keynesian-welfare approach has demonstrated that the government should implement public policies which stimulate the economy, ultimately benefitting society. The latter

has been demonstrably crucial for the implementation of many Canadian policies involving economic inequality. In the future, radical public policies will need to be implemented to ensure that a check-and-balance is maintained on the advancement of economic inequality gap in Canada. Economic inequality is a topic of grave importance because failure to adequately moderate the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have nots' will result in a society which lacks basic human necessities. Subsequently, no one benefits from an impoverished society. It is inevitable that the gap between the rich and the poor is growing however, in a democratic society it is in the governments best interest to arbitrate between the social stratification thus, doing what is best for the greater good.

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IDENTITY POLITICS

“Racial Integration in Post-Segregation America”
By: Mohammed Alsakka

Segregation in schooling has had a long-lasting impact on race relations in the United States. While the rhetoric has dramatically changed in the latter stages of the twentieth century to advocate for racial diversity and equality of opportunity in the attainment of academic achievement, historically disadvantaged racialized groups still face significant challenges for their inclusion in the arena of postsecondary education. This raises the question of whether postsecondary institutions have risen above race to incorporate the various segments of society without racial prejudice. Examining the literature on racial integration in post-segregation America, it is evident that predominantly White academic institutions still fall short of accommodating racialized groups, particularly African Americans. This notion holds true as historically disadvantaged groups remain among the most underrepresented groups in universities and colleges today; predominantly White schools engage primarily in policies of cultural assimilation rather than integration; and the dominant White college subculture still holds discriminatory misconceptions about racialized minorities. Nevertheless, some academics are skeptical of the promotion of racial diversity within American universities and colleges. Some contend that underrepresentation is irrelevant to the diversity of the learning environment, as it places too much emphasis on race at the expense of other factors. Other skeptics point to racialized minorities themselves, attributing the lack of racial integration to the self-imposed segregation by minorities. However, a comprehensive evaluation of the phenomenon of self-segregation indicates deficiencies within the institutions that lead to this behaviour. To begin with, an overview of the history of desegregation in the United States is necessary.

The Supreme Court’s decision in *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) is perceived as a landmark decision that formally ended racial segregation in public schools. Although the

decision primarily targeted public elementary and high schools, it also had a significant impact on the matriculation of African Americans in postsecondary academic institutions.¹ Through gradual ease-of-access to historically White schools, African American students attempted to compete for enrolment in Predominantly White Institutions (PWIs) which always accounted for race as a major qualifying factor for admission. Moreover, affirmative action policies, implemented during the civil rights era, aimed to enhance African American representation in higher education by removing barriers to access to education.² Nevertheless, formal steps towards racial equality have not generated as much success in ending trends of segregation in schools, as residential neighbourhoods remain highly divided based on race.³ In turn, racialized minorities remain disproportionately underrepresented within postsecondary institutions. This raises the question of how profound has the progression of racial integration within academia been. Two measures of racial integration have been the provision of equal opportunity and the level of racial diversity across university and college campuses.⁴

There are clear disparities in the enrolment figures of students, in terms of race and ethnic background, in postsecondary institutions in the United States. Although there has been a significant increase in the five decades since the formal eradication of segregation in education, racialized students remain disproportionately underrepresented. A generally accepted measure of the academic achievement among a particular racialized group is the ratio of racialized student matriculation and the ratio of that identified group within the total population. For example,

¹ William B. Harvey, Adia M. Harvey, and Mark King, "The Impact of the Brown v. Board of Education Decision on Postsecondary Participation of African Americans," *The Journal of Negro Education* 73, 3 (2004): 329

² John Fleming, Gerald R. Gill, and David H. Swinton, *The Case for Affirmative Action for Blacks in Higher Education* (Washington: Howard University Press, 1978), 7.

³ Odis Johnson Jr., "Assessing Neighborhood Racial Segregation and Macroeconomic Effects in the Education of African Americans," *Review of Educational Research* 80, 4 (2010): 532.

⁴ Fleming, Gill and Swinton, *The Case for Affirmative Action*, 7.

according to figures in 2001, African Americans composed over 12 per cent of the general population, yet only 10 per cent of college and university students in the U.S. were African-American.⁵ Hence, although matriculation of Black students rose by over 56 per cent in the last two decades, the population of Black students remains underrepresentative of the general population.⁶ An in-depth assessment illustrates more clearly the persistence of archaic discriminatory norms of the segregation era in the enrolment of racialized minorities. When examining the trends of enrolment among African American students, the record demonstrates slight changes from the era prior to the Supreme Court's decision in *Brown*. For instance, enrolment figures indicate that Black students choose to attend Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), institutions that historically accepted Black students when segregationist policies was strictly enforced.⁷ On the other hand, PWIs, which historically discriminated against Blacks and other racialized minorities in their assessment of prospective students, have witnessed little change in their acceptance rates of racialized minorities. Observing the records of enrolment in 2001, only 8 per cent of African American college students attended four-year PWIs.⁸ The vast majority of postsecondary Black students, over 42 per cent, are enrolled in two-year community colleges.⁹ The rise in attendance at community colleges is explained by their less stringent academic requirements, shorter time-span of academic programs, technical employable nature of their programs, and most importantly their inexpensive tuition fees relative to four-year institutions.¹⁰

⁵"The Racial Wealth Gap has Become a Huge Chasm that Severely Limits Black Access to Higher Education," *The Journal of Blacks in Higher Education* 45 (2004): 23.

⁶ Harvey, Harvey, and King, "The Impact of the *Brown v. Board of Education*," 329.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 330.

⁸ *Ibid.* 331.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 333.

These observations indicate the inadequacy of racial integration policies in two main ways. First, overall underrepresentation of historically underprivileged racialized groups is a direct indicator of the lack of racial integration. It demonstrates a lack of racial diversity in academia and raises the question of why African Americans remain underrepresented over a half a century after the end of discriminatory segregationist laws. Second, PWIs' maintenance of a predominantly White student body in the post-segregation period illustrates the lack of a diverse learning environment. Moreover, it demonstrates the failure to provide historically disadvantaged groups actual equality of opportunity in attaining academic success. This is especially evident when examining the relation between matriculation rates of African American students and the rise in tuition fees. Blacks remain among the most economically disadvantaged groups in the U.S., with the average Black household making 14 times less than the average income of a White household.¹¹ Odis Johnson argues that the move towards formal racial equality during the early stages of the twentieth century has not generated significant positive results. He contends that the deindustrialization of inner city neighbourhoods, composed primarily of African Americans, transformed these systemic ghettos maintained by racial discrimination prior to the civil rights movement to "jobless ghettos" in the latter stages of the twentieth century.¹² In relation to academic aspirations, this trend signifies the perpetuation of poor socioeconomic conditions that pose a real challenge to the pursuit of a proper education; hence the inclination towards less expensive community colleges. Furthermore, Johnson also perceives the social disorganization in Black neighbourhoods associated with high levels of unemployment, as an obstacle. He contends that joblessness has generated an environment that lacks "successful role models for

¹¹ "The Racial Wealth Gap," 23.

¹² Johnson Jr., "Assessing Neighborhood Racial Segregation," 530.

youth to emulate.”¹³ It is thus evident that the preservation of racialized ghettos serves as an obstacle to all means of achieving a truly inclusionary and diverse environment within postsecondary academic institutions.

An examination of race-relations in predominantly White schools serves as another assessment of the inadequacy of the conceptualization of racial integration. While the general discourse among PWIs advocates for racial acceptance and inclusion, the reality is one of continuous pressure on racialized minorities. As William Tierney articulates, racialized students attending PWIs are expected to “break from the communities and cultures in which they were raised and integrate and *assimilate* into the dominant culture of the colleges they attend.”¹⁴ In fact, the success of racialized students in such institutions is inversely proportional to their cultural identities and the level of their communal attachment. In order for racialized minorities to attain high levels of success at an academic as well as a social level, racial minorities are expected to leave behind their racial backgrounds and conform to the dominant White culture.¹⁵ In their study on the impact of desegregation on African American youth, Marvin Dawkins and Jomills Braddock define this phenomenon as cultural assimilation.¹⁶ Moreover, Dawkins and Braddock distinguish between this form of assimilation and structural assimilation, which they define as “the process involving the entry of minority groups into the institutional activities of the larger society at both primary...and secondary levels.”¹⁷ Drawing a distinction between the two forms of assimilation is essential. The objective of structural assimilation is to incorporate

¹³ Ibid., 544.

¹⁴ William G. Tierney, "Models of Minority College-Going and Retention: Cultural Integrity Versus Cultural Suicide," *The Journal of Negro Education* 68, 1 (1999): 82.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Marvin P. Dawkins, and Jomills Henry Braddock II, "The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African American Inclusion in American Society," *The Journal of Negro Education* 63, 3 (1994): 395.

¹⁷ Ibid.

racial and cultural differences as part of the institution's subculture, thereby dismantling a system of domination of the majority White culture. On the other hand, cultural assimilation promotes racial acceptance through conformity rather than diversity. Under this concept, racialized students are pressured to pick between conforming to the dominant White college subculture, or upholding to their "subordinate" racial identity at the cost of being perceived as outcasts and ultimately failing to garner much academic success.¹⁸ Evaluating the nature of race relations and the level of involvement of racialized minorities in PWIs indicates progress towards cultural assimilation.

A case study conducted by Joe Feagin sheds some light on the failure of PWIs to incorporate minorities, demanding instead that they conform to the dominant culture. Feagin interviewed 25 Black undergraduates, graduates, and faculty members from various socioeconomic backgrounds attending and holding positions at 14 different PWIs across the country.¹⁹ One significant observation that Feagin reports is the lack of receptiveness among White faculty members in accommodating for research that primarily deals with issues relevant to racialized minorities. Several respondents in the study pointed to faculty's hesitance in accepting work that tackles issues largely relevant to the African American community.²⁰ In one case in particular, a social science professor rejected a race-related research paper because she deemed the issue as "not universal."²¹ Race-related issues that bring attention to concerns facing minority communities are thus seen as unworthy of any academic exposure. In turn, racialized students are expected to abandon such racial issues to better utilize their time and efforts in

¹⁸ Harvey, Harvey, and King, "The Impact of the Brown v. Board of Education," 337.

¹⁹ Joe R. Feagin, "The Continuing Significance of Racism: Discrimination Against Black Students in White Colleges," *Journal of Black Studies* 22, 4 (1992): 549.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 565

²¹ *Ibid.*, 557

tackling “universal” concerns of the dominant White culture. This constitutes evidence of the subtle emphasis on conformity and outright rejection of racial diversity.

J. Anne Calhoun also highlights her experiences as a racialized minority academic in a predominantly White school. Calhoun, an assistant professor whose academic background does not qualify her to teach American Indian studies, was assigned by the university to a newly developed American Indian program based merely on her racial background.²² Eventually Calhoun accepted her newly assigned role only to discover that her appointment was considered “unofficial,” and it did not contribute to her tenure credentials.²³ This demonstrates an escalated form of assimilation, as racialized faculty members, who are present on a more permanent basis in postsecondary institutions, still face dismissal when attempting to incorporate race-related issues into the curriculum. The level of significance attributed by this institution to academic work on Native Americans is thus clear. Through failing to appoint a competent authority on Native American studies and failing to credit Calhoun for her work in the field, the university isolated Native American academics. Once again it is evident that in order to attain high levels of success within academia, academic institutions require work that conforms to the dominant White ideology. This indicates a failure on behalf of PWIs in the inclusion of racialized members. Calhoun articulates this best when she states, “we pay a very high price for membership; that in becoming academics, we silence our own community voices.”²⁴

The case for cultural assimilation is further undermined after an assessment of the nature of the dominant majority culture within PWIs. The White college subculture still holds archaic racial stereotypes and prejudices towards African Americans. Among the 8 per cent of Black

²² J. Anne Calhoun, "It's just a Social Obligation. You could Say 'no!': Cultural and Religious Barriers of American Indian Faculty in the Academy." *American Indian Quarterly* 27, 1/2 (2003): 133.

²³ *Ibid.*, 134.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

students in PWIs, students have consistently faced various forms of discrimination in their interactions with fellow students, faculty members and the administration. White students still fail to acknowledge the harm associated with derogatory comments directed towards their Black colleagues. Faculty members still act on false racial preconceptions when dealing with Black students. This places pressure on African American students who, due to their small numbers within an institution, must consistently act as representatives of their race through correcting the negative stereotypes held against African-Americans. Joe Feagin's study examines the different forms of discrimination that Black students face in PWIs.

In terms of interactions between students, Blacks face discrimination in the form of racist comments purposely directed towards them, racist jokes, and the general rejection of anything perceived as "Black."²⁵ Feagin refers to this trend as one-way integration, where "Blacks must learn the White subculture, but Whites learn little or nothing about Black American subculture."²⁶ Moreover, a problematic trend among White students and faculty members alike is the perception that African Americans are a monolithic homogenous group. This perception usually holds that all Blacks come from poor socioeconomic backgrounds, they are less intelligent, and they have gained access to PWIs either through excelling in sports or through their "Blackness," referring to the loosened admissions criteria for Blacks through affirmative action policies.²⁷ Hence, Black students are rarely assessed individually. One student in Feagin's study outlined an interaction with a White department chair on the possibility of conducting research on Black academic achievement in college. In response, the White professor echoed his bemusement with the demands of the African-American community and relied on the African-

²⁵ Feagin, "The Continuing Significance of Racism," 552.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 553.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

American student, as a representative of his race, to answer questions on the demands of Black people.²⁸ Through the general perception of the African American community as a bloc, White majority colleges reaffirm the notion that Black students are outsiders, and thus there is no need to break from long-held White dominant convention in academic institutions in order to accommodate them. In other words, once the dominant White culture perceives Blacks students as an exception to the norm, racial diversity within the institution is no longer a requirement.

Scott Olson contends that promoting a diverse learning environment in a university setting does not necessarily stimulate positive racial interactions. Instead, Olson argues that many minority students engage in what he refers to as “self-segregation.”²⁹ For instance minority law students across the United States have taken the initiative to create and join cultural groups, such as Black Law Student Associations and Hispanic Law Student Associations, in which a particular group isolates itself from the diverse setting developed by the institution.³⁰ As a consequence, the author contends that affirmative action policies that assist students of various ethnic backgrounds in gaining admission into schools do not accomplish their primary objective of creating a racially diverse learning environment. Moreover, he asserts that racialized minority students do not demonstrate a desire for inclusion in the diversity programs that academic institutions provide. Ramin Afshar-Mohajer and Evelyn Sung take this claim further, as they assert that the development of “separatist entities”, such as Black Students Associations, isolate racialized students and “divert potential leaders from mainstream campus organizations.”³¹

²⁸ Ibid., 556

²⁹ Scott L. Olson, “The Case Against Affirmative Action in the Admissions Process,” *University of Pittsburgh Law Review* 58, 4 (1997): 1004.

³⁰ Ibid., 1006.

³¹ Ramin Afshar-Mohajer and Evelyn Sung, *The Stigma of Inclusion: Racial Paternalism/Separatism in Higher Education*. (New York: New York Civil Rights Coalition, 2002), 10.

There is truth to the contention that students of various racialized and cultural backgrounds seek avenues of expression by accessing particular racial groups which they identify with rather than the diversity avenues created by the institution itself. However, a comprehensive assessment of this trend demonstrates that this behaviour incorporates more than just a form of self-segregation, as identified by Olson. In reality this trend demonstrates another failure by predominately White academic institutions to include students of color. It conforms to the above mentioned failure to distinguish between trends of racial inclusion and cultural assimilation. As students face the dominant norms of White culture, they are forced to choose between maintaining a strong identity, one that is not defined exclusively by skin color or other physical features but that holds race as a primary factor, or abandoning their identity in order to harmonize with the dominant accepted norm. Hence, students must choose between conforming to a dominant White identity that continues to hold certain prejudices and stereotypes, or maintaining a strong racial or ethnic identity at the cost of being perceived as outsiders. In order to cope with this rejection minority students who decide to uphold their identity resort to other avenues of expression, and hence establish and join groups such as Black Students Associations. The notion that this behaviour deviates from the diversity objective of affirmative action policies is extremely simplistic and misleading. It also fails to shed light on the shortcomings of these institutions in supporting minority students in unreservedly maintaining and exhibiting their distinctive identities.

With regards to Afshar-Mohajer and Sung's contentions that self-segregation diverts interest from mainstream organizations, there is no indication of what constitutes a mainstream campus organization. Based on the analysis above, mainstream organizations are most likely

ones that tolerate conformity of racialized students to the dominant White culture rather than fostering a diverse experience where racialized minorities are free to express their distinct cultural identities without fear of condemnation and stigmatization. Hence, mainstream organizations within PWIs classify potential leaders among racialized minorities through assessment of their potential in abandoning their racial identities and embracing the dominant majority culture. Therefore, it is the failure of such academic institutions in the inclusion of racialized minorities by accepting their diverse backgrounds rather than assimilationist means that must be addressed.

In conclusion, there are still significant deficiencies in the racial integration of historically disadvantaged racialized groups over a half a century after the formal desegregation of education. Racialized groups are still underrepresented in universities and college campuses today; PWIs continue to fail in accommodating racialized minorities, and are instead engaged primarily in policies of cultural assimilation. Racial discrimination is still existent within the dominant White college subculture. It is thus clear that racial integration has yet to trigger actual equality of opportunity as the disadvantaged background of the vast majority of racialized minorities remains to be an impediment to access to education. Moreover, assessing the level of acceptance among PWIs of racialized students also indicates a deviation from racial inclusion, as demonstrated by strong forces of cultural assimilation. Although some critics blame the lack of racial diversity on racialized minorities themselves, due to what they perceive to be a tendency of self-segregation, the literature indicates the contrary. Critics have failed to address the persistence of racial discrimination in the White college subculture, as well as the demands for conformity to the dominant White culture among mainstream circles within academic institutions.

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AMERICAN POLITICS

“An Analysis of Sanctioning Foreign Policy: The Rhetorical Use of President Harry Truman”
By: Vanessa Furgieue

The influence of Presidential legacies has become a critical element of persuasion in ratifying policy ideas. Jason A. Edwards effectively demonstrates this through his article, “Sanctioning Foreign Policy: The Rhetorical Use of President Harry Truman”. Jason Edwards discusses the role President Harry Truman plays in relation to contemporary American foreign politics. He argues that Harry Truman’s legacy helped further the different foreign policies of Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. In order to emphasize his argument, Edwards clearly defined the terms: presidential rhetoric, collective memory and the three functions of an authorizing figure: defining and unifying a movement, sanctioning policy ideas and legitimizing future goals. Edwards also states that these three functions of an authorizing figure act in isolation from each other. The author then uses the three terms in relation to how these predecessors appropriated different aspects of Truman’s legacy to gain support for their own policy decisions. Edwards was correct in stating that, President Harry Truman, as an authorizing figure, was an effective tool in ratifying Reagan’s, Clinton’s and Bush’s policy decisions. However, it is the opinion of this analysis that this was not in isolation from the other two functions, as they are natural extensions of each other. The first part of this paper will briefly summarize the terms and evidence the author used. The later part, will offer a personal analysis of the author’s method of argument and interpretation of evidence, while following the author’s chronological structure of arguments. It is the interpretation of this paper that the evidence and theoretical explanation of presidential rhetoric, collective memory, and authorizing figure, in fact suggest that Harry Truman’s legacy served all three functions, as the sanctioning function naturally derives from the other two.

Firstly, as Edwards correctly purposed, the use of language by a president is an important resource for persuasion. The author emphasized the importance of this through Jeffrey Tulis. Tulis argues that presidential rhetoric has become an essential mechanism of governance to shape the public's perceptions and to gain support for legislative ideas (1). The president's rhetoric equips the public with essential tools to understanding the current political atmosphere (2). When used in accordance with the collective memory, this allows the public to relate and understand policy ideas more clearly. The collective memory as defined by John Bodnar is "a body of beliefs about the past that help a public or society understand the past and present, and, by implications its future" (3). For example, Reagan, Clinton and Bush evoked an understanding of history or 'collective memory, that was selective and partial to their foreign policies in an attempt to further certain principles, legislation or positions (4). By employing the collective memory of specific historical figures that resonate more than others, people are able to more easily comprehend political ideas by relating to concrete examples (5). This allows a president to justify certain policy choices or persuade the public to support their ambitions.

From this, historical figures have manifested into "authorizing figures" which president's use in their rhetoric to further their own aspirations. An authorizing figure provides three different functions. Edwards defines the first as the authorizing figure being able to define movements. For example, Edwards used the example of when President George W. Bush called upon the memory of Harry Truman to rally support "for doing Truman-like work in fighting the war on terror" (6). The "Truman like work" refers to Truman's anti-communist position during the 1940s-1950s. Bush used Truman to strengthen his authority to create and progress his movement, like Fidel Castro used the memory of Jose Marti.

The second function, which Edwards argues is Truman's main purpose, is the aptitude of an authorizing figure to sanction certain policy principles. In this case, Harry Truman's legacy justified the personal interpretations and events of Presidents, Reagan, Clinton and Bush. This suggests that the rhetorers are performing similar work despite some discrepancies and more importantly, it gives the appearance of a seamless transition from one leader to the other (7). This can be seen in the example given of Reagan in 1983 concerning financial, military and political support for destabilizing communist forces in Central America, particularly El Salvador. Reagan employed the collective memory of Truman to persuade congress to work in bipartisanship, as they had with Truman in 1947 with Greece and Turkey (8). Reagan achieved this through suggesting that the political stakes and consequences were the same as they were in 1947, even though the countries of Central America were smaller than those during Truman's time (9). By drawing parallels between these two events, Reagan was hoping to persuade congress in favour of sanctioning his policy of supporting anticommunist forces in Central America (10).

The final function is the ability to legitimize future goals. Often, President's appropriate the legacy of an historical hero to gain public support for what the nation as a whole should strive for in the future (11). This can be seen in Edwards' analysis of Bill Clinton's 1977 State of the Union Address. Clinton called upon the memory of a "farsighted American" to help "prepare Americans for the 21st century...[and]...bring America 50 more years of security and prosperity" (12). Clinton elicited Truman's memory to lead America down the path of shaping the future of world affairs.

The method and chronological structure of Edward's arguments effectively demonstrated the role of Harry Truman's memory in foreign policy rhetoric. The arguments were laid out in a logical manner which was consistent with the three authorizing functions. Edward's

interpretation of the evidence is reasonable in claiming that Truman served as a sanctioning function. However, the ability of the three functions to work together was not recognized by the author. Edwards did not explicitly identify a specific function with each example given, leaving room for the reader to interpret how Truman's memory was appropriated. Although Truman's memory did validate and ratify certain policy positions specific to each of the President's foreign policy agendas, Truman's legacy was also able to define movements and legitimize future goals.

In order to achieve these two functions, it requires the support of the third. The goals of a movement cannot be attained unless certain legislation is passed; just as the ability to achieve future goals relies on the ratification of policy choices. Without the sanctioning function working with the other two, they become simple theoretical discussions opposed to political actions that in this case, are the natural extension of Harry Truman.

The natural relation between these functions can be seen with Ronald Reagan's use of Harry Truman's memory and the Truman Doctrine in 1983. As stated earlier, Reagan implied similarities between Greece and Turkey in 1947 to Central America in 1983. Both Presidents rallied for support in fighting communism through economic, political and military aid. In Reagan's 1983 State of The Union Address he did directly use Truman's memory to sanction policy choices, which would support 'freedom fighters' in Central America. However, Reagan also used Truman as an authorizing figure to legitimize future goals, by using the parallels drawn in his 1983 Address as a precursor to the Reagan Doctrine. This legislation, like the Truman Doctrine outlined what Americans should continue to do and strive for in the future.

Edward's also did not recognize Reagan's rhetoric as a means of establishing an anti-communist movement. The national support that Reagan sought after, which is also reflected in the Reagan Doctrine, suggests that Reagan's era was one of anti-communist sentiments. He

proposed, like Truman a movement to stop the growing threat of communism. Thus, the rhetorical use of Harry Truman's ant-communist legacy sanctioned policy decisions that would combat communism in Central America, while fostering an anti-communist movement and establishing the Reagan Doctrine as a guideline for future success.

As Edwards stated in his article, Truman's memory was applied to different aspects of the President's foreign policies (13). Unlike Reagan, who initially instituted Truman's legacy to maintain American leadership, Bill Clinton used it to purpose that it is America's duty to shape the future of world affairs, and how to achieve this (14). Clinton specifically called upon Truman to legitimize future goals. As stated previously, in the 1997 State of the Union Address, Bill Clinton selectively called upon the collective memory of Truman to prepare 'American's for the 21st century' (15). In order to achieve the goals of this movement, Clinton also tailored the President's legacy to serve as a sanctioning function. To establish America as a leader in world affairs, Clinton used Truman's foreign policy initiatives to authorize the maintenance and expansion of international institutions (16). Clinton sought to extend the powers of international organizations such as the World Bank, United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and NATO. For example, by extending the number of members in NATO and the missions undertaken by the organization, Clinton believed that America and its allies could properly handle security challenges that threaten the "common peace of all" (17). Clinton stated in his speech commemorating NATO'S expansion that, expanding NATO will "fulfill the commitment and the struggle that many...engaged in over the last 50 years", referring to when Truman helped formed NATO in his second term of office (18). By using Truman to sanction policy initiatives, required to achieve future goals, Clinton gave the appearance that he was a natural heir to Truman's leadership (19).

In this section of the article, Edwards intended to emphasize the sanctioning effect that Truman had. However, Edward's did imply Truman also served as a means of legitimizing future goals when he stated, "The president's use of history provided both a lesson and guide for future actions..." (20). It appears from this, one can interpret the function of Harry Truman as an authorizing figure, not only to have sanctioned policy choices, but also demonstrated what Americans should strive for in the future.

The ability of Truman's memory to serve a function other than endorsing policy initiatives can also be seen with George W. Bush. Throughout Bush's presidency, the Bush administration and in his personal speeches relied on the collective memory of Harry Truman to justify low approval numbers, sanction the creation of a larger defence department, and define a movement which fought the war on terror. Even more importantly, Bush went beyond Reagan and Clinton and used Truman to sanction an entire war (21). When Bush compared American presence in Iraq to Korea in the 1950s, he was hoping to justify his unilateral decision by comparing it, to Truman's intrusion of Korea without congressional support. In doing so, he had hoped to subdue concerns about his low approval ratings and suggests that in the future, Americans will view the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan as successes.

The evidence presented in the article also suggests that Bush used Truman's memory as a means of defining a movement that was continuing 'Truman-like work' in fighting the war on terror. Edwards did not recognize Bush advocating for support in fighting terror as a movement, even though he stated that, "Bush, like Truman, made it clear that the struggle on terror was an ideological one of freedom versus tyranny". Both advocated for national cooperation in a movement to destabilize these tyrannical regimes. It is the opinion of this paper that Truman's

legacy of fighting for the liberty of nations, helped to unite the American public in a militaristic, political and extensive economic movement to combat terrorist forces in the Middle East.

From the evidence presented, George W. Bush strategically called upon Truman to serve a sanctioning function. Specifically, in regards to Bush's 2002 radio address in which he campaigned for the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Bush used Truman's legacy of establishing the National Security Council to justify a larger department of defence in order to continue similar reforms to secure safety at home (22). Bush also mentioned in a 2001 speech that he was simply carrying on the work of Truman in establishing a similar doctrine which fought for the liberty of people. Not only did Truman's doctrine justify the enactment of the Bush Doctrine, but it also legitimized future goals, as both the Truman and Bush Doctrines guided their presidencies and still provide guidance to future presidents in the war on communism and now, terror.

Therefore, the ability of President Harry Truman's legacy to sanction certain policy initiatives also bolsters a President's ability to define a movement and legitimize future goals. Through presidential rhetoric in conjunction with the collective memory of a historical hero Americans are persuaded to faithfully follow their commander-in-chief. However, in order for a movement to gain momentum and influence, legislation must be sanctioned. Similarly, future goals cannot be achieved just through theoretical discussions or inspirational words. Action must be taken to put the wheels in motion. By using historical figures to sanction certain policy choices a country or person can effectively achieve those goals. All of this can be seen in the examples presented in the article. Reagan employed Truman's legacy in Greece and Turkey to sanction support for anti-communist forces. This resulted in the creation of an anti-communist movement and in 1983 the Reagan Doctrine. To this day the Reagan doctrine, along with the

Truman and Bush Doctrines plus many others stand as a guidelines for future success. Clinton used Truman's encouragement of international organizations to sanction the expansion of organizations such as NATO, in order to achieve his goal of the United States becoming a superpower in world affairs. Lastly, George W. Bush used Truman to sanction the continued presence of troops in Afghanistan, ultimately furthering his movement in the war on terror. Therefore, Presidents Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush achieved certain aspects of their foreign policies, by effectively calling upon the memory of Harry Truman to serve all three functions of an authorizing figure.

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“Max Weber’s Charismatic Authority as seen in President Barack Obama”
By: Sarah Browning

Charisma is a rare quality that, when exercised, has the ability to manifest unity, change, and regeneration. Individuals with the unique and extraordinary power of charisma have the predisposition to rapidly flourish and entice large and embracing masses of people. This impressive and intriguing attribute is known as charismatic authority. Analyzed and defined by German sociologist and political economist, Max Weber, charismatic authority “is based on individualized, personal characteristics, such as perceived courage, intelligence, dignity, or integrity. Charismatic leaders are followed because of a personal bond people feel towards them.”¹ This essay will examine, in depth, the defining characteristics and composition of charismatic authority, as well as apply these categorized descriptors to the United States’ current president, Barack Obama, in order to support the wide-held belief that he exemplifies Weber’s model of a charismatic leader.

Charismatic authority is a form of leadership that, unlike other forms of leadership, cannot be taught, learned, or acquired. It is a natural and irreplaceable ability that possesses the potential and capacity to mesmerize people, and inspire them to follow and abide solely out of blind faith. In fact, Weber placed a particular emphasis on the relationships between charismatic leaders and the social structures that they establish as solutions to their peoples’ problems, rather than on the charismatic leaders themselves. According to Gary Bowden,

Humans in all cultures faced three basic problems – resource scarcity, the struggle for wealth, and the struggle for power – leading to a society organized around three institutional means for dealing with those problems (economy,

¹ Perez, Douglas Werner., and Michael Barkhurst. "Motivation: Coaching and Closing Gaps." *Paradoxes of Leadership in Police Management*. Clifton Park, NY: Delmar, Cengage Learning, 2012. 165. Print.

polity, and ideology) and defining three dimensions of social stratification (class, party, status).²

Thus, the responsibility to bring about such system change falls in the hands of an exceptional and sometimes revolutionary figure: the charismatic leader. The charismatic leader is the individual who transcends upon those who face hardship, loss and oppression, liberating them from their binding and rusted shackles, promising relief, redemption, and renewal. It is this leader who restores lost morals and abandoned obligations.

A term that derives from the religious experience of God's gift of miraculous healing, charisma has had its scope broadened to include all who seemingly tap into a 'supernatural' or higher presence that allows them to successfully capture and command like no other. While the devout may credit the divine for such undoubted and impactful inspiration, Weber views such authority as a sociological concept that takes root in the relationships amongst individuals. He did not restrict the application of the term to those of divine power, but used it to refer to "powerful, ascendant, persistent, effectively expressive personalities who impose themselves on their environment by their exceptional courage, decisiveness, self-confidence, fluency, insight, energy, etc., and who not necessarily believe in divine inspiration."³

The question must then be asked: What is it that drives forward the one who motivates the masses? According to Weber, there are three key factors that enable a leader to instill excitement among his or her followers. First, the charismatic leader feels compelled to act out of a sense of mission and purpose. Passionate about their cause(s) and anticipated goals, the leader dedicates their life to accomplishing a better tomorrow in the name of the people and their culture. Second, the leader uses his or her charisma and communal tactics to tackle an

² Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 171. Print.

³ Shils, Edward. "Charisma, Order, and Status." *American Sociological Review* 30.2 (1965): 200. Print.

extraordinary situation. “Thus, the charismatic leader embodies hope and instills enthusiasm because they are the vehicle for a new order that resolves the crisis and brings about social and personal integration.”⁴ In the words of Turner, “In this way the charismatic leader acts in a manner that is perceived as exceeding expectations – as having succeeded where ordinary individuals could not – and, hence, gains recognition as ‘extraordinary’.”⁵ The third element that Weber claimed enables and propels a charismatic forward, is success, and the need to prove his or her worth and commitment. One of the descriptors of a true charismatic leader is the relentless pursuit and demand of perfection. Not only in the ends to be achieved, but more importantly in the individual and their methods. In summary, for Weber, charisma cannot be pinpointed in an individual and their persona, but must take into account both the relationships with the community, as well as the social and cultural circumstances by which they are consumed.

Furthermore, Weber perceived charismatic authority as a “mechanism to transcend an existing crisis of social and economic stagnation through the charismatic leader’s ability to articulate a vision that substantially recognizes society.”⁶ When significant reorganization in a community, revolution, or nation is called for, the opportunity for a charismatic leader to emerge and grab hold of the reins immediately presents itself. In fact, it is in these situations and political environments when a people are so desperate for relief and guidance, that they will seize the first, most appealing solution; the prospect with charisma. While such an answer may appear to be the most beneficial at the time, this is not always the case. Take, for example, the

⁴ Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 173. Print.

⁵ Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 173. Print.

⁶ Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 174. Print.

rule of Adolf Hitler, founder and ruler of Nazi Germany (also known as the Third Reich) of 1933 to 1943. Appointed chancellor of Germany by President Paul von Hindenburg on January 30th, 1933, Hitler's first move was to form a coalition government (so as to eliminate non-Nazi party members). With the country under heavy oppression following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the German people were in what appeared to be an inescapable state of depression. Hitler vowed to restore Germany to a nation far beyond the likes of any other, and bring glory and power to its entire people. Notorious for his charisma and charm, Hitler held an unmatched power over the people, evoking in them a passion for their nation, their economy, their land, and most of all, revenge. He fed to them hopes and dreams for the future that were more desirable than any other cause. From powerfully optimistic speeches with promises of restoration, to propaganda and war, Germany soon became a nation fueled on totalitarian regimes, persecution, war and invasion, as well as scapegoats and anti-Semitism. Hitler had morphed from a promising and motivational figure making reasonable demands, to a terrifying dictator who forever stained his country with the blood of millions of innocent people. It can therefore be concluded that, while charismatic leaders have the potential to inspire tremendous good, they have equal potential to fall to the corruption of power, and lead people to a fate more tragic than the state they were already in.

Throughout history, the world has witnessed many other individuals who possess the charismatic authority that Weber has so meticulously described. Names such as Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Mao Zedong, Ronald Reagan, Pierre Trudeau and now Barack Obama, are some of the most prominent faces of Weber's concept of charismatic authority. Weber defined charisma as the following:

A certain quality of an individual personality, by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or

at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader.⁷

In order for a charismatic leader to be successful and uphold the loyalty and respect of their people, one must dispose of the old way of doing things (culturally, economically, politically, and socially), and in its place, introduce the revolutionary platform upon which he or she will base their drastic reform. However, there are social restrictions imposed on a charismatic's reform, in that the new vision must somewhat conform to a "culturally relevant vision."⁸ In the case of Barack Obama, from his days of early campaigning to global discourses as President of the United States, his rhetoric resounded with the basic unity in and of American culture. As a multi-racial man (son to a Negro father and Caucasian mother), Obama "represented the living embodiment of his own rhetoric; a product of the ability to transcend divides."⁹

The following is a segment from Obama's speech at the 2004 Democratic National Convention that provided the basis for the entirety of his election campaign:

Now even as we speak, there are those who are preparing to divide us – the spin masters, the negative ad peddlers who embrace the politics of 'anything goes.' Well, I say to them tonight, there is not a liberal America and a conservative America – there is the United States of America. There is not a Black America and a White America and Latino America and Asian America – there's the United States of America.

The pundits like to slice-and-dice our country into Red States and Blue States; Red States for Republicans, Blue States for Democrats. But I've got news for them, too. We worship an 'awesome God' in the Blue States, and we don't like federal agents poking around in our libraries in the Red States. We coach Little League in the Blue States and yes, we've got some gay

⁷ Bakken, Børge. "On Models and Modelling." *The Exemplary Society: Human Improvement, Social Control, and the Dangers of Modernity in China*. Oxford [England]: Oxford UP, 2000. 195. Print.

⁸ Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 176. Print.

⁹ Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 176. Print.

friends in the Red States. There are patriots who opposed the war in Iraq and there are patriots who supported the war in Iraq. We are one people, all of us pledging allegiance to the stars and stripes, all of us defending the United States of America.¹⁰

It is obvious in reading this exceptionally moving speech, that Obama has a strong and genuine belief in the communion of his people, despite the stereotypes, prejudices, and segregations that continue to plague the United States. For many, Obama is the long-awaited healer – even savior for some – that America is so in need of. For him, it is not about waiting for the right time or the easiest solution; “Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time. We are the ones we’ve been waiting for. We are the change that we seek.”¹¹ As a charismatic leader, his presidency proves to be a constant back-and-forth between leadership over style and style over leadership. Regardless of the minor details in his tactics and reasons for success, his impact on an ignorant and uncaring population is beyond a matter of question. He evidently has the ability to instill curiosity and compassion in his followers, and above all, attract young people to politics and world issues. It is in his doctrine of radical change, that Obama aims to transfigure America from a place of gluttony, suffering, and self-indulgence, to a united nation of pride, equality, and honour. He says that “we can replace a politics that breeds division, conflict, and cynicism with a politics that fosters unity and peace.”¹² This radical and sentimental president has been so effective in his attempts to further awareness in the non-voting and youth populations, that the voter turnout among those aged 19 to 29 increased from 40

¹⁰ Dupuis, Martin, and Keith Boeckelman. *Barack Obama, the New Face of American Politics*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008. 152. Print.

¹¹ McNamara, Carol, and Melanie M. Marlowe. "The End of Small Politics?" *The Obama Presidency in the Constitutional Order: a First Look*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. 132. Print.

¹² Beran, Michael Knox. "Obama, Shaman." *City Journal* 18.3 (2008): 1. Print.

percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2008. The number of votes cast by youth aged 19 to 29 in 2008 increased by nearly 2.25 million votes.¹³

In contrast to the typical Anglo-American political perspectives held by many American presidents of the past – excluding Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan – Obama proclaims a very Machiavellian political tradition. In the *Discourses on Livy* and *The Art of War*, this Italian political philosopher of the Renaissance period argues that in order to create a “communitarian republic...a polity in which citizens, forsaking their own swinish pursuits, would become happy in the pursuit of a common good.”¹⁴ Machiavelli was a strong advocate of a specific type of charisma known as *virtù* – a genius and confidence that far exceeds that of any other person, allowing the one in possession of such a gift to satisfy all yearnings. It was in *The Prince* that this thinker developed his first fictional form of his ideal. Furthermore, Machiavelli expresses his belief that the only effective approach to communitarianism is through civic selflessness: “Self-interest leads to market capitalism and alienation; civic selflessness leads to public-spirited communitarianism and happiness.”¹⁵ It was this same prototype that helped to evolve the theories of Karl Marx and practices of Vladimir Lenin and Adolf Hitler.

With community as his primary and definitive goal, Obama stresses a policy of zero tolerance towards absolutists who would dare to challenge the united body. He states that the “ideological core of today’s GOP (Grand Old Party; the traditional nickname for the Republic Party) is absolutism, not conservatism, an absolutism driven by those whose prize stands in the way of politics that can solve our problems and change our lives.”¹⁶ As further proof of the conviction of Obama as a Machiavellian charismatic, Obama’s rejection of moral standards of

¹³ Bowden, Gary. "Obama, Palin, and Weber: Charisma and Social Change in the 2008 U.S. Election." *Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue Canadienne De Sociologie* 47.2 (2010): 178. Print.

¹⁴ Beran, Michael Knox. "Obama, Shaman." *City Journal* 18.3 (2008): 3. Print.

¹⁵ Beran, Michael Knox. "Obama, Shaman." *City Journal* 18.3 (2008): 3. Print.

¹⁶ Beran, Michael Knox. "Obama, Shaman." *City Journal* 18.3 (2008): 4. Print.

the past is yet another leadership characteristic identified by Machiavelli for the charismatic redeemer.

Kennedy was notorious for his tax cuts, Regan for halt on étatism, and Clinton for his (scrapped) assurance of nationalized medicine. While similar to these presidents of the recent past in the sense that he possesses a charismatic ability, Obama is unlike these men in that his grasp on and application of charisma is profoundly different. Stemming from empathy rather than authority, Obama's approach in leading his country to recovery is "to appear an androgyne, the nurturant male or male mother."¹⁷ Widely recognized as not only a figure of traditional and presidential authority, but also as one who will truly listen and consider the voices of the people, "his charisma is grounded in empathy rather than authority, confessional candor rather than muscular strength, metrosexual mildness rather than masculine testosterone."¹⁸ It is this post-masculine charisma that has provided a gateway to a state of empathy foretold by Balzac, in *La Comédie humaine*. In his theory, Balzac proposed a state of the future was to be successfully governed by a maternal figure (versus one of brute force and intimidation). Obama defined the odds by overcoming the leadership paradox of individuals striving for achievement out of "high need for personal achievement."¹⁹ In his rise to power, and pursuit of personal accomplishment, he never loses focus on his original and selfless goal of helping others to triumph and unite.

In conclusion, charismatic leaders possess the remarkable ability to proclaim a vision of the future that captivates and inspires many populations and communities. In using metaphors and parables, these leaders enable their follows to understand the vision, and foresee how it can, and will, become their future state. It is the fundamental element of trust that is immediately established by a charismatic leader and entices people to follow in blind faith, believing in the

¹⁷ Beran, Michael Knox. "Obama, Shaman." *City Journal* 18.3 (2008). Print.

¹⁸ Beran, Michael Knox. "Obama, Shaman." *City Journal* 18.3 (2008). Print.

¹⁹ Rhode, Deborah L. "Lawyers and Leadership." *The Professional Lawyer* 20.3.1 (2010): 5. Print.

cause they have (unconsciously) become a part of. The term of Obama's is one that will undoubtedly claim a chapter in history. From being the first African American President of the United States of America, to ushering in public health care to a privatized system, and initiating the mending of a catastrophic economy, his optimism for change and faith in unity have been astoundingly contagious. In restoring the people's hope for a better tomorrow and initiating the start of a better relationship between the people and their leader, Obama formed the fundamental ingredient necessary for social change to occur. His charismatic authority has stimulated and transformed a nation that, originally diminished by economic devastation, continues to progress to a place of equality and opportunity. Led by a man of hope, healing, and harmony, the United States has endured drastic social change that promises a better future for the people as a united front.

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BUSINESS AND GOVERNANCE

“Food for Credit: How A Microfinance Based Development Approach Affects Food Security and Sovereignty”

By: David Basu Roy

The global food crisis has grown seemingly in tandem with the popularity of employing microfinance as a tool to challenge structures of poverty. However, any connection of the two in the literature is limited, with few studies investigating the direct effect, if any, microfinance plays in advancing food sovereignty. This paper seeks to investigate this relationship, and determine if microfinance has a positive, neutral, or negative effect on improving food security and promoting food sovereignty. It is found that microfinance often addresses issues of food insecurity, but not in a manner that challenges larger structures impeding food sovereignty. More holistic ideologies and movements toward achieving food sovereignty are investigated. The result is ambiguous as to whether or not microfinance is a net positive force in such movements, but it is concluded that power structures must be challenged for microfinance's implementation to be effective.

Background: The Struggle for Food

Peasants, agrarians, farmers—the Southern rural poor—whichever way we chose to label them, this massive and marginalized group of global citizens plays a fundamental role in each of our lives, yet their own struggle for freedom, autonomy, and life is as relentless as the global North's demand for cheap, imported foodstuffs. Justice Studies professor, Annette Desmarais, argues that all social resistance movements “are deeply connected to agriculture and those who produce food;” despite the globalization of oppressive, agrarian capitalism led by foreign multinationals, “peasants are stubbornly refusing to go away.”¹

With the inherent, and generally unavoidable, connection every society has with mechanisms of global food production and distribution, the struggle for food that has (in the author's opinion) underpinned all of human existence has shifted. The concern is no longer as simple as determining the best method of harvesting food from our environment for sustenance, and possibly for pleasure. Instead, oppressed societies have been dealt the task of determining the best method of interacting with global food structures, or extracting themselves from such structures, in order to regain sovereignty over their own food production and consumption. The

¹ A. Desmarais, 2008, p. 139

monetary economy's infiltration into the smallest of villages has shifted the agrarian's focus from sustenance to profit—from selecting the best, natural crop rotation cycle to feed a family or community, to determining the fertilized mono-crop that can yield sufficient income to allow for the purchase of food and necessities.

The increasing liberalization of food trade is a growing threat to food security and sovereignty, undermining domestic markets and farmers.² This process is creating a global culture of dependence that vulnerabilizes agrarians of the global South, already marginalized and exploited, to the effects of price shocks and volatile market forces. Despite this, there remains startling debate as to whether food insecurity should be alleviated through increased trade, or through promoting self-sufficiency.³ This investigation assumes that the same forces responsible for food inequality—trade liberalization, multinational growth, and unilateral or bilateral directives—cannot also provide a solution. Instead, one alternative method of supporting self-sufficiency is studied: microfinance.

Microfinance can positively interact with such food structures in two primary ways, which are not mutually exclusive: (1) by enabling or empowering entrepreneurialism and financial sufficiency, allowing for the purchasing of required food, which generally alleviates food insecurity; or (2) by enabling or empowering the modern agrarian community to produce their own food supply locally, as a first resort, without completely alienating them from economic structures through poverty—a process that generally increases food sovereignty⁴. Microfinance

² Blouin et. al., 2010, pp. 5–6

³ Ibid, p. 6

⁴ There are, of course, other interactions between microcredit and food sovereignty that are beyond the scope of this paper.

can also negatively impact food security in a variety of ways, generally based on the notion that microfinance enables the poor to participate in inherently oppressive financial systems.

As Naila Kabber notes in her 2005 study of microfinance impacts on the Millennium Development Goals, it is “clear that food security is a key indicator of impact in the lives of the very poor.”⁵ But more than just security, citizens require food sovereignty: self-determination over their food, farms, and environment. Both are necessary to achieve sustained, communal prosperity.

The question then becomes: does access to microfinance (including participation in groups and other associated benefits) have a net positive or negative impact on household and community food security and food sovereignty?

TERMINOLOGY

Before beginning our discussion, it is necessary to define a few ambiguous terms, as they will be used in this paper.

Microcredit, microfinance: refer to any small-scale lending operation aimed at reducing poverty and improving social well-being through availability of small loans, specifically those provided through local, group-based initiatives that use social capital as collateral and do not seek to make a profit. Microfinance provides additional financial tools, such as savings and insurance, while microcredit does not. Applications of both will be investigated.

MFIs (microfinance institutions): MFIs refer to large-scale, non-localized businesses or social enterprises that provide microfinancing across various communities, and may make profit.

⁵ Kabber, 2005, p. 89

Despite their relative size, many MFIs, such as the Grameen Bank, are able to retain social business priorities and grassroots growth.

Food security: refers to the ability of a family or community to have a constant and consistent supply of nourishing and nutritious food, across all ages and genders, especially during droughts, floods, or other emergency situations. Food insecurity implies a relative or growing lack of both security and sovereignty, as any food supply that is not sovereign must also be somewhat insecure by virtue of its dependence.

Food sovereignty: refers to the independence of a family or community's food supply with respect to: (1) to the degree of dependence on purchased food (especially imports), on food aid, and on subsidies; and (2) the relative influence and control of corporate multinationals and international bodies over local production.

Development: refers to any process or paradigm having a primary goal of improving the general well-being of citizens; this is not limited to, nor does it exclude, improvements that attempt to emulate successes of the global North in the global South.

Introduction

Lack of access to credit is consistently seen as a deterrent to consistent and sustainable food production.^{6,7} Additionally, it is show that, empirically, “the most productively and socially efficient agricultural production structures are small family farms,” which poses a direct challenge to the corporatization of farmland and agriculture.⁸ By corollary, it is evident that

⁶ Bateman, 2010, pp. 9–10

⁷ Pretty et. al., 2002, p. 253; Madeley, 2002, p. 100; FAO, 2006

⁸ Bateman, 2010, p. 80

access to financial tools and resources is essential for efficient agriculture in any region where small-scale farmers typically reside in poverty.

There is inherent risk, though, in using a market-based tool, credit, as a means of ameliorating a market-created problem, food insecurity. This can lead to the creation of further problems, such as credit-dependence, debt-poverty cycles, and an over-emphasization of the relative non-profitability of small-scale farming as compared to other business ventures.⁹ Moreover, when operating with a goal of ‘poverty alleviation’, microfinance does not necessarily seek to challenge existing, oppressive financial structures; in fact, it is often dependent on them.

Yet, there is clear evidence in the literature that microfinance can be delivered on a local scale, and in a manner that empowers members to take matters of food security into their own hands. This is accomplished by improving self-determination, financial stability, gender equality, agroecology and technology, and clean water access. If the means of achieving food security also challenge larger power structures, then a path toward food sovereignty is created.

In praxis, there is no instance of a ‘perfect’ or ‘ideal’ application of microfinance: none will meet all criteria, and many will cause detriments as well as improvements; however, there exist many success stories. It is a matter of determining if challenges to food insecurity are best delivered under a microfinance umbrella.

Methodology

An investigation involving such complex and inter-connected forces must be carefully constrained, so as to analyze appropriate literature for specific indicators of improvement.

⁹ Ibid, pp. 80–92; Aggarwal, 2009, pp. 248–249

CRITERIA FOR IMPROVEMENT

A microcredit scenario is determined successful at improving a community's food situation if one or more of the following occurs:

- Food security is improved: greater food availability and consistency; chronic, acute, and gender-based hunger and malnutrition are reduced
- Food sovereignty is improved: increased self-determination of farmers and agrarian communities, less dependence on purchased and imported food
- Factors affecting the above are improved: socio-economic stability, gender-equality, land-determination, access to agrotechnology and clean water
- Food inequality is reduced, relative to regional and/or hemispheric norms
- Power structures that threaten the above are challenged: international trade accords and financial institutions, multinationals, neoliberal 'aid', political corruption and hegemony, etc.

If not all of the above factors are improved in a given situation, access to, and use of, credit must not impede improvements in other factors.

Microcredit has been functioning for decades. So, any success in improving food security due to microcredit must be occurring or have already occurred. In other words, it is too late into the development 'game' to posit that microfinance has the potential to positively impact food systems if such potential has not yet been realized.

PHYSICAL AND THEORETICAL SCALE

The goal of microfinance is to operate on a community level. Thus, what will be investigated is the local community impact of microfinance policies, including how their national and international relationships change, assuming (inter)national policies and paradigms remain static. In other words, policies that could reshape or improve global or national food policy will not be investigated, but rather those that can empower a community to cope within, and challenge, existing oppressive powers. The realist assumption is made that existing national and global power structures that affect food are oppressive and will continue to be oppressive.

In summary: this investigation questions the potential for theoretically-ideal microfinance that is locally-driven and delivered, and empowers communities and individuals—in a grassroots, bottom-up approach—to challenge larger power structures and prosper despite their oppressive nature.

LIMITATIONS

It is important to acknowledge that community-based microfinance, like any other development paradigm, cannot act alone. This is not only because it is frequently linked with aid, educational programs, and group participation, but also because macroeconomic forces and policy penetrate even the smallest communities, due to (among other factors) subsidies, market forces and prices, and international aid.

So, there is an inherent difficulty in isolating microcredit as an independent factor contributing to the improvement of food security. Nonetheless, it is important, for this discussion, to isolate

the financial aspects of microfinance schemes, so as not to confuse their effects with those of social programs, which can be delivered independently.

APPROACH

A detailed examination of factors affecting food security and sovereignty is required prior to analyzing the success of microfinance in improving such factors. Subsequently, shortcomings and failures of microfinance will be reviewed before investigating successful developmental approaches that exist or extend beyond the realm of microfinance. Reviewing the means, successes and failures of, and alternatives to, a microfinance approach to alleviating food injustices will lead to a holistic analysis of what factors are truly beneficial or detrimental to food security and sovereignty.

Factors Affecting Food Security

Food security “results from the availability of adequate food at country level, household and individual access to adequate and nutritious food, effective consumption and adequate nutrition outcomes—all in a sustained manner.”¹⁰ The literature suggests that microcredit focuses primarily on improving food security, through isolated analysis of community variables, and less so on challenging regional or global power structures to improve sovereignty. However, the former can create some elements of improvement in the latter.

The following factors represent means by which microfinance can improve food security. These are common target areas of improvement, but their benefits are diverse. Performance indicators show if these factors have lead to tangible improvements in food security and sovereignty.

¹⁰ Ramachandran, 2007, p. 220

FINANCIAL STABILITY

Financial stability is a means of achieving food security, primarily through consumption smoothing achieved by savings, insurance, and stockpiling.¹¹ This can reduce the effects of droughts, floods, and hunger caused by seasonal harvests and variability of farm production. It is for this reason that investment in small-scale farming is viewed as having “far stronger poverty-alleviating effects,” than investment in other sectors.¹²

For example, as of 2002, Grameen Bank members experienced a 25% improvement in agricultural wages.¹³ As over 90% of the bank’s equity is owned by its members (and the majority by the state), Grameen is able to link improved financial stability with community solidarity, rather than with institutional profits. Though financial security does not necessitate improved food security, it provides a means for improvement to occur.

GENDER EQUALITY

“Releasing the potential of women farmers is vital if food security is to be achieved.”¹⁴ In developing nations, women are typically responsible for non-export crops—those that feed local communities, rather than hungry Westerners. On average, women produce 60 to 80 per cent of staple foods, though, in certain regions, this figure is as high as 90 per cent.

Despite this enormity of work, women are often disempowered and lack control over personal and family decisions, for a variety of socio-cultural reasons. Women, and especially girls, are typically underfed at the expense of men and boys. Microfinance seeks to ameliorate this gender

¹¹ Meyer, 2003, pp. 349–50

¹² Matin, 2005, pp. 17–18

¹³ Madeley, 2002, p. 102

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 91

inequality by providing most of its loans to female clients, who demonstrate superior ability to equitably manage household finances and resources.^{15,16}

FARM INPUTS AND TECHNOLOGY

In many instances, farmers are trapped in a cycle of poverty that prevents them from making small investments in farm inputs or simple technologies. Agroecology—the application of environmental principles to agriculture—is useful in ensuring productive, sustainable use of farmland. In order to apply such principles, though, capital costs are required that can be exclusionary for farms in perpetual poverty. Additionally, there is little interest in the upgrading of farmland that is not secured with tenure or ownership.^{17,18}

The cliché of microcredit being used to finance purchasing of crop seeds, fertilizer, or simple farm equipment is a powerfully simple tool in attacking structures of perpetual poverty. In fact, when access to rural microfinance is constricted, farmers are likely to pursue off-farm employment, rather than improving farm production.¹⁹

ACCESS TO CLEAN WATER

Proper water access is a requisite to food security for two reasons. First, a reliable and uncontaminated water source is required for irrigation; second, safe water is required if benefits

¹⁵ Hamad and Fernald, 2010, pp. 1–2

¹⁶ Hazarika, 2008

¹⁷ Magdoff and Tokar, 2010

¹⁸ Rukuni, 2002, pp. 3445S–3446S; Madeley, 2002, p. 81

¹⁹ Pretty et. al., 2002, p. 257

of improved nutrition are to be realized. The UN Food and Agriculture Association (FAO) lists clean water as necessary for proper food utilization: an essential component of food security.²⁰

Microfinance ventures often target issues of drinking water, especially in India and Bangladesh. For example, in an investigation of the Centre for Youth and Social Development (CYSA), an MFI operating in India's poorest state of Orissa, mature members were 20% more likely than new members to use reliable sources of safe drinking water.²¹

Sovereignty and Security

Food security and food sovereignty are symbiotic and co-dependent forces. Achieving food security, without having sovereignty, can leave a community vulnerable to economic and political shifts at the regional or international level. Similarly, achieving self-determination and independence in food production and consumption does not imply that hunger is eliminated or that local food equity is achieved. However, farmers that would quickly be labelled as 'poor' are capable of achieving food security, through their sovereignty, by creating a supportive network of community growers, largely independent of food purchases.²² This tactic of creating 'food wealth' can be effective at challenging market forces and trade policies, promoting food sovereignty.

Throughout the microfinance literature, achieving food security is periodically discussed as a target goal,²³ but mention of sovereignty is all but absent. It is unclear if MFIs lack mandates to directly challenge forces that oppose sovereignty, or if the notion of employing microfinance as a tool toward achieving food sovereignty is still novel. This is problematic, as food security cannot

²⁰ FAO, 2006, p. 1

²¹ Kabeer, 2005, p. 73

²² Based on personal experiences in El Salvador, 2011

²³ Hunger reduction is very frequently mentioned

be fully achieved without a good degree of independence from food imports, market forces, and trade policies.

Despite this lack of focus, it can be inferred that microfinance is a reasonable means (one of many) toward gaining agricultural independence. With a goal of eradicating structures of poverty, citizens aided by microfinancial tools should be better suited to assert control of their food production and to create intentional intra-community food connections, rather than being subject to unfair interregional or global trade.

Food Security, Performance Indicators

The following indicators respectively demonstrate improvements to quantity, quality, equity, and dependency of food consumed.

FOOD CONSISTENCY AND STABILITY

Members of the Grameen Bank gained (to an extent) price-control over exploitative local traders and monopolists.²⁴ This allows group members to function with a collective social and financial strength, reducing the potential for local exploitation. This, in turn, improves agricultural consistency and long-term planning capabilities, as farmers can begin to count on base prices for their crops.

In Kabeer's 2005 study, food shortages were compared between new and mature members of microfinance groups. Four of five groups experienced improvement in food security, food sufficiency and/or a reduction in food shortages (CYSD, India; PRADAN, India; SHARE, India;

²⁴ Madeley, 2002, p. 102

and CARD, Philippines); one group experienced no significant change (LAPO, Nigeria).^{25,26} Clients of SAT, based in Ghana, self-reported that poverty-based hunger decreased by half between new and mature members.²⁷ The geographic dependency of these results is prominent, and likely dependent on larger socio-political factors and policy. However, all groups operated in communities that experienced ubiquitous hunger and food shortages, and the greater the relative food scarcity, the better the improvement between new and mature group members.

HEALTH AND DIET

Kabeer's study of PRADAN and CYSD clients in India self-reported increased consumption of higher-value foods (those rich in proteins), improvement in consumption standards, and increased nutritional value.²⁸ No information was provided as to what informational campaigns were included that may have directly affected this.

In a more holistic study, Sharma and Buchenrider found mixed results. Participants in Bangladesh showed improved caloric intake but no improvement to child nutrition; those in Malawi experienced neither; and those in China and Madagascar saw improvements to caloric intake only. Participation was higher by families who experienced seasonal food shortages, periods during which credit was found to have the largest effect.²⁹ While any improvements are far from universal, no studies reports on microfinance having any adverse effects.

GENDER-BASED FOOD POVERTY

²⁵ Kabeer, 2005, pp. 72–74

²⁶ SAT (Ghana) did not report on food in Kabeer's study

²⁷ Opoku, 2005, pp. 117–118

²⁸ Kabeer, 2005, p. 73

²⁹ Sharma and Buchenrider, 2002, pp. 228–229

Hamad and Fernald's 2010 study (2007 data) of Peruvian microfinance clientele found positive correlation between length of participation and: (1) reduced food insecurity for women; (2) improved female health, indicated by higher haemoglobin.³⁰ However, the gender-based effect was significantly influenced by the fact that 90% of respondents were, expectedly, female. Nonetheless, microfinance attempts to achieve gender equality by targeting women, specifically, so the sample demographics should not detract from improvements to female health, especially since this indicates that women are directly benefiting from their participation, rather than having increases in food propagate existing gender inequalities.

Another Peruvian study (2011) found that providing health education to microcredit members did not improve child health status, though this was not analyzed by gender.³¹ This suggests that microcredit's ability to reduce gender-based health inequality may be independent of supplementary social programs.

Correspondingly, a 2008 study of food security in rural Malawi found that female access to microcredit led to increased long-term nutrition for girls below the age of seven, but not for boys, and increased household expenditures on food. Men's access to microcredit did not have any positive effects.³² This not only supports the conjecture that access to microfinance should improve food-related gender inequality, but also reaffirms the importance of providing microfinancing to women, specifically. However, there is contention in the fact that microcredit leads to increased expenditures on food, representing dependency-based improvement to food security, rather than improving food production and promoting food sovereignty.

³⁰ Hamad and Fernald, 2010, pp. 4–5

³¹ Hamad et. al., 2011

³² Hazarika, 2008

AGROECOLOGY

In another investigation of CYSA members, agroecological benefits were apparent. For example, mature members were almost four times more likely than new members to engage in land bunding as a means of preventing erosion; mature members were also 24 per cent more likely to engage in nutrient-replenishing cultivation methods and 22 per cent more likely to engage in multiple cropping.³³ All of these practices improve farm sustainability, ecological integrity, and productivity. However, the caveat with this study is that programming was targeting at improving agricultural sustainability, so it is not possible to comment on what improvements might be seen if the microfinance component of the program were to be removed.

When compared directly to moneylenders, institutionalized microfinance may provide increased flexibility of crop production methods and inputs, through encouragement of sustainable practices. Loan sharks are more likely to insist on high-value and environmentally-damaging crops and practices, such as high-yield cotton farming.³⁴ In this case, the causal relationship is tenuous, as the removal of the moneylenders' trap and not the availability of microcredit are two positive changes that are analyzed simultaneously.

FOOD DEPENDENCY

Dependence on purchased and/or imported foodstuffs is not addressed by the literature; it would be plausible to suggest that such financial flows are not viewed as problematic. Most reported counts of increased food consumption in high-hunger communities correlated with increased

³³ Dash and Kabeer, 2005, p. 75

³⁴ Aggarwal, 2009, pp. 248–249

food expenditures, though where this money was spent (within or beyond the local community) and the origin of purchased food (communal, regional, or imported) was not mentioned.

Interaction with international powers is not discussed beyond the fact that trade accords and multinational interests are often cited as root causes of food insecurity, in addition to local political corruption.

Negative Impacts of Microfinance

Microfinance can fall victim not only to remaining neutral in the face of food injustice, but also to exacerbating existing challenges or creating new ones. While the potential of creating dependency on MFIs could be argued as a result of improper application of microfinance values, the argument that MFI ideology reaffirms oppressive elements of the status quo reflects an intrinsic component of the movement's philosophy.

CULTURE OF DEPENDENCY

Microcredit should be used as a means, an intermediary between poverty and self-sufficiency. If, instead, it is viewed or used as an ends, then dependency is created. Not only does this build a culture of debt that creates an addiction to credit, but there is also dependency on commodities purchased with such credit.^{35,36} Moreover, in certain villages, microcredit can become a prerequisite for sustenance or success, creating displacement effects: microenterprises that were successful without access to microfinance become replaced by those funded by credit.

³⁵ Shiva, 2006

³⁶ Bateman, 2010, pp. 60–90

This issue is heightened by the fact that most microcredit study methodologies assume the model to be successful, ignoring displacement effects and survivor bias, both resulting from a lack of information from non-participating citizens and dissatisfied former members.³⁷

ADHERING TO THE STATUS QUO

There is strong weight to the argument that microfinance uses the power of money to empower groups and networks, rather than using a rights-based approach (in this case centred on land rights and rights to food) or one rooted in the power of deep democracy and organized citizenry, as a first priority. Microfinance is used as a tool to acquire rights through financial security, rather than asserting rights to achieve financial independence. There is growing issue of MFIs using profitability, rather than increasing social capital, as a means for growth, especially when proponents of microfinance view profitability as a “precondition for sustainable poverty development.”³⁸

For a realist and pragmatic school of thought, this may not be an issue, and may in fact be ideal, but this philosophy is flawed if applied to any movement aimed at challenging oppressive power structures. As Bateman poignantly notes, “it is markets which are being empowered here, not women.”³⁹ In one instance, the Grameen Bank had a tentative partnership with Monsanto, enabling, and encouraging, the bank’s members to purchase the corporations environmentally destructive seeds, dependent on expensive yearly upkeep.⁴⁰

More and more, the goal seems to be to placate poverty, rather than to challenge the fundamental systems that create it. This represents movement toward food security at the expense of food

³⁷ Bateman, 2010, pp. 63–75

³⁸ Copestake et. al., 2005, pp. 1–2

³⁹ Bateman, p. 49

⁴⁰ Bosisia and Ayers, 2010, p. 17

sovereignty. This is evidenced by the fact that MFIs support profitable, but inefficient, farming activities. “An MFI can clearly succeed...and become financially sustainable, but the local agricultural sector is destroyed in the process.”⁴¹

While Bateman’s argument do have an overt level of cynicism, perhaps due to a focus on finding flaws rather than success with microfinance, his work does include successes that arise from alternatives to microfinance. This suggests that, even among microfinance opponents, opposition lies more so with praxis than with theory, and there is demonstrative evidence that the former has much room for improvement.

It becomes difficult to separate the tangible benefits of a microfinance venture (in terms of food security, nutrition, gender-equality, and independence) from the larger, intangible detriments caused by participation in our global financial system. Vandana Shiva comments, rather negatively, on the ill-effects of ‘empowering’ rural Indian women to sell homecare products produced by large multinationals, that were once made by the village women themselves.⁴² Their income may increase, but the effects on their sovereignty, security, and level of systemic co-option can be severe, albeit intangibly measurable.

Gaps in Microfinance Research Findings

The microfinance literature reveals a relative lack of focus on achieving food sovereignty (eradicating structures that create food injustice), in contrast with a strong focus on achieving superficial food security (systemic poverty reduction).

⁴¹ Bateman, 2010, p. 90

⁴² Shiva, 2006

When focusing on community-specific initiatives, there is great difficulty in finding appropriate interregional comparisons. As such, mid-scale results, such as improvements to food independence relative to neighbouring communities or regions, often remain undiscussed, or differing methodologies restrict comparative analysis.

In many studies, there are inherent methodological issues due to a lack of representation from community members who chose not to be a part of the microfinance group. It is unclear if benefits experienced by group members may also be experienced, in part or full, by non-members, which could attribute a portion of success to other factors. This is true of shortcomings as well, though debt-poverty cycle based repercussions of microcredit are not affected by this statistical imperfection.

Lastly, there is a disappointing disconnect between microfinance literature that challenges structures of power and oppression, and those that discuss issues of food security. Model organizations, such as Wesco Credit and Working World, seek to empower by encouraging profitable and financially-sustainable microbusiness. While this process has clear, proven benefits—and challenges corporate power structures—it does not seek to retake control of food production into the hands of members, the people.

Beyond Credit: Food Democracy

Many food movements exist beyond the realm of microfinance, either proposing collaborative programs or taking an entirely different approach to achieving food democracy. In some cases, microfinance could be a complementary tool, while in others, the philosophy is entirely different than the microfinancial approach.

LAND DETERMINATION

Loss of farm ownership and land control creates a cycle of ecological degradation and perpetual poverty. Efficient management of arable land, which is urgently necessary to feed growing populations, is dependent on individual control. A growing number of farmers are forced to rent small plots of workable land, reducing interest in sustainability and innovation—an exacerbation of food insecurity that has not improved over the past decade.^{43,44} However, “when people have land, which they either own or farm under secure tenure, they are likely to grow more food.”⁴⁵ While microfinance typically targets those who are landless or control only a fraction of an acre, there is no directly stated goal, in the microfinance literature, of promoting land ownership and land rights (though this process often accompanies holistic programs involving a microfinance aspect).

EARTH DEMOCRACY

In her 2005 work, Vandana Shiva outlines a plan for ‘food democracy’ as part of a larger scheme of a ‘living earth democracy.’ The model has three pillars, focusing on (1) “democratizing access to land”; (2) “democratizing access to credit”; and (3) “re-linking city and country, consumer and grower.”⁴⁶ In essence, Shiva argues that both food security and food sovereignty can be achieved by combining access to rural microcredit with overarching campaigns to improve self-determination and land rights, through participatory democracy, and improvement social structures that encourage local consumption.

COOPERATIVE MOVEMENTS

⁴³ Magdoff and Tokar, 2010

⁴⁴ Rukuni, 2002, p. 3445S–3446S; Madeley, 2002, p. 81

⁴⁵ Madeley, p. 82

⁴⁶ Shiva, 2005, pp. 164–167

There are a growing number of resistance movements that are able to simultaneously use a grassroots approach, while connecting communities across regions, countries, and even continents. In some cases, this is demonstrated by fair trade initiatives, particularly in the coffee industry, that seek to connect farmers with improved income through negotiation of higher international prices, rather than only through use of microfinance.⁴⁷

La Via Campesina presents a more holistic approach. The movement emerged in 1993 in resistance to neoliberal globalization, with a decentralized, grassroots approach, across multiple sectors and societies. As Demarais argues in her 2008 summary of the Latin American peasant movement, “the ability of a movement to act effectively depends on its capacity to collectively analyze the current global context...[its] commitment to distribute power among all participants and...[to] ensure inclusive democratic decision-making and participation.”⁴⁸ The movement seeks to empower the most marginalized global citizens through a network of community organizations and ideologies that focus on empowering people through their collective action and inherent democratic rights.

In a similar vein, Altieri’s 2010 report outlines how focusing on smallscale, farmer-owned agriculture improves production, efficiency, sustainability, agroecology, and general food security. This shift can come about through the power of rural resistance movements that seek to employ their critical mass to challenge large agrobusiness, multinationals, trade restrictions, and other oppressive forces, with a grassroots approach.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Moving Images, 2007; Kineticvideo, 2005

⁴⁸ Desmarais, 2008, p. 1

⁴⁹ Altieri, 2010

All of these above alternatives have a direct goal of challenging larger structures of power, in an approach that could be deemed ‘democracy from below,’ or in some cases referred to as a ‘trickle up’ approach. While they are fantastic in theory, there exist great obstacles in praxis. Nonetheless, the global peasant resistance movement has seen relative success, as described by Desmarais, and Shiva’s principles of ‘living democracy’ have been employed by organizations such as the Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) in India, among others.

The challenges may be greater than those facing implementation of a microfinance group, but the goals of challenging systemic power are equally greater, and also necessary to achieve true food sovereignty.

Summary: Credit for Food

If there is one thing that might be agreed upon by both proponents and opponents of the microfinance model, it is that its effects are anything but consistent. With respect to achieving food security and sovereignty, its effects include quantitative improvements to security and gender equality, intangible detriments to sovereignty and dependency, and an ability to act as a useful cog as part of much larger social resistance movements. In other cases, microcredit’s ideology is entirely superseded by a demand for holistic systemic change.

A 2002 symposium on addressing threats to African food security lists improved performance of institutions, of which credit is only one example, as only fourth most important of five forces necessary to achieve sustainable food production.⁵⁰ Arguably, this is still the case, as lack of access to credit, insurance, and savings is routinely listed as a primary barrier to improvements in

⁵⁰ Ibid

food security and sustainable agricultural production, while it is also shown that microfinance alone does not address issues of food sovereignty.

For those who believe microfinance's values to be diametrically opposed with their own ideologies, specifically of not being co-opted by an oppressive financial system, the role of MFIs are still unclear. Even those who discuss harsh effects of microfinance reliance (Bateman, Shiva, et. al.) describe situations and models where it is a useful tool—so long as it functions according to its 'for the people, by the people' model.

IS MICROCREDIT WORKING

In 2002, it was believed, "too little capital is flowing into the rural areas and...microfinance initiatives cannot fill the gap. Microfinance also is largely subsidized by other institutions and unsustainable."⁵¹ Though aforementioned case studies argue that this generalization is not presently valid, Bateman (2010) presents valid arguments to that fact that microfinance's current, general direction is tenuous, at best. Yet, within its mandate of empowering (primarily) women to achieve independence through access to financial instruments, microfinance has proven successful in a multitude of cases. What is often lacking is a connection between microcredit and larger movements.

Bateman posits that microfinance can be extremely successful if heterodox methods of delivering it are employed, such as the Vietnamese model. The state's relative 'progressive-ness' in delivering rural finance has caused outrage from the World Bank, especially its Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), and the International Monetary Fund. Yet, from 1993–2004,

⁵¹ Rukuni, 2002, 3446S

the program reduced nation wide poverty by over 65%, with almost no increase to its Gini coefficient, indicating a relative equality in distribution of newfound wealth.⁵²

While it remains unclear as to whether or not microfinance is an inherent force for good, or one for co-option, there is one commonality among the largest success stories: power structures and normalities are directly opposed.

Conclusion: From Security to Sovereignty

As Shiva notes in *Earth Democracy*, “rights cannot be substituted by credit.”⁵³ Rights—to food, land, equality, self-determination, and democracy—are essential to achieve food sovereignty, though food security is often reported despite the absence of some or all of these rights.

Examples in India and Vietnam demonstrate a capacity for microfinance to function as an integral component of larger resistance movements aimed at promoting deep democracy and holistic citizen justice. On the other hand, the indoctrination into normative financial systems that accompanies financial institutions can significantly co-opt any movement aimed at resisting oppression created by global financial institutions.

But, perhaps the situation is best viewed in the grey regions between idealism and pragmatism. *La Via Campesina* demonstrates that successful, grassroots movements that directly oppose neoliberal oppression and inequality can function beautifully without needing to directly address the issue of co-option into financial structures. Whether involvement with global systems is ideologically counterproductive is irrelevant. The focus must be on what factors improve the

⁵² Bateman, 2010, pp. 191–198

⁵³ Shiva, 2006

overall well-being and democratic rights of global citizens. And, in certain cases, microfinance can act as just such a factor.

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EXPRESSION GRAPHICS

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THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

